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Dilthey and the Young Heidegger: 
a Way Toward a Hermeneutics of Dasein 
by WONG Kin-keung 
ABSTRACT 
In the modern development of hermeneutics, it is well-known that there is an 
essential transformation of hermeneutics from Dilthey to Heidegger. While Dilthey 
represents the climax of methodological hermeneutics, Heidegger re-orients the 
essential meaning of hermeneutics immediately after him. He abandons the 
epistemological function of hermeneutics altogether and gives it an “ existential-
ontological turn." After all, hermeneutics becomes constitutive of the Being of 
human existence. 
Concerning the transformation, most scholars tend to emphasize the deficiency of 
Diltheyan hermeneutics and Heidegger's advancement. However, if we look closer 
into the thought path of the young Heidegger, we find that he has virtually re-
formulated and appropriated a lot of insights from Dilthey's Lebensphilosophie for his 
own purpose. My paper intends to reveal this side of story. 
For the purpose of my paper, the young Heidegger primarily means "the early 
Freiburg" period from the War Emergency Semester 1919 ("KNS" thereafter) to 
i 
1923. In KNS, Heidegger was commonly known to have initiated “ the 
phenomenological beginnings" with a “hermeneutic breakthrough. “ The beginning 
and the breakthrough had been developed into “ hermeneutics of facticity" and finally 
“hermeneutics of Dasein" in Being and Time. In KNS and the lecture courses 
thereafter, we can find that a lot of Dilthey's philosophical motives and insights were 
alive in the young Heidegger's path of thought. In order to make the point 
transparent, I generalize the relevant philosophical insights of Dilthey's into the two 
theses: “Behind life thought cannot go" and "To understand life in terms of itself". 
Those of Heidegger's are indicated by two phrases: “the phenomenological 
beginnings" and “ hermeneutic breakthrough". Through comparing these 
generalizations, I shall argue for the internal connection of the philosophical thoughts 
between Dilthey and the young Heidegger, and how it paves the way toward 
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Dilthey is an important philosopher in the modern development of hermeneutics. 
From Schleiermacher, he takes over hermeneutics and broadens its scope from an 
exegesis of the bible to an understanding of human life. Hermeneutics becomes the 
method of Geisteswissenschaften, or human sciences, which is supposed to be 
foundational to all other subsidiary disciplines of human studies such as politics, 
economics, sociology, history, etc. Also, it is well known that there is an essential 
transformation of hermeneutics from Dilthey to Heidegger. While Dilthey 
represents the climax of methodological hermeneutics, Heidegger re-orients the 
essential meaning of hermeneutics immediately after him. He abandons the 
epistemological function of hermeneutics altogether and gives it an 'existential-
ontological turn. ‘ Hermeneutics becomes constitutive of the Being of human 
existence. 
It is usually regarded that the transition is one from the methodological 
hermeneutics to philosophical hermeneutics. Concerning the transition, scholars 
tend to emphasize the break that Heidegger makes from Dilthey. One typical 
example is Gadamer, who especially draws reference to the internal tension between 
Lebensphilosophie and Wissenschaftstheorie within Dilthey's Geisteswissenschaften 
and then illustrates how the problem is overcome through Heidegger's hermeneutic 
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phenomenology in Being and Time {'BT thereafter)/ Dilthey rightly emphasizes 
the significance of experience of life as well as the historical world in human 
sciences. However, as a result of his search for an epistemology of the subject 
matter, the historicity of historical experience is never truly integrated or presented 
for its unmethodical character? Shaking off the shackle of epistemology, the young 
Heidegger returns to the primal happening of life from the very start in order to 
make access to the ‘facticity，’ the locus in which hermeneutics operates. 
Understanding in 'hermeneutics of facticity' is purged of any trace of the 
methodological and the theoretical and becomes a disclosive mode of the Being of 
Dasein. 
Of the two poles of Dilthey's Geisteswissenschaften i.e., Wissenschaftstheorie 
and Lebensphilosophie, between which he let himself gravitate, Gadamer tends to 
polemically over-stress the control of the former in such a way that Dilthey appears 
to be muddle-headed of the essential character of his own problematic. Gadamer's 
analysis is definitely helpful in casting light on the preoccupations of Diltliey's 
philosophy and the Heideggerian way of advancement. Yet, it tends to conceal the 
truth that Heidegger virtually has a lot to inherit from Dilthey, especially his 
Lebensphilosophie. As more and more of Heidegger's early lecture transcripts were 
released and published after his death, we are able to look closer into the connection 
between Dilthey and the young Heidegger . From these publications, we find that 
the young Heidegger had a very intensive and extensive study of Dilthey,s 
philosophy. Diltliey's problematic often appeared as the issue of concern and 
‘See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, translation revised by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald 
G. Marshall (New York : Continuum, 1994), 2nd ed., Part II，I 2&3. Martin Heidegger, Being and 
Time, translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967.) 
2 See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 241. 
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reference in his early lecture courses. Underneath the prima facie evidence that 
Heidegger has broken away from Dilthey, particularly on the meaning of 
hermeneutics, he was actually indebted to a considerable extent to Dilthey for some 
essential means of conceiving the constitution of human existence. More and more 
discoveries from the publications of these early transcripts help to reveal this side of 
the story. 
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In fact, underlying the two poles of Dilthey's Geisteswissenschaften is the 
fundamental motive that Dilthey claims 'to grasp life in its own term.' Life is 
regarded as the ultimate reality, that all aspects of human existence have to be 
referred back to the constitutive characteristics of lived experience [Erlebnis]. The 
world immediate to human beings is not the one constituted of natural phenomena; 
rather, it is a spiritual world, the world lived and endowed with psychic quality. 
The noun ‘life’ may easily mislead people into conceiving life as an object or natural 
phenomenon. Dithey especially objects to treating life as vital organism, which 
turns life into another kind of natural phenomenon. 
Accordingly, I understand Lebensphilosophie as referring specifically to 
Dilthey's endeavour in exploring the original givenness of life, i.e., the manners in 
which life is lived. Dilthey observes that life is a stream of experience ever flowing 
ill time. However, it is not a blind flux of potentialities impenetrable by thought. 
Rather, life unfolds in terms of its own structural moments, i.e., its relational 
moment to the world and its temporal-developmental moment. Dilthey approaches 
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life in order to find out the ways that life experience is brought into being and the 
conditions that render life understandable. However, Dilthey does not think that 
the task of philosophy should stop there. For him: 
Philosophy accomplishes its task first as a founding discipline or as a theory of 
knowledge. Its givens are all the thought processes that are determined by the 
purpose of producing valid knowledge. Its task lies finally in answering the 
question whether and to what extent knowledge is possible.'^ 
Therefore, Dilthey's Lebensphilosophie provides the basis for his epistemological 
inquiry. It serves as a preliminary step to the quest for a theory of knowledge for 
human sciences, which he refers as Geisteswissenschaften. Arriving at the 
Wissenschaftstheorie of the reality of life, Geisteswissenschaften now has its own 
epistemological foundation, independent from that of natural sciences. 
For the purpose of my thesis, Dilthey's Lebensphilosophie will be brought to a 
prominent place. I shall illustrate to what extent the development of hermeneutics, 
or particularly ‘hermeneutics of facticity’’ in the young Heidegger may be possibly 
attributable to Diltehy's systematic investigation of the original givenness of life. In 
the development, the epistemic character of hermeneutics is renounced, but the 
experiential character of hermeneutics is retained. The being of hermeneutics 
belongs to the being of facticity. The transformation of hermeneutics is, in fact, by 
going back to Diltehy's own motif of 'understanding life in terms of itself and 
finally radicalising it. 'Understanding', in Heidegger, no more takes life as an 
object of interpretation; rather, it is inseparable from factical life in such a way that 
we ultimately live 'understandingly. ‘ From Dilthey's philosophy, the young 
'SW3： 27. 
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Heidegger has actually led the development of hemeneutics all the way towards 
'hermeneutics of Dasein，in BT. Hermeneutics becomes the means by which we 
make explicit the meaning of our existence in each case. In this paper, 'the young 
Heidegger ’ refers primarily to the early Freiburg period starting from the War 
Emergency Semester 1919 (‘KNS，thereafter) to 1923’ during which the way had 
been paved via 'hermeneutics of facticity，towards 'hermeneutics of Dasein.' 
In fact, the Dilthey-Heidegger connection does not limit itself to one or two 
particular points. Illumination of the connection involves identifying the batch of 
inter-related insights in Dilthey, from his different periods of philosophical 
development, and indicating the respective contributions of these insights in the 
development of Heidegger's own hermeneutic project. The task requires, first of all, 
a certain organization of the insights by means of generalization in both parts of 
Dilthey and Heidegger, and the generalization proceeds, particularly by such means 
as to make transparent of the connection between the two philosophers. On the part 
of Dilthey, insofar as my paper is concerned, I generalize his major philosophical 
points under two theses by adducing his own sayings—thesis I: 'Behind life thought 
cannot go’ and thesis II: T o understand life in terms of itself. ‘ On the part of 
Heidegger, since his 'hermeneutics of facticity' also signifies a 'hermeneutic turn' to 
phenomenology, his insights have to be generalized via two aspects, i.e., 
phenomenological and hermeneutic, which are originally intertwined. The 
transformation is commonly known to have substantially initiated in KNS and 
culminates in 'hermeneutics of Dasein' in BT, The connection between Dilthey and 
the young Heidegger is, thus, particularly essential. 
4 BT 10211/ H 72n. 
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According to Kisiel's study in his The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time 
('Genesis‘ thereafter), KNS represents in Heidegger the full identification of the 
tactic and the means to get at it. It indicates his effort to go all out after the factic 
by finding a method to approach it. The breakthrough to the topic is a double play 
of matter (facticity) and method (formal indication), which is drawn under the theme: 
a hermeneutics of faciticty. In the chapter 1 of Genesis, Kisiel traces the various 
intellectual origins of the phenomenological construal of 'facticity' proposed in KNS, 
such as neo-Kantians and Fichte. He particularly relates the breakthrough to Lask's 
distinction between the constitutive categories, which pertain to the matter of the 
domains of reality, and the more formal, general, and so 'empty' reflexive 
categories. There are basic terminological interchanges accordingly, i.e., 
facticity— verum— constitutive matter, and formal indication— unum— reflexive 
forms.5 The facticity refers, in KNS, to the impersonal event of life which is 
‘ontologically different from thins, subjectless as well as objectless.' 'Life befalls 
me, anonymously, impersonally.' ‘I am of It, I find myself in It willy-nilly, already 
under way in existence, Kisiel frames the overall breakthrough concisely with two 
phrases of inter-related significance: 'Phenomenological Beginnings' and 'the 
Hermeneutic Breakthrough'. ? Being led away from Husserl's phenomenon of 
transcendental consciousness, the phenomenon in KNS beginnings is identified with 
‘the primal something' or the factic event (facticity) of our being. For such an 
altered sense of phenomenon, phenomenology requires an alternative means to get 
5 See the discussion of Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time ('Genesis‘ 
thereafter； (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1993), chapter 1 and especially p.25-30. 
6 Kisiel, Genesis, 24-5. 
7 Kisiel, Genesis, 21. The English translated term 'lactic' in Kisiel's Genesis appears to be as 
'factical' in the translations of other scholars'. Accordingly, I keep to 'fectic' when quotation is 
adapted from Genesis and 'fectical' when quotation is adapted from other translations. 
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at it. It entails a ‘hermeneutic breakthrough' to the issue in order to arrive at the 
method proper to the matter. Such method is shown to be 'formal indication.‘ 
For the purpose of my paper, I shall adopt the two phrases to generalize 
Heidegger's insights, matching their relevance and relationship with Dilthey's. In 
Kisiel's analysis, Dilthey's philosophy is relatively marginalised in KNS. However, 
I find that the thematic in the 'phenomenological beginnings' is, in certain sense, a 
continuation of Dilthey's thesis of 'Behind life thought cannot go.， The 
identification of facticity in KNS and the lecture courses thereafter, if understood 
properly, draws considerable reference to the Diltheyan theme of 'original givenness 
of life'. Thus, I shall see 'the phenomenological beginnings', as the search for 
faciticity, from the perspective of Diltheyan contribution. Furthermore, such 
Dilthey-Heidegger relation is led further to 'the hermeneutic breakthrough'. The 
breakthrough finally renders hermeneutics an ontological sense, which is totally 
different from Dilthey's epistemic hermeneutics. However, in that transformation, 
Heidegger virtually has a lot to learn from Dilthey's another thesis: ‘To understand 
life in terms of itself.' 
The complexity of my paper consists, first, in identifying the relevant insights 
from the two philosophers and generalizing them into thematic formulations, i.e., 
the two Diltheyan theses, and Heidegger's double themes in KNS; secondly, making 
explicit of the internal logical connections of these thematic formulations; and 
thirdly, illustrating the overall wholesale adaptation of Dilthey's insights in 
Heidegger's project. However, my paper does not mean to suggest that the 
appropriation is a passive adaptation or continuation. Rather, we shall see that, in 
the very continuation of Dilthey's problematic, Heidegger has virtually transformed 
7 
those Diltheyan philosophical insights creatively for his own purpose of radicalizing 
them towards existential-ontological quest. By that means, Dilthey's problematic, 




Prelude: The Two Broadly Generalized Theses of Dilthey's Project 
Apart from some passing accentuated appreciative remarks regarding Dilthey's 
philosophical contributions, Heidegger has never indicated his connection with 
Dilthey's philosophy in direct and positive terms. Detailed appraisal of Dilthey's 
philosophy, as the Kassel Lecture in 1926, turns out to be something that Heidegger 
has to criticize and advance.^ Meanwhile, the outlooks and the use of conceptual 
means in Dilthey's epistemological project and Heidegger's existential-ontological 
inquiry are very different. One may risk the error of assuming too much by 
claiming any direct and remarkable connection between the two thinkers. 
Nevertheless, if we digress a bit from the concrete formulation of theses, and trace 
them back to the more original form of philosophical motives, such connection will 
emerge in a more transparent and less arbitrary configuration. Yet, both of their 
philosophical projects are of such massive magnitude. The philosophical motives 
that they share in common will be of interrelated manifold. One-to-one matching of 
these motives and insights will only render the analysis trivial, loose and 
unsystematic. In order to avoid this, I try to conclude the relevant philosophical 
motives of Dilthey and Heidegger under some broadly generalized theses, and make 
them comparable in a more focused and systematic manner accordingly. 
8 Martin Heidegger, ‘Wilhelm Dilthey's Research and the Struggle for a Historical Worldview', 
Supplements : from, the Earliest Essays to Being and Time and Beyond {'Supplements'' thereafter)， 
John van Buren ed. (Albany : State University of New York Press, 2002), ch. 10. 
9 
On the part of Dilthey, the theses are derived from Dilthey's own sayings: 
'Behind life thought cannot go.，(thesis I) and T o understand life in terms of 
itself.，(thesis II) Below we shall see what philosophical motives are included in the 
two theses. 
10 
(a) Thesis I: Behind life thought cannot go. 
(i) Against Hegel and British Empiricism 
Dilthey is mostly acknowledged for his pursuit of Geisteswissenschaften, the 
human studies with an independent method and epistemological validity from natural 
sciences. Before going into the epistemological issue, let us draw attention to 
certain aspects of the coined term, Geisteswissenschaften. 
Geistes- resonates the tradition of German idealism culminating in Hegel's 
'Absolute Spirit'. From Kant, who is intent to delineate the limits of reason, Hegel 
empowers reason with a transcending function over knowable limits. He projects it 
as something unconditioned and absolute, capable of developing and revealing itself 
in history. The underlying motive is to make world and history a scenario of 
spiritual forces emerging from partiality to totality. Geist manifests itself 
progressively into the real. In the concepts of thought the ideal content of reality is 
fully comprehended. By purging every trace of sensory perception, reason comes to 
grasp the true reality in terms of ideality. Reason operates with experiential content 
at preliminary level, but as it pushes forth for higher calibre of the ideal, the 
intuitive content and immediate feelings of the world have to be transcended. In the 
progress of Geist reason transcends it's limits posted by experience to pure ideal 
reality. Therefore, logic is no more static and formal in Kantian sense, but devised 
as dialectical. It is a 'logic of becoming', witnessed in the evolution of life as 
historically unfolded. Behind the phenomena of life is the activity of Geist 
motivated out of the dialectical logic of reason. Hence Hegel's logic is both 
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ontological and historical. It depicts the process that raises the ceaseless flow of life 
and development to conceptual knowledge. The fixity of concepts is overcome by 
making thought fluid and concepts concrete? In this sense, the dialectic is a method 
illuminating the operations of thought-cum-reason on the one hand, and the 
historical manifestations and culmination of life-cum-Gd对 towards the being of 
'Absolute Spirit' on the other. In the finality of Geist, all tension and distinction 
between subject and object, spirit and nature, thought and being, 'ought' and ‘is, are 
distinguished and united. At that stage, the rational is real and the real is rational. 
Nevertheless, no matter how much Hegel draws reference to life and history in 
order to illustrate the dialectical reason of Geist advancement, the ideality of thought 
and reason is all the more triumphed over the polymorphous experiential contents of 
life and history. Between thought and life, the theoretical balance is skewed all the 
way to the former. In the guise of the plasticity of logic and speculation is a virtual 
dogmatism that crams the manifestations of life into the plastic box of Dialectics. 
The unfolding of life is rendered a function of reason, an exegesis of thought. The 
metaphysics of idealism points towards the rational finality of Geist, and every 
move of Hegel's speculative method virtually serves to explain the logic of certain 
fixated pattern of progress. Consequentially, to the ultimate reality of 'Absolute 
Spirit' are the experiential contents of life and historical phenomena sacrificed. To 
metaphysical schemas is historical understanding sacrificed/® 
9 GS 4:236-7. To be quoted from Michael Emiartli, Wilhelrn Dilthey: the Critique of Historical 
Reason (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1978)，49. 
10 GS 4: 249. To be quoted from Michael Ermartli, Wilhelrn Dilthey: the Critique of Historical 
Reason�50. 
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Critical as Dilthey is towards Hegelian idealism, his reflection upon it helps to 
shape his own position. In his later major work ‘The Formation of the Historical 
World in the Human Sciences he borrowed from Hegel the term 'objective spirit'. 
He strips off its ideal construction, simply to connect it with the reality of life and 
history. 'Once objective spirit is extricated from its one-sided foundation in a 
universal reason that expresses the essence of world-spirit, and from ideal 
constructions, a new conception of it becomes possible that encompasses language, 
custom, every form and style of life,' and thus is capable of serving as an operative 
concept of Geisteswissenschaften. ^^ In fact, Dilthey admits the dynamic character 
of life that the term Geist captures. There are also fears that its theoretical 
application will mislead the readers with its speculative connection and idealistic 
tradition. This he tries to guard against. Dilthey notes that thought is fruitful only 
when it is based upon the investigation of some aspect of the real. Accordingly, the 
living reality has to be consulted neither speculatively nor assertively, but 
thoughtfully in accordance with its own empirical experiential characteristics. The 
empiricism of John Stuart Mill is stimulating in this regard. 
Mill's work, ‘System of Logic’ generated great influence on Germany after 
the mid-19山-century. As a counter-current to the rationalist tradition it proposed 
that philosophy be rested upon principle generalized from demonstrable empirical 
facts. Rather than from rationalist intuition or deduction, knowledge is derived 
from logical connections of common experiences, from propositions generalized by 
observation and induction. Knowledge in this sense is regional and varies from one 
particular case to another, rather than being comprehensive and self-contained. 
“ S W 3: 173. 
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Empirical facts and logical induction are the sole grounds of judgments. Knowledge 
departing from these grounds is only an objective disguise of arbitrariness and 
prejudice. 
Though Dilthey shares with British empiricism on the primacy of factual 
experiences, he finds that there are limitations. Empiricism presupposes the pre-
dominance of natural sciences, and relegates philosophy to the bases of naturalism 
and scientific realism. The natural causality and its method of investigation become 
the basic assumption and the model approach to explain all phenomena, including 
the mental and the social. With its intent to distil all traces of metaphysical 
conception, empiricism dispels any affirmation of meanings, value judgments and 
mental qualities as either 'un-clarified facts', or being insignificant to causal 
relations. The empiricist claim of valid knowledge has its footing solely on naked 
observable experiences, to which all human factors, social factors, or cultural 
factors are reduced. For Dilthey, empiricism rightly sticks its philosophical eye to 
common experiences, but wrongly confines them to such a limited scope that the full 
spectrum of the concrete I-ness and its lived experiences are simply obliterated. 
Furthermore, the naturalistic tendency in social sciences renders social and historical 
phenomena to be accounted in accordance with the principle of causality. 
Determinism is for them the necessary presupposition of a science of society, and 
consequently, the self-active T is for them an illusion of the 'intuitive' standpoint/? 
12 GS 4: 538-9. To be quoted from Michael Ermartli, Wilhelm Dilthey: the Critique of Historical 
Reason’ 7 3 . 
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(ii) The personalistic tendency and the primacy of life 
An important move towards establishing Geisteswissenschaften in Dilthey is 
the intent to rescue a methodology for the study of life as a foundation to all human 
sciences independent of the predominance of naturalistic causal explanation. The 
epistemological motive draws him close to the philosophical schools of Kant, Locke 
and Mill who explore the foundation and valid method of human knowledge. 
However, his good acquaintance with historical knowledge and the affluence of 
human experiences makes him unsatisfied with the direction these schools have 
taken towards 'experience'. Dilthey finds himself frequently in agreement with these 
epistemological schools, but has to hold in reservation their explanation of 
experience and cognition in terms of facts that are merely representational. The 
reason is, by that means, 'no real blood flows in the veins of the knowing subject 
constructed, but rather the diluted extract of reason as a mere activity of thought.'" 
In his understanding, the scope of knowledge should not be limited to the derivation 
from representational or naturalistic experiences, but expanded to cover the 
manifold human powers of willing, feeling and thinking. 
Closely related to this line of complaint is the philosophy of subjectivity 
descending from Descartes. Upon establishing the sole certainty of cogito, 
Descartes renders the pure thinking subject the final indubitable reality of the 
universe. The world has, thus, to be accounted with reference to the construction of 
subjectivity. The philosophy of subjectivity has such an arche that the solipsistic 
tendency of the subject remains the over-shadowing issue for the philosophers of this 
i3sw 1: 50. 
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tradition. The existence of the world as a whole is often called into question. 
The solution sought in Kant's transcendental philosophy renders the sensory 
experience of the world to be constructed according to the orderly operation of the 
cognitive faculty of the subject. The cognitive activities and rational thinking are 
fundamental in securing the existence of the self and the world. Thus, 'thinking' has 
the primacy over the self and the world. 
Diltliey's philosophy has totally different point of entry. His 'standpoint of life' 
has, from the very beginning, repudiated the separation between self and the world. 
From the perspective of mere representation, our belief in the reality of the external 
world is limited to its phenomenality. Yet, for the whole human being who wills, 
feels, and represents, external reality is given simultaneously and with as much 
certitude as his own self. That which is independent of us, whatever its spatial 
characteristics, is thus given as part of life, not as a mere representation/"^ 
111 life, the external world is not known, ‘by virtue of an inference from effects 
to causes. ‘ These representations of cause and effect are themselves only 
abstractions from our volitional life.'^^ Therefore, the primacy of (cognitive) 
thinking in modern philosophy is made subordinate to the fundamental reality of life. 
However, it is not to overthrow the doctrine of the 'thinking I.’ Rather, 'the horizon 
of experience' has to be expanded to include 'thinking' as one of the experiential 
moments. The existence of external world and alter ego, the certainty of which is 
dubious in Cartesian tradition, have their certitude in the expanded horizon of 
experience. For Dilthey, 'an external world and other life-units are given together 
14 SW 1： 51. 
” S W 1: 51. 
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with our own life-unit. 
Dilthey in his Introduction to the Human Science {Einleitung - thereafter) noted 
that, 'in the real life-process, willing, feeling and thinking are only different 
aspects.，i7 ‘Life’ has a larger (or in fact an all-encompassing) parameter than 
'thought'. Thinking, or thought, is merely a means in which 'life' finds its 
expressions. Thus arises the thesis that, ‘behind life thought cannot go.’ 
Life itself, the living reality behind which I cannot go, contains connections, 
which hold the key to explaining all experience and thought. And it is here that 
the decisive point lies for the entire possibility of knowledge. We have 
knowledge of reality only because life and experience contain the framework, 
which we find in the forms, principles and categories of thought, only because 
we can show that framework analytically in life and experience/^ (Dilthey's 
italics) 
Accordingly, Dilthey often refers to life as the fundamental reality with its own 
experiential connections, i.e. life-nexus, and ‘it is always its own proof.' Then, if 
knowledge about life is at all possible, it must not be given in the Kantian way in 
which life is treated as appearance and knowledge is to be based on ‘ the assumption 
of a rigid epistemological a priori.' It has to originate from the vividness of lived 
experience. 
The psychical experience of life has to be related to the wholeness of human 
being, who is understood as a concrete person being capable of willing, feeling and 
” S W 1: 51. 
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thinking. The psychical event is understood as event of 'spirit and person. "9 The 
return to personal istic experience means to supplant the primacy of cognition in 
modern philosophy with the primacy of lived experience. Thought becomes one of 
many ways that life expresses itself. 
(iii) Brief conclusion of the thesis 
The initial impetus that motivates Dilthey to search for the original given iiess 
of reality is the acute observations regarding the flaws that those philosophies inflict 
upon the understanding of life. Such flaws include the one-sided intellectualism of 
metaphysics, the rigidity of Kantian epistemological a priori, and atomistic 
investigation of life in terms of causal relation in empiricism, etc. For Dilthey, the 
error they commit in common is that life is forced to appear in the form of 
knowledge {Erkenntnis) by means of certain pre-determined conceptual detour. 
Dilthey reverses the tendency by claiming the primacy of the fundamental reality of 
life and the sub-ordinate status of thinking as well as the derivative character of 
conceptual knowledge. It is the experiential character of life that contains, 'the 
entire possibility of knowledge', and the knowledge of reality is possible only 
because lived experience comprises, 'the framework which we find in the forms, 
principles, and categories of thought. ‘ Thinking or thought is merely a means in 
which life finds its expression. Finally, the thesis, 'Behind life thought cannot go， 
leads towards the search for the original given ness of life. 
Martin Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, translated by Theodore Kisiel 
(Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1985), 116. 
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(b) Thesis II: To understand life in terms of itself, 
(i) Against Nietzsche 
With German Idealism and dogmatic character reaching its zenith in the first 
half of the century, it began to dig it's own tomb. Hegelian idealism fails to 
stand valid to actual historical happenings. Except for maintaining an internal 
theoretical coherence of speculative abstraction, the all-encompassing explanatory 
function of dialectical logic turned out explaining nothing. Eventually, it gave rise 
to revolts from different camps of philosophy. Nietzsche is one of them. 
Nietzsche espouses life with its full magnitude while despising the efficacy of 
thought. He launches a battle against rationalism for it impedes the natural 
proceeding of life by mutilating it rather than giving life its own due. The 
Nietzschean view of life is deemed irreconcilable with rational thought and science. 
Its origin lies beyond all knowledge and resists conceptualisation. Life is manifested 
through incessant acts of will-to-power, from which the reality of man is being 
fabricated, while knowledge is but counted as another form of wilful assertion. As 
a result, the truthful claim of knowledge is a mere, Vital lie', the kind that man 
cannot live without. Life is to be lived out for its practical value of self-assertive 
heroism. Thus, Nietzsche deprecates thought and reason for their failure to 
penetrate the opaqueness of life, and denounces them for hampering the will to 
power. 
Dilthey is well aware of the prominent place that Nietzsche confers to the 
'practical life' which resists any prior theorizing, but the Nietzchean individualistic 
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and anti-historical interpretation of human life sound for him mystical, irrational at 
the beginning, and nihilistic in the end. The major reason is that life is 
individualized and withdrawn from its social and historical contexts, rendering any 
attempt to make sense of life impossible. Only an elevated subject of heroic 
morality is left to engage itself in overcoming all historical and moral impositions. 
Without considering the inevitableness of historical and culturally interactive 
dimensions of human existence, Nietzsche induces arbitrariness upon life rather than 
illuminating it according to its own right. Separating life from thought only makes 
life even more beyond grasp. Of that reflection, Dilthey remarks: 
The highest and most important task of all philosophy lies in the securing of 
valid knowledge. For the progress of mankind is conditioned in the modern 
period by its guidance through scientific knowledge; this knowledge must be 
secured against dark feeling and the arbitrariness of subjectivity— and the 
sceptical spirit, which accompanies b o t h , 
(ii) The predicament of the Historical School 
Before Dilthey came to grip with philosophical studies he had been a well-
professed intellectual of historical study with keen interest in a variety of arts. His 
affluent knowledge of both history and aesthetics enabled him to envision a much 
broader and richer content of what human experiences can encompass. By means of 
the early term 'lived experience', or the later 'the objectifications or manifestations 
of life' where Dilthey tries to include the broadest possible sense of life experiences 
20 GS 4: 200. To be quoted from Michael Ermartli, Mlhelm Dilthey: the Critique of Historical 
Reason, 8 9 . 
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as far as they are concretely and historically experiential. Such sense of experience 
is a far cry from the epistemological schools of his time, which delimit experiences 
within the sensory given-ness. Nor are biologism and traditional metaphysics able 
to capture the psychic quality of life on its own right. 
Unlike natural science that deals with narrow definition of experience given to 
human cognitive faculty, Geisteswissenschaften as a 'science' is composed of 
complex mental facts which are structured in terms of part-whole relations. The 
empirical method of Geisteswissenschaften requires that, ‘we establish the value of 
the particular procedures necessary for inquiry on the basis of the subject matter of 
the human sciences and in a historical-critical m a n n e r . H e emphasizes that, 'the 
nature of knowledge in the human sciences must be explicated by observing the full 
course of human development.'^ Life experience is necessarily developmental and 
historical. Historical studies become an inseparable part of Geisteswissenschaften. 
However, when Dilthey turned his eye to the Historical School of his time, he found 
that it 
was characterised by a purely empirical mode of observation, sympathetic 
immersion in the details of the historical process, a universal approach to 
history aiming to determine the value of a particular state of affairs solely from 
the context of its development. This school considered spiritual life as 
historical through and through and approached social theory historically, 
seeking the explanations and rules of contemporary life in the study of the past. 
2' SW 1: 57. 
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New ideas flowed from it through countless channels into all the particular 
disciplines.^ 
As a result of lacking philosophical foundation, the historical approach becomes the 
interplay of ideas without a uniform methodology of its own. As a result, it allows 
a leeway for positivists and empiricists to impose principles and methods from the 
natural sciences upon the humanistic-historical realm. Though such adaptation is 
able to arrive at analytically refined results; yet for Dilthey, historical reality is 
rendered truncated, mutilated and impoverished by assimilating it into the concepts 
and methods of natural sc iences . On the other hand, if the historical account of 
human life as a whole goes without its own epistemological basis, different 
philosophical schools will arbitrarily depict the picture of life. The continuation of 
such milieu but only speaks for the fact that 'life' in general is still far from being 
understandable. 
(iii) A brief conclusion of the thesis. 
Dillthey often speaks of life as inscrutable, ineffable, unfathomable and 
essentially puzzling and mysterious. Yet, life being like that is one thing, the 
persistent failure of philosophy to grasp the 'Wissen' of it is another. Different 
philosophical schools misrepresent the richness of historical life by different means, 
either by mutilating 'life' into atomic sensory given-ness or by attenuating its rich 
meanings through speculation. Even the historical studies of his time lacked the 
philosophical efficacy to address the fundamental reality of life. As a way out of the 
23 SW 1: 48. 
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predicament, Dilthey found his dominating philosophical impulse in the desire to 
understand human life in its own terms. The Lebensphilosophie heralded by Dilthey 
intends such a philosophy that 'life', in the broadest sense of the term, emerges for 
the first time as the proper subject matter of philosophical reflection. Life is 
historical and all encompassing, and there is no cognitive stance standing away from 
life that makes knowledge of life possible. It is an infringement of life to bring it 
under investigation of any pre-established analytical framework. Any conceptual 
elucidation of life, if possible, has to originate from the way life 'expresses' itself 
temporally. Immediate knowledge {Wissen) of life is there in life-course. In fact, 
there exists a reciprocal relation of conceptualisation and immediate experience. It 
is only by means of the mediation of thought and concepts that lived relations, 
immediately experienced and yet indeterminately present, are made determinate. 
Jacob Owensby rightly concludes that the function of thought is to, 'articulate 
relations already given in lived experience, an articulation that does not distort lived 
experience.(My emphasis) 
The attempt to delineate as 'descriptive psychology', in an early period, is to 
describe faithfully how life comes into being, i.e. the psychic facts of consciousness 
with respect to its nexus. Also, as life has its own expressive means and expresses 
itself in time, life is essentially a productive system of meaningful content. 
Construction of knowledge about historical life at reflective level has to follow the 
productive course of life by interpreting the collected parts of, 'life objectifications', 
back to the psychic wholeness of meaning. This is the method of Verstehen, or 
'understanding'. It was first raised and remained undeveloped in Einleitung when 
Jacob Owensby, Dilthey and the Narrative of History (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1994), 36. 
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Dilthey was still occupied with the approach of 'descriptive psychological. ‘ As his 
philosophical position gravitated towards 'the Critique of Historical Reason' after 
1900，the importance of Verstehen was elevated to become the sole method of 
Geisteswissenschaften.^^ It is a conscious effort in extending the application of 
hermeneutics from the hand of Schleiermacher, who regards the bible as the sole 
text open to interpretative exegesis, to a far broader realm in which the all-
encompassing world of human spirit, with the manifold life manifestations, emerges 
to be the textual objects of interpretation. Eventually, it leads towards the quest for 
an epistemic hermeneutics. 
There was a well-noted transition of philosophical treatise in Dilthey. His early psychological 
treatise had ever been attacked by his friend Ebbinghaus, to which he foiled to make response. 
Plantiiiga remarks that 'sometime between 1896 and 1900 lie began to have serious doubts about the 
new psychology as a basis for the Geisteswissenschaften. His 1900 essay on 'Die Entsteliuiig der 
Hermeiieutik' is the first solid indication of the emergence of a new position, (towards the method of 
Verstehen). ‘ {Historical Understanding in the Thought of Wilhelrn Dilthey, 55.) As the discussion has 
no direct relevance to my paper, I skip it, in order not to side-track into triviality. But for detail of the 
transition, see Planginga's Historical Understanding in the Thought of Wilhelm Dilthey�cli. 3. 
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Chapter 2 
Toward the Original Givenness of Life 
(a) Erlebnis as the Nexus of Facts of Consciousness 
One of Dilthey's philosophical motives is to rescue an independent study method 
of Geisteswissenschaften from the domination of the scientific method of natural 
science. Dilthey pushes the inquiry, first of all, towards distinguishing the difference 
between experiences of the external natural world and the more primordial experience 
of life. For Dilthey, the distinction is founded on the nature of experience, outer or 
inner. While from the perspective of mere representation, the external world always 
remains a phenomenon, given to the life as outer experience. Yet, in reality, 
That which is independent of us, whatever its spatial characteristics, is thus given 
as part of life, not as a mere representation. We know this external world not by 
virtue of an inference from effects to causes or some corresponding process. 
Rather, these representations of cause and effects are themselves only abstraction 
from our volition life?' 
In Einleitung, Dilthey broadens the horizon of experience to describe the inner 
state of life. Both inner and outer experiences can be related back to life that Dilthey 
sees as 'psycho-physical life-units', in which the mental side of life cannot be isolated 
from its physiological side. For example, the abundance and liveliness of one's 
27 SW 1： 51. 
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representations, the strength and direction of acts of will are in many ways dependent 
on changing conditions within one's nervous system. The volitional impulses of the 
will tend to induce various bodily changes.^^ Therefore, Dilthey comes to the 
conclusion that, the mental life of a man is part of the psychophysical life-unit, which 
is the form in which human existence and human life are manifested. Only by means 
of abstraction is mental life separable from that psychophysical life-unit. The system 
of these life-units is the reality, which constitutes the subject matter of the social-
historical sciences. 29 
With reference to the characterization above, Dilthey means, basing on the 
Wissen of life, to rescue a sense of experience that he calls Erlebnis, from the 
commonly known Erfahrung. It comes from the verb erleben which means ‘to live' 
or ‘to experience (something) in life'. Erlebnis is the experience that 'lived' 
immediately in an ‘inner’ or subjective sense as our ownness. It is used in contrast 
to the term Erfahrung of which Kant has made use. Erfahrung refers to the sensible 
experiences of the nature, which are given to us externally. Erlebnis is in possession 
of its givens and the phenomena of Erlebnis are given with certainty, whereas 
Erfahrung confronts its givens. The objects of Erfahrung are, at the least, partly 
products of in ference .Fur thermore , Erlebnis is not a discrete experience, but a 
unit of experience held together in a common meaning. 
That which forms a unity of presence in the flow of time because it has a 
unitary meaning is the smallest unit definable as a lived experience. Each 
more comprehensive unity of the parts of a life that is linked by a common 
28 SW 1: 67. 
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30 See Rudolf A.Makkreel, Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Studies (N.J. : Princeton University 
Press, 1992.) 147. 
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meaning we also call a 'lived experience, ‘ even when the parts are separated by 
intervening events. ^ ^ 
Erlebnis refers not to a blind flowing stream of life but to a unitary sense of life 
experienced with meaning. The life to be lived as an inner meaningful immediacy 
constitutes the basic manners in which human beings exist in the world. It captures 
the wholeness of the human being who is capable of willing, feeling and representing. 
All are experienced as the interplay of volitional, emotive and cognitive processes. 
These qualities and life-processes of ‘real blood' are lived out in structural unity of 
Erlebnis, from which the meaningful immediacy is disclosed. 
Dilthey regards all science as experiential and the major task of philosophy 
consists in securing knowledge with a solid philosophical foundation for the 
experienceable object. The philosophical foundation is related back to the conditions 
and context of consciousness in which all experiences arises. It is from these (mental) 
facts of consciousness that the reality of human world is derived. Unlike the natural 
sciences that engage with causal explanation of sensory experiences or outer 
experience, Geisteswissenschaften involves descriptive analysis of the facts of 
consciousness given in inner experience. By asserting life as a psychophysical unit, 
Dilthey brings the manifold of inner and outer experiences into an integrated unified 
base: 'the nexus of the inner facts of consciousness.， The Principle of 
Phenomenality dictates that everything given to me in inner and outer experience is 
only there-for-me as a nexus of fects of my consciousness.^^ The reality of life 
experienced as Erlebnis can only be grasped with the analysis of what is given to me 
in my consciousness, and such life reality experienced in consciousness is not isolated 
31 SW 3: 216. 
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chunks, but always given in the 'totality of psychic life.’，� In the 'totality of psychic 
life’ we find the most elementary form of life, in which the interplay of cognitive, 
emotive and volitional processes takes place. This is what we turn to in the next 
session. 
SW 1: 264. 
28 
(b) The Relational Dimension of Life. 
(i) The Psychic Structural Nexus of Erlebnis 
The principle of the totality of psychic life dictates that，'the methodological rule 
(of human sciences) in accordance with which analysis and explanation of the facts of 
consciousness, including perceptions and other intellectual operations, must be 
carried out: consciously referring to the whole of psychic life and to the nexus found in 
it.，34 By characterizing life as psychic nexus, Dilthey moves on to analyse the three 
major capacities of human life— cognition, feeling and willing— into inner structural 
relations. It is a means to explicate the sense of 'inner' (lived) experience, within the 
psychic nexus of which the empirical given of representations, judgments, feelings, 
desires, acts of will are always interwoven into a web of inner relations. These 
relations, according to Dilthey, ‘form a main part of the developed psychic nexus, 
according to its permanent uniform existence. 
Of these relations, emphasis is drawn to the systematic nexus of the inner 
relations holding among perceptions, remembered representations, judgments, 
combinations of judgments and such other psychic activities. In order to simplify the 
point, let's consider the case of being scared by a coil of rope that I have mistaken for 
a snake. The perceptual object is finally found out to falsify my judgment, but the 
attitudinal state of affeirs— including the scary feeling and the falsely perceived snake 
as a whole— is there, being objectively true for me. Unlike traditional epistemology 
34 SW 1: 264. 
SW 3: 46. 
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that seeks the truth of reality in terms of the correspondence between the ideas of the 
objects and the material determination of the objects, Dilthey refers 'objective reality' 
to the structural state of affairs that we experience as connected fects of consciousness 
or psychic nexus. Let's see in closer details of the psychic nexus. 
Experience immediately lived arises from a certain determinate mode of 
consciousness and its content. The objectivity of lived experiences points to the 
content, to be conscious of ('the perceived coil of rope') together with its related 
conscious mode (the scare). As the givenness of perception, imagination, judgment 
and feeling vary in content, it necessarily comes under the modifications of 
consciousness, which are experienced as 'attitudes'. My perceptual attitude with its 
relation to an object is just as much a lived experience as my feeling about something 
or my willing something. Lived experience is first of all the structural unity of 
attitudes and contents, and the certainty of itself is immediately experienced. 
We strive for a goal, care about somebody or take a look at the notice一- all 
these are lived experiences with clearly different attitudinal relations from one another. 
Dilthey also notes that, though ‘lived experience is first of all the structural unity of 
attitudes and (their related) contents, some lived experiences may have a psychic 
structural nexus constituted by attitudinal relations without noticeable, distinguishable 
content. For example, in the experience of drives, there appear states in which no 
definite object-representation is combined in striving. There are possibilities of lived 
experience that do not contain a relation of a sense content to an act, to a feeling or 
str iving? However, psychic attitude is always there, alternating from situation to 
SW 3： 46. 
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situation. Therefore, the universal condition for anything being there for me—by 
means of consciousness or lived experience—must be contained primarily in the kinds 
of attitude found in me.38 That is the origin of the concept of a structural psychic 
nexus, and also the characteristic of psychic life.^^ 
In the more general case, psychic attitude and psychic content, though conjoined, 
are two distinguishable constitutive moments of lived experience and neither of them 
determines the presence of the other. Asking, claiming, wishing and willing are 
examples of modifications of psychic attitudes. Of the same psychic content one may 
have different attitudes while the same attitude can persist over the changing contents. 
In feet, the relation between attitudes and contents undergoes dynamic alteration as 
life flows on. In a case of alteration of outer conditions, one mode of attitude passes 
over into another. A desire can turn into a wish if the conditions of its realization 
vanish. Or an assertion upon the object will change into a doubt or question if the 
relationship of a sense complex to an object has shown itself to be erroneous/® 
The assertion of lived experience is objectively true insofar as it means the 
attitudinal state of affairs in consciousness—the relation between the psychic attitude 
and the psychic content. Psychic nexus understood in terms of attitudinal state of 
affeirs allows us to see 'how' life is experienced rather than 'what' is experienced in 
life. In the life-course, we experience amorphous instances of self and diversification 
of world. However, these do not undermine ‘the objectivity of life' as the structural 
certainty of inner relations is effectual all the way in bringing life and world in 
38 SW 3: 47. 
SW 3: 43. 
40 SW 3: 43. 
31 
attitudinal or modal unity. Diversity of experience is maintained within the structural 
unity of psychic nexus. 
The fluid dynamism of life is thus well structuralized by the alternating moments 
of psychic attitude and content—or Erlebnis with respect to its psychic structure. It is 
the major characteristic of psychic life, and inherent in its structure is immanent 
subjective teleology, the striving towards goals. The teleological structure of life will 
be further explicated in a later session. Now let's look into the relational sense of 
life—how life relates to its world. 
(ii) Objective World with respect to Life-concern. 
In Einleitung, Dilthey distinguishes two kinds of perception, outer and inner. 
By means of outer perception, external objects are given to the five senses and 
represented to me as natural and isolated phenomena. Meanwhile, lived experience 
is given to me by means of inner perception. These experiences are neither discrete 
nor isolated experience but they are connected by inner relations. 'Lived experience', 
as such, has a more basic and larger parameter than empirical experience. Objects 
can be what are given to the senses, but they can be also our lived experience, at least 
partially. The object of outer perception is related to psychic structural nexus as well. 
That about which I feel displeasure via outer perception is related to the psychic 
attitude of displeasure itself. The object-representation, involved in setting a purpose 
is related to the volitional attitude that strives toward the realization of the object-
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image.41 Pure cognitive process that is totally unconnected with psychic nexus is not 
found in the human world.'*^ Inner and outer perceptions are merely two related 
moments of lived experience insofar as objects of outer perception are necessarily 
psychic objects in one way or another. The human world is first of all the psychic 
givenness of 'the objective apprehension' in aggregation. It 'is only the sum total or 
the ordering of what is apprehended as being objective. T h e objective world' is 
one which psychic attitude relates the psychic nexus to, and is primordially given as 
the manifold of psychic contents. Therefore, the world that human beings inhabit is 
the one lived out of the determination of the psychic structural nexus of life. 
As discernible life-unit, the immanent psychic structure of Erlebnis reveals itself 
to be in correlation with our everyday lives. In our everyday lives each one of us is 
involved with people of different backgrounds and relationships in one particular 
matter or situation after another. Life-units act on one another interactively and 
reciprocally so that it gives rise to the meanings that we are capable to have in our 
daily life. We are always in certain conduct and stance toward things and people. In 
fact, each particular life-unit manifests in itself 'life-concern'. Inherent in lived 
experience is the world of life-concern that discloses itself through cognition, feeling 
and willing. The world seen through life-concern is not, first of all, composed of 
discrete physical phenomena. People or things to me are no bare objects which 'do 
not involve pressure or furtherance, the goal of some striving or a restriction on my 
will.' They are 'either already important to me or demand my consideration; they 
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are either close to me or distant, resistant, and strange.’斜 Life-units—being 
functional in terms of objective apprehension, evaluation, and the positing of purposes 
that emerge as different psychic attitudes with countless nuances merging together— 
exist in the sense of our everydayness as ‘life-concern.’ It manifests itself as the 
living comportments to the objects, people and the surroundings that confer 
meaning-relationships between parts and the whole. What we mean by 'significance', 
which appropriates a feet as a meaning-constituent determined by a whole, indeed 
manifests a life-concern.'^^ 
Accordingly, though I am unable to determine what I am about to encounter in 
my daily life; yet, with the efficacy of life-concern, my life-unit is always ready to 
'project' meanings and significance upon every instance of encounter. 
From the specific factual life-concerns that relate the self to things and other 
humans, particular states of life emerge: differentiated states of self, feelings of 
the diminution or intensification of one's existence, desire for an object, fear, or 
h o p e . 
Thus, through life-concern the world of one's existential situation is revealed. 
Nevertheless, natural scientists tend to assume tacitly the independence of 
cognitive process from our worldly involvement. What they have cast in total 
negligence is the ‘living’ character of scientific researches, supposing their selves to 
be able to cut away from the multi-dimensional referential system of life-nexus. 
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Dilthey remarks that even the cognitive process undergone in a scientist is a purposive 
system of life/^ Research activities arise initially from the life-concern shared 
among the scientists, concerning the topics to be investigated, results expected, and 
the influence upon the human world. Scientific investigations utterly detached from 
such life-concern are simply unimaginable. 
47 SW 3: 43. 
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(c) The Temporal-dynamic Dimension of Life. 
(i) The Purposive Efficacy and Immanent Teleology 
Insofar as the efficacy of psychic nexus reveals itself as life-concern, life is always 
experienced relationally and situationally. Apart from the relational, contextual 
character of life-concern, it is also temporal-dynamic. Intrinsic to life-course are 
various tendencies, of contextualized possibilities. Life-concern, to be viewed as 
consisting of contextualized tendencies, has its own principle of selective orientation. 
According to its own principle ‘it considers whether representations fit into the 
tendency to grasp the object in its connectedness with the world as it is primarily 
given in the sensory horizon of apprehension."*^ 
The tendency is much transparent if we consider the 'purposive efficacy' of life-
nexus that always directs forward toward certain state of consciousness/^ Life-nexus 
at any moment slides from one state of psychic affairs to another. The tendential 
movement is inherent in life, irrespective of what concrete willed purpose is led in 
each case. The tendency of striving toward goals, or properly called, the immanent 
teleological character of psychic life does not denote any definite goals or purpose in 
an objective sense. Rather, it refers to the ever 'striving toward something without 
necessarily having fully defined it,' or the 'intention to actualise some thing that was 
not already part of reality. The immanent teleology of life does not tell us what the 
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telos of life in general is. It points to the tendential character (or how) that life is led 
and experienced. The purposive efficacy of the psychic structure gives rise to the 
tendency to move 'towards \ in such sense that life is led and experienced 
teleologically, irrespective of 'what' goals are aimed for in actuality. 
Though I am not able to determine what I am about to encounter in my daily life; 
yet, the teleological tendency renders life the efficacy to 'project' meanings upon the 
factual instances of the world, which is already significant to my life-concern. The 
meaning of each object to be apprehended, willed or felt depends on the life-course 
for actual definition. Thus, psychic process is virtually a 'productive process', with 
products of which consist not merely of sensed qualities but of objective contents of 
mental expressions. The mental 'products' arising from the accomplishment of the 
psychic structure of life are intelligible as norms, values and goals, and life-course. 
Psychic life is always on the way of acquisition or production of these meaning-
contents, under the press of the purposive efficacy of life-nexus. In this sense, 
life-nexus is also a 'productive system'. The productive system that generates values 
and realizes purposes lies in the very psychic structure of human spirit.^^ Life-
process is immanently teleological and so it is capable to be productive of various 
potential forms of goods, values and meanings. Again, the immanent productivity 
does not signify any specific outcome as its products. 
51 SW 3： 176. 
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(ii) The Temporal Dynamism of Life-course 
The fore-going analysis enables us to see life-nexus in terms of temporal 
dynamism of efficacy. The 'natural state' of life is not a static entity but a purposive 
course of directedness extending in time. The ‘essence’ of life should not be what is 
given at the present. Only in the connectedness of past, present and future are we 
able to arrive at the genuine vision of life. In life experience: 
[PJarticular events occupy a position in the course of time that, at every point, 
presupposes an influence from the past and has consequences that reach into the 
future. Thus, everything that happens demands development, and the present 
leads beyond itself into the future.^^ 
Only against the temporal dynamism of life-process can the essential comporting 
characters of psychic nexus such as life-concern, purposive efficacy and immanent 
productivity make sense. The basic form of life manifests itself as a purposive-
cum-productive system as it ‘arises in the individual who gathers together the present, 
the past, and possibilities of the future in a life-course. It adheres the past values 
and the future realizable goals to the present and produces meaningful connections of 
them. The temporal structure of productive dynamism is inherent in life-nexus, 
irrespective of 'what' substantial life is to be lived out. 
The temporality and the productivity of meaningful experience are the two 
essential moments of lived experience. From the togetherness of both we obtain the 
historicality of life. In this sense 'life is historical to the degree that it is apprehended 
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SW 3: 178. 
38 
as advancing in time and as an emerging productive nexus产 The temporal and 
meaningful characters of life can be further illuminated if we set the analysis against 
Dilthey's categorial investigation. 
On working out the ‘real’ categories of life, Dilthey claims that temporality is the 
first categorial determination, the one that is fundamental for all other categories. 
We find in life-nexus the inborn tendency 'that is directed, an action reaching out for 
fulfillment, an advance of psychic activity itself, a being conditioned by the past and 
yet the containment of various possibilities, an explication that is at the same time 
creative.’55 Thus, it is in time that life fulfills itself. The dynamism of lived time 
manifests itself in such a way that 'the present never is': 
[W]hat we experience as present always contains the memory of what has just 
been present. ...the continued efficacy of the past as a force in the present, 
namely, what the past means for it, imparts to what is remembered a distinct 
character of presence, whereby it becomes incorporated in the present.^^ 
Furthermore, the force of the past that gravitates towards the present also carries its 
efficacy onto the possibilities to be projected upon the future. Time is experienced 
not just as given to the present but as the continuum of the present moment, which is 
constituted with the past and the future. The temporal structure is originally built in 
the tendential dynamism of lived experience. 
Of the three moments of time, Dilthey, accords priority to the present. 
According to the principle of lived experience, anything that is there for me is given to 
SW 3: 280. 
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the present. Even if a past experience is aroused in me, it is given to me as 'present' 
experience, whether by means of memory or effecting efficacy of the past upon the 
present moment.^'' It is the present moment that encompasses 
the representation of the past in memory, and the representation of the future 
through the imaginative consideration of its possibilities and through activity that 
frames purposes for itself in light of these possibilities.^^ 
The fulfillment of the dynamic present occurs continually, irrespective of what the 
concrete and actual content of lived experience is. For Dilthey, life is effective to us 
only at the present. ‘The present is always there, and nothing is there except what 
emerges in it.'^^ The comportmental characteristics of life-concern, purposive 
efficacy, and productive system contained within life-nexus all have their bases on the 
dynamic present in accordance with the principle of lived experience. 
“ S W 3: 250. 
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Chapter 3 
Toward an Epistemic Hermeneutics 
(a) Reflexive Awareness as a Kind of Pre-reflective ‘Living-awareness， 
According to the principle of phenomenality, 'everything is a fact of 
consciousness, and accordingly is subject to the conditions of c o n s c i o u s n e s s . T h e 
real of perception, volition, memory, cognition and such other psychic acts have 
their reality in terms of being accessible and 'conditioned' as facts of 
consciousness.Dilthey, thus, leads us to see the original from of consciousness so 
that life is grasped at its basic form. Such experiential state of immediate 
consciousness is accessible by means of Innewerden. Innewerden— reflexive 
awareness— is the primary fact of being-for-oneself. In its most basic sense, it is an 
immediate pre-reflective mode of self-givenness of life in which the dichotomies of 
form and content, subject and object, characteristic of reflective consciousness do 
not yet exist. Rather, these dichotomies have their foundation in reflexive 
awareness.62 It is the simplest form of psychic life-process, which has its own 
immediate certitude. 
6 � S W 1: 24. 
‘What is real is subject to the conditions of consciousness. ‘ See SW 1: 247. 
62 See SW 1: 339 and SW 3: 28，note 6. 
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In the case of perceptual acts, we experience the representational object 
being placed before us. Accompanying the perceptual process is the reflexive 
awareness of the process.6， 
Wherever a reflexive awareness of the process involved in the perceptual act is 
added to the consciousness of the object, consciousness possesses its con ten t -
by virtue of the relation between subject and object in self-consciousness— as 
facts of equal immediacy and evidentness.^ 
For any psychic acts intended, underlying them is the persistent reflexive awareness 
of the psychological state and at any given moment they co-exist within the same 
complex configuration of consciousness, as constituents of the same whole.^^ As the 
primary fact of consciousness, it indicates how our awareness leads. Given the 
nature of reflexive awareness as such, the considerations below follow. 
1. The certainty and objectivity of reflexive awareness: 
It is maintained independent of the perceptual process. While the psychic 
object may vary in accordance with the change of the leading psychic acts, 
these 'facts of consciousness' are immediately apprehended by reflexive 
awareness. Whatever we are conscious of, we always have the reflexive 
awareness at the background, being aware of the particular state of 
consciousness. 
2. Containing the formative law of self-consciousness 
“ S e e SW 1: 256. 
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Reflexive awareness is a pre-reflective, ever-existent kind of awareness, 
present prior to the conceptual distinction of 1/ world, or subject/ object. 
However, as the simplest form of lived experience, reflexive awareness is 
inclusive of the sense of ego. The reflexive awareness of the various psychic 
moments of an individual life process maintains in it the awareness that these 
moments belong to the same consciousness. It is "an immediate knowledge of 
being contained together with all my other psychic processes in an ego, a self, 
or more precisely, a substantial 'me'."^^ The ego that we experience in life co-
exists with other psychic moments as a psychic wholeness. It is never an 
abstract ‘1’，but a coherent sense of ‘me’ with ever-changing meaningful 
content. Thus, lived experience given in reflexive awareness is not something 
‘possessed’ by T . Rather, we should say: live is experienced as being 
‘mine，, 
3. Co-existence of the reality of self and world: 
Though such ‘me，‘is the most changeable of all that is c h a n g e a b l e , it 
remains to be a concrete sense of self, in each case inseparable from the world 
surrounding me. Through the reflexive awareness of the state of consciousness 
the psychic acts of the ego, and the psychic objects of the external world are 
experienced in wholeness. In lived experience, the real is what the will 
possesses in reflexive awareness when it meets resistance or when the hand 
feels pressure. The external world is given to me with as much immediacy as 
any mood or any exertion of the will."^ ® By such means the external world is 
SW 1： 371. 
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seen as real in life, and its certitude is not deduced by logical means, but 
experienced immediately. Given the totality of psychic life, both self and the 
world exist in relation to each other, being equally immediate and real. 
Conclusively speaking, reflexive awareness, as the most primordial kind of 
apprehension, underlies all living comportments. Life-course consists in unfolding 
experience of reflexive awareness. It is by means of the 'living-awareness' that the 
reality of the changing moments of self-world derives its certitude and concrete sense. 
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(b) Meaning as the part-whole relation of life-nexus 
The category of meaning refers to the parts-whole relations of life-nexus. Life 
fulfill itself in time. At each moment, it is fulfilled as a 'part'. Life is 
understandable because the parts bear meaningful relations to the whole. An 
elapsed life span can be surveyed through the connectedness in memory and 
meaning that serves as the form of life-comprehension. A 'lived experience' is a 
unit in which parts of experienced life are connected by a common meaning, even 
when the parts are separated by intervening events. However, 'meaning' 
belongs not distinctly to past moments, nor is confined to individuals. 
It is meaningful insofar as an act, or some external event committing us to the 
future took place; or insofar as a plan to guide us into the future was adopted; 
or insofar as such a plan was carried out. Or, it is meaningful for communal 
life insofar as an individual's engagement with it, at the same time, allows his 
distinctive being to contribute to the shaping of humanity."^^ 
Every individual moment has meanings that tend always to unfold 
diachronically forward and connect synchronically with existing humanity. We can 
imagine that, without the designation of meaning, life will be either too fluctuant to 
understand or simply fall prey to discord and chaos. It is also in this sense that 
meaning is referred as 'the all-inclusive c a t e g o r y b e c a u s e every facet of human 
life can only be understood in the connected wholeness of meaning. We may 
experience various intrinsic values at the present, but leaving these values there 
juxtaposed and unconnected will cause confusion and chaos. It is overcome by 
7' SW 3: 253. 
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means of the category of meaning. It forges a meaningful coherent whole out of 
'the efficacy of the past' and 'the values of the present', thus, projecting it into the 
future in terms of refined possibilities. 
On the other hand, the meaningful relation of part-whole can never be 
completely consummated so long as psychic life is always futurally prone. As life 
lives on and 'the parts of life' proliferate onward unceasingly, our comprehension at 
the present, of the meaning of life as a whole relative to its parts lived in the past is 
always temporary. Any determination of meaning is provisional, pending and 
subject to revision insofar as it is mutually conditioned upon what life-plans are 
adopted. 'What we set as our future goal conditions, how we determine the 
meaning of the past, and any realized shape of life receives its measure from the 
way we assess the meaning of what is remembered.' Accordingly, the 'essence of 
meaning relations lies in the shaping of a life-course: over time on the basis of life-
structure as conditioned by a milieu严 
Meaning has such an adaptable and ad hoc nature that the understanding of life 
is only a continual approximation. For Dilthey, only in the last hour of one's own 
life-course can one survey the whole to ascertain the relation between whole and 
parts, so that the meaning of life is able to have a final determination. Similarly, 
one would have to wait for the end of history to possess material sufficiently 
complete to determine its meaning. 
73 SW 3: 253’ 254. 
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(c) The Method of Verstehen. 
The disunity of epistemological access to life in terms of descriptive 
psychology earmarked in Einleitung in 1883，and in terms of hermeneutics after 
1900 has long been the issue of dispute among the critics of Dilthey. The 
commentator Ermarth has argued in favour of Dilthey's psychology as being more a 
shift of dialectical 'Aufhebung' than a clean break from later development.''^ 
Makkreel has taken it as being re-evaluated and adapted to his later mature works. 
He makes a reservation on the point that, 'in his late writings, the status of 
psychology is made ambiguous at best. The critic Plantinga has argued for the 
outright replacement of psychology by hermeneutics as a development of his 
thought.77 
The major reason for the discrepancy is due to the shift of the concept of 
experience in Dilthey's later writing: from individual lived experience {Erlebnis) to 
culturally-historically mediated experience (life-experience or Lebenserfahrung). 
The epistemological project analysed in descriptive psychology is confined to the 
givenness of life, to immediate lived experience in its manifold references, but it 
only gives us knowledge of our own individual life. It provides an account of the 
general structure of human consciousness and the life-nexus in which each mental 
state assumes, but it offers no insight to 'the life in general', i.e. the constitution of 
historical life and the meaning of its expressions. 
” EnnarUi, Wilhelm Dilthey: the Critique of Historical Reason, 226. 
Makkreel, Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Studies, 294. 
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The hermeneutic turn signifies the recognition of Dilthey's early passing 
observation, as found in, Ideas about a Descriptive and Analytical Psychology (1894) 
that, 'man does not discover what he is through speculation about himself or 
through psychological experiments but through history[Emphasis added by me.] 
By that means, the personal 'psychological' experience has to reach out into a 
common historical world which 'lived experience' seeks to 'understand' and 
becomes 'life-experience' by enriching itself through understanding. 
'Understanding first overcomes this limitation of the individual lived experience and, 
at the same time, bestows the character of Lebenserfahrung to personal Erlebnis. 
It leads us from the narrowness and subjectivity of experiencing into the region of 
the whole and the g e n e r a l . W h i l e Erlebnis refers to immediate and subjective 
experience, Lebenserfahrung redefines experience of life as a whole in terms of a 
broader, understanding-mediated context of inter-subjective experience with deeper 
historical content. We do not merely live out of the immediate experience of 'mine', 
but we all the more co-exist with others by living through a meaningful network of 
custom, establishments, prevalent values and systematic knowledge 
'understandingly.' Mutual understanding assures us of what individuals have in 
common. In the process, individual perspective involved in personal life-experience 
is corrected and broadened by general life-experience. This commonality is 
expressed in the common beliefs, in the selfsameness of reason, in sympathy as part 
of the life of feeling, and in the mutual commitments of duty and justice 
accompanied by a consciousness of obligation.^^ 
78 Ricknian, W. Dilthey: Selected Writings, 93. 
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Accordingly, Dilthey finds that there is an 'interpretive moment' in experience 
itself, which is not secondary to some purportedly more original process, but is 
constitutive of experience as such. Experiencing is an interpretive-adaptive mutually 
implicated process of personal life with life in general. To be experiencing is 
already a kind of proto-interpretation in such a way that experience of life and 
understanding work together reciprocally to promote an ever-higher level of 
consciousness. Here Dilthey manages to avoid psychologism because 
interpretation is concerned not with the mental process of particular life, but rather 
with the meaning of the expressions of human spirit and the world opened up in the 
text. Experience of life is identified, not with the psychological process of 
subjective acts, but with the inter-subjective, mediated experience of cultural and 
historical contents. Interpretation of meanings in expressions or objectifications of 
life, rather than method of psychological description, becomes the subject matter 
proper to human science. The world of spirit is the creation of the apprehending 
subject. An objective knowledge of this world requires the method of Verstehen. It 
involves complex cognitive interactions among lived experience, expressions and 
understanding. In general terms, it is a 'rediscovery of the I in the Thou' by means 
of the selfsameness of spirit in the I and the Thou.^^ Verstehen is the key to open 
the historical world in which the historical agent grasps the various manifestations of 
life. The analysis below will illustrate how we are led into the spiritual world 
through Verstehen (understanding), which is virtually constitutive of our daily 
experience in its elementary form and consolidates the basis of Geistewissenschaften 
in its higher form. 
8 2 See the discussion in Ermartli, Wilhelm Dilthey: the Critique of Historical Reason, 227-8. 
“ S W 3: 213. 
49 
(i) From Elementary Forms of Understanding 
The simplest form of understanding, in feet, a functional part of our everyday 
practical life such as communication and personal interaction: Dilthey's analysis of 
understanding starts with the elementary forms of understanding— the interpretation 
of a single manifestation of life for the relation between an expression and what is 
expressed in it, without relating it to the overall nexus of life. Just as friendliness is 
expressed by a smiling fece, or access to a handset indicates an intention to contact a 
person, these sensorial given expressions and their spiritual meaning content -
distinctive as they are— do not exist in separation. There is an inherent unity 
between the sensorial given expressions and the spiritual content. Interpretation 
proceeds by means of inference based upon analogy drawn from regular relationships 
between a manifestation of life and the spiritual meaning expressed. Within the 
regularity and commonality of our daily life we communicate by making sense of 
others and making ourselves understandable in each case of expression. 
This is made possible because of the fact that we are always already dwelling in 
the world of 'objective spirit'. 'Objective spirit' objectifies itself in the world of the 
senses. It gives rise to a commonality in manifold forms, which are present among 
individuals . 
In this objective spirit, the past is a continuously enduring present for us. Its 
scope extends from lifestyles and forms of social intercourse to the system of 
purposes that society has created for itself. It also encompasses custom, law, 
state, religion, art, the sciences, and philosophy. For even the work of a genius 
84 SW 3: 229. 
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will reflect a common stock of ideas, attitudes, and ideals characteristic of an 
age and a region.85 
In that sense, human beings are necessarily born and thereafter nurtured in the 
world of objective spirit. Since childhood, we have already been surrounded by 
remnants of the past and brought up within the very descendent, objectively binding 
spirit. Wholly immersed in the world of objective spirit, children learn from 
repeated encounters of the selfsameness of expression-cum-meaning passing down 
from their situatedness as a medium to understand gesture, facial expressions, words 
and sentences. Commonalities in their recognizable manifolds are bred from 
objective spirit. 
Every square planted with trees, every room in which chairs are arranged, is 
understandable to us from childhood because human tendencies to set goals 
pro- duce order, and define values in common have assigned a place to every 
square and every object in the room. The child grows up within the order and 
ethos of the family that it shares with the other members, and in this context it 
accepts the way the mother regulates things. 
Accordingly, we are necessarily brought up in commonalities. And we learn 
to make sense of the world by means of interpretation, i.e., drawing 'inference from 
analogy in which a predicate is assigned to a subject with probability on the basis of 
a finite series of cases involved in a common situation. Obviously, the acquisition 
and interpretation of expression-cum-meaning does not proceed in isolation but 
contextually and situationally, with reference to prior knowledge about 
85 SW 3: 229. 
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commonalities. Thus, the 'interpretive moment' of life-experience is open to the 
historical efficacy of commonalities and the objective spirit. Understanding is 
historical. 87 
(ii) To Higher Forms of Understanding 
While our everyday practical life is in each case interpretively committed 
(with elementary understanding), sometimes we need to seek to further 
understanding when certain life manifestations do not make sense to us immediately. 
Higher forms of understanding arise from cleavage of expected connection between 
an expression and its meaning content. 'When the result of understanding presents 
an inner difficulty, or something contradictory to what is otherwise familiar, we are 
forced to reconsider. 
Unlike elementary understanding which is highly merged with practical life, 
higher forms of understanding signifies a break from the normal interpretative track 
of everyday life and becomes more reflectively prone. Previous cases of life 
87 Objective spirit may have an articulated order enshrined in regular social institutes such as religion 
and legal system. In these cases, interpretations are regularized. For example, particular harmful 
behaviour is criminalized according to the related legal system and definition. So understanding of 
certain manifestation of life is eiiliaiiced when locating it within the appropriate common context, and 
once it is successfully done, a spiritual meaning is secured. It is also true of a linguistic 
coniniumty—tliat forms a commonality upon the use and meaning of words, idioms, sentences and 
syntactical structure so tliat each verbal expression or written message is made intelligible; and of 
certain cultural code of conduct—from the common range of specified gestures and formality of 
which people choose to coimnuiiicate a definite stance and attitude toward others or have others， 
intended meaning understood. ‘In this sphere the relation between a manifestation of life and human 
spirit is everywhere established by a common order,' (SW 3: 230) which is also a historically 
effective product. Therefore, the objects of human sciences are all historically bounded—insofer as 
they are manifestatioiLS of life, historically engendered out of objective spirit. It is also why the 
pliilosophical foundation of liistorical studies is fundamental to human sciences as a whole. 
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manifestations are reconsidered altogether to reconstruct the overall nexus of life so 
as to bear out the dubious instance. Understanding here presupposes the knowledge 
of an approximate wholeness of life-nexus. The inductive inferences drawn from 
analogy run from particular expression (part) to the overall life-nexus (whole). 
While understanding in its elementary form works simply on interpreting the 
meaning content out of a particular expression, understanding, in its higher form, 
requires one to construct the life-nexus as a whole by drawing reference to the 
repertoire of past life manifestations in order to make the case in doubt discernible. 
Should it be a particular person, a poem or a play on stage, understanding proceeds 
from particular encounter to encounter, from sentence to sentence, or from act to act 
inductively. It is to attain insight into the connected whole of life-relations, from 
which the induced parts derive their meanings. 
Accordingly, since the psychic life presupposed in understanding is capable of 
further developing and always in the shaping, higher form of understanding is only 
but ad hoc and indeterminate. Dilthey notes: 
Because the series of available manifestations of life are limited and because the 
underlying nexus is indeterminate, only probable results can be expected. If we 
infer how a life-unit that we have understood will act in new circumstances, the 
deductive inference from an inductively arrived at insight into a psychic nexus 
can only produce expectations and possibilities. When we proceed from a 
psychic nexus that is itself merely probable and add new circumstances to 
consider how it would react to them, we can only generate an expectation, not a 
. O Q 
certainty. 
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The uncertainty is not due to the method of understanding itself but the object of it, 
i.e. life, which is ever unfolding unceasingly in time. In a previous section, we have 
concluded from Dilthey's analysis that the meaningful relation of part-whole can 
never be completely consummated so long as psychic life is always futurally prone. 
Our comprehension of life, at the present, is relatively determinate with reference to 
its past and relatively indeterminate with reference to its future possibilities. Thus, 
the meaning of life expressions is understandable in each case as determinate-
indeterminate. Any determination of meaning in interpretation is necessarily 
provisional, pending and subject to revision. Dilthey's analysis has revealed that, 
insofar as the subject matter of human sciences is conditioned up the givenness of 
life, we have to accept the degree of universal validity human sciences are capable of 
attaining. 
However, Dilthey's project aims not at the practical function of understanding, 
which is only a signpost at the start of the road to the epistemic status of 
hermeneutics in Geisteswissenschaften. Rather than as the means of meaning 
disclosure of daily practical life, understanding is ultimately oriented towards the 
epistemological methodological foundation of the world of human spirit, from which 
the individual lives emerge to be the objects of understanding. The individual is not 
merely 'an example of the human in general but as an individual whole. ’卯 
Understanding has such a self-contained individual as its object, which, on the one 
hand, has ever dwelled in the objective spirit and lived under the influence of it. On 
the other hand, individual lives, as productive systems, also constitute the world of 
human spirit. In such understanding process, which presupposes the connection 
90 SW 3: 233. 
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between the universally human and individuation, 
the realm of individuals, encompassing human beings and their creations, opens 
up. .. .Together, objective spirit and the productive force of the individual define 
the world of human spirit. History is based on the understanding of both^ 
Concerning the disciplines of Geisteswissenschaften, Dilthey draws especial 
reference to the work of historians and poets, which are most capable of fathoming 
the mystery of life and are most typical of such epistemic understanding. The reason 
is that their tasks entail earnestly the disposition of 'transposition' to discover the 
vital connectedness of a given complex of life manifestations— may it be a human 
being, or a work, by transferring 'one's own self into it. It is the highest form of 
understanding 'in which the totality of psychic life is active—re-creating or re-
experiencing.'^" Following the sequence of events and re-experiencing 
(nacherleben) it with the aid of sympathy and empathy, poets and historians present 
the discovered connectedness and continuity in their works. Sympathy is ascertained 
to be able to strengthen the energy of re-experiencing.^^ As Dilthey himself reports, 
The possibility of experiencing religious states in my own life is narrowly 
delimited for me, as for most of my contemporaries. But when I survey the 
letters and writings of Luther, the reports of his contemporaries, the records of 
religious disputes and councils, and those of his dealings with officials, I 
experience a religious process of an eruptive power and intensity commensurate 
with issues of life and death, which is beyond the possibility of direct 
experience for a present-day human being. But I can re-experience it. I 
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transpose myself into circumstances in which everything supports such an 
extraordinary development of religious emotional l i f e， 
Understanding is no mere logical operation of thought. It involves a collaborative 
proceeding with a peculiar experience of creative re-living an alter ego's (past) 
psychic state in my own psyche.^^ 'Discursive thought re-presents what inheres in 
• • 5 0 6 experiencing. 
The 'logical' side of understanding can be reinforced by rendering the remnants 
of the past or the objectifications of life permanently fixed so that understanding can 
go back to it repeatedly. Only when the object of understanding is relatively, 
permanently fixed—unlike those fleeting and vagarious expressions of life 
encountered in daily practical life— can understanding be fully developed into a rule-
guided method. The universal validity of understanding can, thus, be better secured. 
It is especially true of literature for it is only in language that spiritual life finds its 
exhaustive, and objectively understandable expression, and is able to be passed down 
from generation to generation constituting our spiritual world. It is also what the 
science of hermeneutics means to be— as a theory of the rules of unde r s t and ing 
textually fixed objectifications of life. It is exemplified in academic labour of 
philology and exegesis or interpretation of those remains of human reality preserved 
ill written form. 
So the proper sequence of the hermeneutic method is: (1) the method of 
creative genius (2) the already existing abstract rules based on the former, which are 
SW 3: 236. 
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subjectively conditioned (3) the derivation of a universally valid codification from an 
epistemological foundation.^'' A well-established hermeneutic method should enable 
the interpreter to understand a given historical individual better than he has 
understood himself. It is because the nexus operative as the whole in organizing the 
parts of life, unconscious to the individual, is capable of being brought into full 
relief by the interpreter.^® The temporal distance is an advantage for the interpreter 
to make access to full repertoire of particulars. By such means, one can construct a 
more complete meaningful wholeness of the individual and the spiritual world of 
his/ her time, which transcends the individual's own awareness. 
Though the possibility of transcending understanding is hard to dismiss; yet, 
insofar as the capacity of interpretive sympathy remains highly subjective and 
mystical, the universal validity of hermeneutic method is but called into doubt. 
Dilthey has avoided giving any explanation of sympathy and empathy, psychological 
or conceptual. He concedes, without hesitation, that the capability of sympathy is 
personal and subjective when he claims: re-creating and re-experiencing what is 
foreign and from the past shows clearly how understanding is based on a special, 
personal kind of genius.^^ Accordingly, Dilthey remarks that '[I]nterpretation is a 
product of personal skill and its most perfect application is dependent on a certain 
kind of genius; the gift of interpretation is based on affinity, intensified by thorough 
familiarity with an author and constant s t u d y . • 
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In fact, Dilthey himself is also well aware of the problem of universal validity 
of hermeneutics. Hermeneutics involves a process of objectifying experiencing-in-
terms-of-pre-reflective-awareness-of-reality to an attentive consciousness of 
discursive thought. By means of applying the logical operation of inductive 
inference as well as transposition, it intends to find out the relations inhere in lived 
experience, of an expression to what is expressed, and of the parts to the overall 
life-nexus. Yet, both inductive inference and transposition yield only relative 
validity. Dilthey reminds us that '[t]he ultimate, although quite subjective, sureness 
residing in this re-experiencing cannot be replaced by any cognitively tested 
inferences that explicate the process of understanding. 
A more subtle aspect of the process of understanding is that 'it is connected 
with experiencing itself, which, after all, is merely a reflexive awareness of the 
whole psychic reality in a given s i t u a t i o n . H e r e Dilthey seems to suggest, but 
without further elaboration, that the process of higher understanding— though 
logically and conceptually directed— is itself an incident of experiencing. 
Experience carries in it the pre-reflective irrational function of reflexive awareness 
and, especially, sympathy. No matter how close it is to our common sense to 
ascertain the importance of sympathy in the success of textual understanding, yet the 
vagary of the lived quality of sympathy alone is thought baffling enough to resist any 
logical explanation. This is why Dilthey claims that '[tjhere is something irrational 
in all understanding, just as life itself is irrational; it cannot be re-presented in a 
logical formula.’肌 
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After all, understanding as an attempt to determine what is inherently 
determinate-indeterminate. It is a process of part-whole interchange that will never 
come to an end. The limit of understanding and its degree of universality attainable 
is not due to the futility of logical thought but due mainly to the modes of givenness 
of its object, i.e. the vagarious nature of life, insofar as it is temporal. Anyway, 
Dilthey may further argue that historians, above all, have an advantageous position to 
bring the validity of hermeneutics to a relatively high degree because they can 'wait 
for the end of history to possess material sufficiently complete to determine its 
meaning. ’io4 Insofar as the objective, textual givenness of understanding is logically 
and permanently fixed— that is, the 'objective' side of understanding is scientifically 
ascertained— hermeneutics can then be developed into rule-guided procedures 
corresponding to the nature of the object, so that the scientific status of hermeneutics 
can well be established. 
However, the 'subjective' side of understanding is always beyond scientific grasp. 
With a relatively complete collection of the textual remains of Martin Luther's life I 
may be able to penetrate into the depth of Luther's religious life. But the insightful 
interpretive achievement obtained from genius effort cannot be pinned down by any 
scientific or logical means. Dilthey has to stop here and claims that, given the 
nature of the science, we have to accept the degree of certainty and validity that 
methodological hermeneutics is capable to reach. It cannot, and should not be 
consummated with that of natural science. 
SW 3: 253. 
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However, Dilthey's analysis of understanding has revealed to us that 
understanding grows primordially from our practical concern. Our daily practice 
and social interactions cannot depart from interpretive acts of one kind or another, 
bringing to manifest the efficacy of commonalities and the spiritual world we have 
always, already been dwelling in. Understanding is essentially a mode of disclosure 
of meaning. It is practically and existentially bound. But for Dilthey in his time, 
philosophical research consists in deriving an epistemology of the inquired subject 
matter. Though he has been able to arrive at certain practical-existential nature of 
understanding occasionally; yet immediately does he go over the insight and head 
for an overall epistemic character of hermeneutics. It turns into a search for a 
scientific method of Verstehen. However, Heidegger notices very clearly not only 
the essential difficulty of such a move. It is fundamentally a betrayal of the proper 
sense of hermeneutics itself. From the findings of Dilthey, he eventually advances 
an, 'existential-ontological turn' to hermeneutics, which was initiated in 1919. 
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Chapter 4 
Heidegger's Appropriation of Dilthey's Philosophy in KNS 1919 and 
Early Lecture Courses 
1 
Dilthey finds in life its own dynamism and polymorphism that any one-sided 
intellectualism of traditional metaphysics tends so much to suppress and attenuate life 
by means of intellectual abstraction. On the other hand, regarding the 'irrational' 
claim upon life as a blind flow of drives and antagonism of will power, Dilthey intends 
to derive an accountable structure and categories intrinsic to life itself. The 
motive— to describe life with respect to its unified structure in which its multi-
modalities and dynamism are maintained in unity—persists throughout his 
Lebensphilosophie. Dilthey successfully captures the wholeness of human being in 
terms of the capabilities of willing, feeling and representing, and translates them into 
the interplay of life-processes of volition, emotion and representation. 
In History of the Concept of Time, Heidegger takes Dilthey's task as ‘a 
personalistic psychology against the reigning naturalistic psychology. ‘ Descriptive 
psychology against explanatory p s y c h o l o g y， The movement arises from the 
distinction between the logic of the psychic process (the act) of judgment and the logic 
Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, 116. 
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concerning what is judged in these acts, as Brentano first demonst ra tes .舰 The laws 
of thought and the laws of the psychic process of thought are different. The necessity 
of this distinction has moved Dilthey to affirm the primacy of psychic life over thought, 
and to explore the underlying psychic structure of life in which the rational capacity of 
thinking is merely a constituent part. Man or life is no more taken as objective 
occurrences to be explained by means of universal laws of events, but understood as 
the psychical event of spirit and person involved actively in history, described and 
analysed by means of understanding. The philosophical motive is broadly 
summarized in the two thesis: 'Behind life thought cannot go.，and 'To understand life 
in terms of itself. ’ 
However, Dilthey's approach to life is drawn from such a variety of intellectual 
and philosophical resources. If a science of life is possible, this science will be akin 
to anthropology, which is open to a heuristic condition of inquiry of human being 
rather than making itself into a fundamental science. 
Psychic life is something unfathomable. ...a science and certainly a single 
science of psychic life with its ever new scope and boundlessness does not exist. 
Conceptual cognition has several approaches available to it. The approach that 
stands closest to psychic life is anthropology, because it aims to penetrate the 
concrete nexus of mental life itself, antecedent to the interpretation of the 
creations of human spirit or history/®'' 
Dilthey is able to attend to the reality experienced in terms of ‘the wholeness of 
human beings' with respect to its world. But, because of the motive to draw upon 
variegated perspectives and often conflicting tendencies of human beings under the tile 
Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, 116. 
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of ‘life’，he can hardly come to a more rigorous formulation of the phenomenon of 
life. 
This is the line of the critique that Heidegger poses in History of the Concept of 
Time, in which Dilthey is first credited for the extensive influence of his personalistic 
psychology upon Husserl and Scheler. Also, in the overall movement, Dilthey is the 
first one who 'understands the aims of p h e n o m e n o l o g y . ’舰 The critique is 
everywhere suggesting that, though both Husserl and Scheler share 'the common root 
of Dilthey's initiative and the phenomenological way putting q u e s t i o n s , t h e y do 'not 
advance beyond D i l t h e y . Y e t , despite the superiority of Dilthey's analysis, his 
mode of questioning, together with Husserl ’s and Scheler's, share the same 
fundamental deficiency, i.e. ‘the determination of the unity of the experiential context 
as a spirit and person adheres to the traditional definition of mzw—homo animal 
rationale.,…Dilthey is right in keeping in view of the whole 'living subject' who is 
capable of thinking, willing and feeling. 'He wants to get to the totality of the subject 
which experiences the world and not to a bloodless thinking thing which merely 
intends and theoretically thinks the w o r l d . I n other words, what Heidegger has 
discovered in Dilthey is the most fundamental insight that the self {personalistic) has, 
rather than standing against, its world. 
Before rolling into the detailed elucidation of Dilthey's resources in Heidegger, 
let's stay a while longer with this line of critique in History of the Concept of Time, 
刚 Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, 118. 
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which is incorporated into section 10 of BT. 
The critique points out the anthropological limitations of the traditional definition 
of man within Husserl, Scheler and Dilthey, each being limited in a different way. 
Concerning the definition in which ratio is understood in terms of the rational person, 
Husserl proves to have adopted a 'rationalistic o r i e n t a t i o n . T h e personalistic 
movement initiated by Dilthey attempts to understand man as holistic person and 
spiritual existence rather than an event of the nature; however, in Husserl, man is still 
a ‘reality of the world which constitutes itself as transcendence in absolute 
consciousness.，The description of the primary kind of experience under the 
fore-conception of the transcendental consciousness to testify its primacy and further 
its characterization is not phenomenological at all, but already theoretically oriented. 
‘The starting point for the elaboration of pure consciousness is a theoretical one' 
insofar as the manner in which what is experienced is led through by, rather than the 
natural attitude, 'the feature of an objectivity for a theoretical consideration of 
nature.’ 115 
Riding the personalistic tide and dismissing any objectification of person, 
Scheler holds to the intentional and its acts, regarding the acts as non-psyhic in order 
to demarcate them from the psychic. The person comes to be understood as ‘the 
performer of acts.'"^ The vitality of experience consists in living the performance. 
Acts get performed and the person performs. ‘A person is, in any case, given as a 
Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, 126. 
Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, 125. 
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performer of intentional acts which are bound together by the unity of a meaning.'"^ 
The whole inquiry terminates here so long as it is conducted under the guide of 
traditional anthropology in which the living experience is identified with 'the 
experience of man as an extant thing— (thinghood) of the world— animal— which has 
reason—rationale_(or other humanly significant capacities) as an intrinsic 
p r o p e r t y . U n d e r l y i n g these lines of fore-conceptions is the primal categorial 
separation of the entities: self and world, i.e. the consciousness and the world in the 
case of Husserl, or the performer and the world disclosed by means of the intentional 
acts as in the case of Scheler. These fore-conceptions prevent one to further question 
the ontological meaning of the self and the ontological meaning of the world in the 
respective senses of Husserl and Scheler, let alone the unified ontological basis of self 
and world. Consequently, the mode of access to the 'person' is 'nothing other 
than the already defined immanent reflection upon lived experiences, from which all 
the theses of absolute giveniiess and the like are d e r i v e d . I n f l u e n c e d by the 
traditional way of questioning, the phenomenological investigation of life in Husserl 
and Scheler turns out to be un-phenomenological but theoretically biased. 
For Heidegger, the anthropological conception of man with respect to his various 
living characteristics will fail to grasp the proper phenomenon of life or existence. 
He even stresses pointedly in BT that 'if we posit an T or subject as that which is 
proximally given, we shall completely miss the phenomenal content of Dasein.' It is 
also why he avoids such expressions as 'life' and 'man' in designating the entity that 
best illustrates the ways of human existence广 Though Dilthey cannot be totally 
" 7 BT13I H 4 8 . 
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exempted from the traditional way of questioning, he has drawn relatively closer to the 
origin of phenomenon on the point that he has never elevated 'the person' above or 
against his world. There are reciprocal acting and reacting between the world and 
the self in such a way that life cannot be understood apart from its world. Thus the 
totality of human beings is understood in terms of the life-context of the person as well 
as in its developmental (temporal-historical) s e n s e . � 
Of course, Dilthey fails to raise these ontological questions and to make them 
into a problem; yet, 'the tendency to do so was alive in him,' as Heidegger claims in 
History of the Concept of Time严 He even proclaims pointedly in BT, after having 
recognized Dilthey's attempt of 'geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie' to understand 
'life as a whole' in terms of 'Experiences' in their structural and developmental 
inter-connections, that 
in any serious and scientifically-minded 'philosophy of life' there lies an 
unexpressed tendency towards an understanding of Dasein's Being. What is 
conspicuous in such a philosophy is that here 'life' itself as a kind of Being does 
not become ontologically a p r o b l e m . � 
While affirming Dilthey's real philosophical tendencies towards 'an ontology of 'life", 
Heidegger finds what at issue is the limitations and insufficiency of his problematic as 
well as his methodological and conceptual means.i以 
The reality of life has been presupposed and pervading the whole of Western 
philosophy when the world or the nature is taken to be the immediate reality. Yet it 
121 Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, 118. 
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was a muddled history of philosophical investigations in which the authentic sense of 
the being of human life had been repeatedly missed. In the history of this question, 
Heidegger remarked that the work of Dilthey had a central place/^^ Dilthey was 
acknowledged to such a prominent and central place because he had made an initial 
attempt to render human life as the ultimate reality, to which all final accounts of 
worldly and human phenomena have to lead back, as well as his resolute pledge of 
denunciation of any metaphysical approach to that purpose. 126 
For Heidegger, to gain an intimate understanding of Dilthey's work means to 
formulate the questions that moved Dilthey and question beyond him.^ ^^ This has to 
be done on the basis of phenomenology— which presupposes life.^ ^^ Without 
phenomenology, the exposition of existential constitution of Dasein in BT will not be 
possible. Here we see a transition from 'phenomenology that presupposes life' to the 
phenomenology of Dasein (via the phenomenology of factical life), as the reflection on 
life phenomena from the Diltheyan problematic matures. Anyway, the fore-going 
clarifications help re-affirm the centrality of Dilthey's issue and influence upon early 
Heidegger's ontological inquiry into the existential constitution of Dasein. When 
Heidegger claims to develop from phenomenology a set of vocabularies and grammar 
for his ontological description of Dasein, we should be able to see Dilthey's influence 
and problematic hovering in the background. 
Before we come to the nuts and bolts of Heidegger's indebtedness in Dilthey, let's 
� See Heidegger, ‘Wilhelm Dilthey's Research and the Struggle for a Historical Worldview,' 
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turn to a short discussion on 'reality as resistance' in History of the Concept of 
Time尸 which is helpful in casting light on what we shall talk about later. 
Dilthey...has pointed to the phenomenon of resistance, specifically resistance as 
a correlate of impulse. For every impulse, which comes from the subject and is 
operative in the subject there is a correlative resistance/^" 
The theory of the being of the real is picked up and re-formulated by Scheler in his 
phenomenological analysis of acts, taking into account also of the specific function of 
corporeality in the structure of the reality of the world. He follows Dilthey in that 
reality is never primarily given in thinking and apprehending. The being of objects 
is given immediately only in their relation to the instincts and will, and not in some 
form of knowing . ’� However, their analysis is not getting at the original 
phenomenon. Heidegger deepens the discussion in BT. 
Resistance is encountered in a not-coming-through，and it is encountered as a 
hindrance to willing to come through. With such willing, however, something 
must already have been disclosed which one's drive and one's will are outforJ^^ 
Heidegger does not draw our attention to 'what' is willed or 'what' is 
encountered as resistance. Though what one's will is out for ‘is ontically indefinite', 
insofar as the motivated tendency of the will being out for is concerned, it 'means that 
something is already primarily present for caring and c o n c e r n . H e r e he 
accentuates that ‘this indefiniteness must not be overlooked ontologically or taken as if 
� The discussion also reappears in BT, section 43，under the heading of 'Reality as an ontological 
problem,' 
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it were nothing.' In fact, being-out-for-something ‘is itself already alongside a 
totality of i n v o l v e m e n t s . T h e resistivity has its basis upon the presence of the 
caring, concern and a totality of involvements, in a word, the presence of the world. 
'Resistance is a phenomenal character which already presupposes a world. 
Therefore, the authentic connection of world and human existence ‘is not that of 
impulse and resistance, or as in Scheler, will and resistance, but rather care and 
meaningfulness.The experiencing of resistance, or the discovery of what is 
resistant to one's endeavors is possible only by reason of the disclosing dynamism of 
the existential-meaningful context, which is ever present. It is effecting not 
particularly to willing but to the various personalistic comportments-toward. It is the 
motivated tendency of life that constitutes the phenomenon most proper to 
phenomenology. Riding on the motivated tendency, we find the world as one we 
encounter, rather than one lying there for apprehension. Entities are no mere objects 
put before the knowing I，but emerge as constituent part of the meaningful activities of 
encountering. 
The phenomenon itself thus directs us to interpret the structure of encounter, the 
activity of encountering. And the more we go about this without prejudice, the 
more authentically is the entity encountered ascertainable in its being/^^ 
The task of the following chapters is to exhibit how Dilthey's undertaking has 
antecedently opened and prepared the horizon for Heidegger to further his exploration 
of phenomenology along the newly discovered definition of phenomenon. The 
Dilthey-Heidegger connection will be explicated with higher precision. 
'^57^253/ H210. 
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2 
However, there is a major difficulty with my explication. The reason is that, 
apart from some passing accentuated appreciative remarks of Dilthey's philosophical 
contributions; Heidegger has never indicated his Dilthey's heritage in explicit and 
exact terms. In order to capture the Diltheyan influence in concrete terms, I have 
chosen Heidegger's KNS 1919 as the point of entry for illustration. The reason 
given in Kisiel's research, which has eloquently pointed out that, despite some 
preliminary philosophical considerations and sketches before, the KNS marks 
conclusively the starting point of BT. 
The textual clue for that is buried in the footnote (BT H72n), which places the 
beginning of fir...in the first analysis of the environing world within the context 
of a 'hermeneutics of facticity.， It all began in KNS, in the upshot of the effort 
'to go all out after the fectic' by finding a method to approach it/^^ 
As a starting point, the KNS has included the major philosophical motives that lead 
the phenomenological investigations of the following years all the way to BT. The 
motives are well pinned down by Kisiel as 'Phenomenological Beginnings: The 
Hermeneutic Breakthrough', the title of Genesis chapter 1. 
Here I find that Kisiel's title is peculiarly to the point and appropriate for my own 
use in this paper. I split it into two headings: ‘the phenomenological beginnings' and 
‘the hermeneutic breakthrough', representing two fundamental theses that Heidegger 
has adapted from Dilthey and extended them into his own inquiry. However, my 
interpretation of 'the phenomenological beginnings' and 'the hermeneutic 
138 Kisiel, Genesis, 21. 
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breakthrough' is different from Kisiel's'^^, though not necessarily contradictory, as far 
as the orientation of my paper is concerned. My exposition of KNS is by no means a 
repetition of Kisiel's study. In more exact terms, I shall take 'the Phenomenological 
Beginnings' in KNS as the thesis descended from Dilthey's thesis of 'Behind life 
thought cannot go，and ‘the hermeneutic breakthrough' from To understand life in 
terms of itself]"*� Heidegger has not only taken them over but gives them the most 
radical reformulation. Based on KNS, with the correlation of these motives as the 
guiding thread, I shall move into the manuscripts of the lecture courses afterwards 
(Freiburg period primarily) in order to penetrate into the depth at which the hidden 
Diltheyan insights are illuminated and their traces of influence in KNS are identified. 
As the way that two theses of Dilthey's are reciprocally related, Heidegger's two 
theses are, in fact, the two sides of a coin. But it is too early to speak of such 
analytical union before we come to grips with the concrete proceedings of their 
philosophical undertakings. For the sake of analysis, I classify Heidegger's 
philosophical points under the two theses as if they were separable, just as I have 
presented Dilthey's philosophy in fore-going chapters. Before we turn to the nuts 
and bolts, let's take a look at the neo-Kantian challenges (Richert and Natorp) 
presented in KNS. They represent the major source of stimuli and criticism which 
are detrimental to Dilthey's project as well as the phenomenological tradition initiated 
by Husserl. They also prove to be an important motivation for the young Heidegger 
to search for 'the phenomenological beginnings' and 'the hermeneutic breakthrough.‘ 
139 Kisiel's interpretation is found in Genesis, 23，in connection with the KNS-Scliema, which is 
skipped in my paper as there is no direct and immediate relevance my paper as a whole. 
140 As far as my paper concerned, ‘the phenomenological beginnings' will be explicated in the direction 
of Dilthey-Heidegger connection, rather than Husserl-Heidegger connection. 
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Chapter 5 
The Neo-Kantian Challenges 
The phenomenological beginning that represented Heidegger's own advancement 
over Husserl emerges as a critical response to the attack on the objective of 
phenomenological description as such. It retorts to a detrimental criticism from 
Neo-Kantians, as mentioned in KNS. They have raised serious doubts upon the 
viability of phenomenology's claim of 'the purely descriptive' that changes nothing of 
what it describes in regard to its theoretical character .� It is intended in Husserl's 
phenomenological method, which 'operates entirely in acts of r e f l e c t i o n . W e 
experience life and are able to describe it by rendering it as looked-at experiences. 
Through reflection [Reflexion], every unexamined and unreflectively experienced 
living experience can be turned into something 'looked at.’ The stream of living 
experience can be known through reflectively experiencing, which is itself lived 
experience. Then we are bound within life by describing life through the lived 
experience of reflection. Thus: 
The science of experience is a descriptive one. Every descriptive science 'has 
its justification in itself. ...Experiences are not explained psychologically, nor 
referred back to physiological processes and psychic dispositions. No 
hypotheses are made about them, but we simply bring out what lies in the 
experiences themselves .� 
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Phenomenology establishes itself on 'the purely descriptive', the method of 
description that brings the Sache forth for explication in the way it is, without inducing 
distortion or intrusion of any means. Concerning the scientific disclosure of the 
sphere of lived experience, the possibility and capability of description has to originate 
from some kind of apprehension through which the givenness of life is accessible. 
Husserl takes it as an 'intuition' in that everything that presents itself originally in 
'intuition' is to be taken simply as it gives itself/^ Husserl's intuition attends to the 
primordial bearing of life-experience and life as such, and serves as an absolute 
sympathy with life. The 'sympathetic' intuition itself remains to be a kind of life-
experience. It is 'the principle of principles,' something that 'precedes all principles, 
in regard to which no theory can lead us astray. ’ � According to Heidegger, though 
Husserl has not explicitly said that his ‘principle of principles' has a non-theoretical 
character; yet the phenomenological motive that drives through ‘the 
phenomenological life in its ever-growing self-intensification' requires a method to be 
freed from any constructed system of concepts outside of life. The non-theoretical 
motive is hidden in Husserl's project but has not been radicalized since he hardly 
realises the dividing line and the tension between the theoretical and the non-
theoretical. It is coming to grips with the intriguing issue that Heidegger brings forth 
the antagonistic notions of Rickert's and Natorp's. 
Both critics, directly or indirectly, raise doubt upon whether 'reflection' as such 
is capable of describing life without making intrusion upon it or being led astray by the 
theoretical. Rickert points out the two characteristics of the fluid reality. First, as 
everything flows, reality has the character of continuous transition, a continuum that 
170 Heidegger, Towards the Defifiition of Philosophy, 97. 
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consists of 'incalculable m u l t i p l i c i t y . S e c o n d , reality is always of 'heterogeneous' 
reality and no part of it is absolutely identical with another. Everything is different 
and has its own unique, characteristic, individual mark. Reality is a 'heterogeneous 
continuum.'147 T h e togetherness of continuity and alterity renders reality the 
character of irrationality and the powerlessness of concepts to master its content. 
The empirical perception of reality cannot be represented by any science, because it 
remains infinitely diverse under all c o n d i t i o n s . T o t a l seizure of reality by 
conceptualization is impossible because reality is irrational with respect to the rational 
use of concepts. Something of the reality must be left out after conceptualization. 
The portion of reality captured by concepts is small relative to what remains. Any 
scientific knowledge that claims to describe reality as it is accepts an implausible 
undertaking. What we can do is to relinquish the ambitious objective and come to 
grips with transforming reality in favour of conceptualization. The heterogeneous 
continuum of reality can be re-formed into homogeneous continuum or heterogeneous 
discretum so that it is graspable by concepts. The cognitive orientation will set the 
principle of selection to determine the criteria of what counts to be essential and thus 
taken into the concepts. Reality cannot be reduced to any concept, but this does not 
hold true for individuality. In the case of historical sciences, reality is presented in 
its individuality and uniqueness. It is an opposing way of concept-formation to 
natural sciences, the concepts of which aim at generalization, excluding the particulars 
as inessential. Therefore, the problem of concept formation in history 'is whether a 
scientific analysis and reduction of perceptual reality is possible that does not at 
Heidegger, Towards the D^nition of Philosophy, 144. 
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time—as in the concepts natural science— forfeit individuali ty. ’丄明 The science of 
history holds to the individuals and 'reality becomes history when we consider it with 
respect to the particular and i n d i v i d u a l . H i s t o r i c a l sciences have to proceed by 
seizing upon the value-attached individuals, ‘the objects of culture' as the proper 
givenness. 
Pointing also to the viability of describing the fluidity of reality in accordance 
with itself, Natorp raises a more penetrative query upon the possibility of both 
immediate apprehension and the non-theoretical character of reflection. Insofar as 
life is a stream of experiences, from which we have to set out the experiences for 
reflection, we unavoidably 'still the stream', as Natorp says, and turn it into 
individually intended o b j e c t s . � 
'Reflection necessarily has an analytical, so to speak, dissective, or chemically 
destructive effect upon what is experienced. ‘ For any kind of cognitive seizure 
of experience to be possible, a theoretical orientation is inevitable. Theoretical 
experiences themselves are only theoretically apprehensible. Epistemology is 
nothing but theoretical forming and shaping.^^^ 
Particularly, proceeding via concepts, description presupposes a certain kind of 
concept-formation that involves generalization, abstraction and theorization. 
Description as knowledge of facts is already objectifying and it is impossible to avoid 
theorization. Thus, there is no immediate apprehension of experience. 
Accordingly, despite the living character of intuition and reflection in Husserl's case, 
anything describable in life is described by, first of all, objectifying it. As a result, 
Heiiiricli Rickert, The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science�78. 
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‘living in meaning implies a theoretical grasping of what is meant, that the fulfillment 
of meaning is, without further ado, only o b j e c t - g i v i n g . T h e objectifying-
theoretical imperative is ineradicable as it is bound to the levels of verbal expression 
as well as reflection. Hussed's 'principle of principles' cannot distance itself from 
all the other theoretically constructed principles. Phenomenological principle is but 
an alternative approach of theorization. 
These critiques are a matter of life and death to the enterprise of phenomenology. 
They prompt the need that Heidegger has to re-orient the phenomenological project in 
order to maintain its consistency. Heidegger made the following remark in KNS, 
implying his departure from Husserl for a new phenomenological beginning: 
Until now Natorp is the only person to have brought scientifically noteworthy 
objection against phenomenology. Husserl himself has not yet commented on 
these/M 
Aiming at the phenomenological disclosure of the sphere of lived experience, the 
phenomenological beginnings initiated in KNS, under the press of the neo-Kantian 
challenges, means for Heidegger the need to re-consider what the phenomenon of 
phenomenology is. Granted the nature of life as 'heterogeneous continuum of 
incalculable multiplicity', the re-orientation of phenomenology led away from Husserl 
means for Heidegger the two intertwined lines of pursuance: 
(1) Phenomenological description has to hold fast to the pre-theoretical, non-
objectifiable character of life. It entails disclosing the original sphere in which 
life experience happens precedent to the emergence of I-consciousness and its 
170 Heidegger, Towards the Defifiition of Philosophy, 97. 
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object-correlates. On the other hand, the description has to be able to bring to 
relief, rather than carry it astray by means of any prior theoretical determination, 
the authentic sense of life understood as transitional continuum (the temporal 
sense), which is qualitatively heterogeneous from moment to moment (the 
historical sense). Heidegger has to justify that the application of descriptive 
conceptual means is capable of intensifying the temporal-historical characteristics 
of life without necessarily generalizing and objectifying life and consequently 
ossifying and homogenizing it. It means to describe life in a ‘formal objective' 
manner that leaves open and set the fulfillment possibility free with regard to the 
heterogeneous multiplicity of life. 
(2) The second closely related pursuance comes from the question of whether and 
how such descriptive language is possible. If phenomenology claims to 
articulate life as it is, the possibility of the articulation must come not from 
outside of life, but arise from some kind of primary apprehension concomitant in 
life. Rather than being a blind flow of drives, life— in terms of its motivated 
tendency—has its own sight and apprehension, which is pre-theoretical in nature. 
Any conceptual meanings of life drawn from the apprehension are a self-referring 
understanding. It is this hermeneutical intuition (the hermeneutical 
breakthrough) that brings to light 'the originary phenomenological back-and-forth 
formation of the recepts and precepts from which all theoretical objectification, 
indeed every transcendent positing, fell out.'^^^ 
The first line of consideration has already revealed to us the 'phenomenological 
155 Heidegger, Towards the Definition qf Philosophy, 99. 
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beginnings' in KNS that Heidegger has well been ready to lead away from Husserl. 
One important motive is that life has to be understood with regard to its historical 
character. Phenomenological disclosure of life has its main objective to bring into 
relief the temporal-historical dimension of existence, to which the Husserlian way of 
handling what counted as phenomenon is bound to fail to attend. As we shall see 
later, Heidegger's disclosure of life virtually runs along two inter-related axes: the 
pre-worldly and the worldly. The pre-worldly attends to the motivated tendency of 
life, which pertains to the temporal dynamic. The worldly signifies the 
environmental connection of life. Regarding the two axes of inquiry in ‘the 
phenomenological beginnings', we shall see how Dilthey's insights and motives are all 
the way influential and attributable. 
The second line of consideration, ‘the hermeneutic breakthrough', is virtually an 
inseparable part of ‘the phenomenological beginnings'. Textbooks on hermeneutics 
usually impress us how Heidegger has transformed hermeneutics from the hand of 
Dilthey and elevated it to the ontological height. But, if we look closer into Dilthey's 
own investigation, we shall find in it serious considerations of some kind of 'living-
knowing' which are conducive to Heidegger's own development of hermeneutics. 
The 'hermeneutic turn' that Heidegger has made to phenomenology will be shown to 
have activated the philosophical resources which Dilthey has antecedently prepared. 
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Chapter 6 
The Hidden Diltheyan Sources in ‘the Phenomenological Beginnings' 
(a) ‘The Phenomenological Beginnings' 
(i) Phenomenological disclosure of the sphere of lived experience. 
The fundamental methodological problem of phenomenology, as stated in KNS 
lectures, concerns ‘the scientific disclosure of the sphere of lived experience,' which 
requires ‘the absolute sympathy with life严 What matters most for the rigour of 
phenomenology is 'method'. Such method should not be theoretically contrived, 
nor be borrowed from a certain standpoint. 'Phenomenology can prove itself only 
through itself’, 157 i.e., any possible description of lived experience has to be able to 
show that it adheres closely to how life manifests itself without bringing it in 
advance under the control of any thoughtful formulation or theoretical imposition. 
Nevertheless, a challenging objection is immediately raised to phenomenology. All 
descriptions entail the use of language, and these verbal expressions are necessarily 
generalizing and objectifying. It implies that grasping and expressing what is meant 
in life is only but theoretical and object giving.^^^ Natorp's thesis about the 
necessary theoretical moment of conceptual expressions seems to prevail here. 
156 Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy�92. 
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Heidegger has hereby drawn his project of phenomenology to the crossroad, 
i.e., either losing the whole frontier of life to theoretical formulations of one kind or 
another, or rescuing some a-theoretical kind of descriptive expression. By tracking 
the latter path, Heidegger seeks in lived experience for the intuitive moment, which 
is prior to the theoretical so that one is able to see a-theoretically. We tend to think 
that we describe 'what is seen' by means of thoughtful formulations. Then 
theorization is ineradicable, insofar as 'the seen' is taken as standing over against 
‘the seeing.' The sphere of lived experience is so theorized tacitly by rendering 
experience as ‘given’ separately to the cognitive seeing. Nevertheless, what has 
gone unnoticed is that the initial theoretical motive draws upon the division between 
'knowledge and object', between ‘the description and the given', so that, a 
theoreticized language of description is made unavoidable/^^ In an indirect way, 
Heidegger complains that phenomenological research may have committed the same 
error if it makes itself ‘a 'comportment towards something" as it 'involves an 
unavoidable objectification, an absolutely irremovable moment of tlieoretization.'^^® 
Heidegger realises why the theoretical sphere usually enjoys a precedency in 
dealing with reality. First, the elements of norm and form can be exposed most 
easily in this domain so that the theoretical has the character of secure accessibility 
and objectivity. Also the norms and forms in this domain are easiest to ground so 
that the idea of truth with universal validity can be established. It is the basic level 
to lend grounds to all other spheres. The truth established by means of the 
theoretical, when conceived as a value, colours all other domains of value in such a 
170 Heidegger, Towards the Defifiition of Philosophy, 97. 
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way that we talk about the moral, artistic, or religious ' t r u t h ' H o w e v e r , the 
primacy of the theoretical has to be broken because it is not the original sphere in 
which we experience life. The reason for opening up the pre-theoretical sphere is 
not only for the access to life phenomena but also that it is something, which the 
theoretical has to refer back. 
Now, the rigor of phenomenology lies at the possibility of establishing a pre-
theoretical kind of intuitive seeing in life that entails no distinction of seeing and the 
seen. 162 If there is, phenomenological description of lived experience can have its 
character of universality upon the generalization of the meaning function of concepts, 
as distinguished from the conceptual and theoretical universality of the genus 
concept. It serves to attend to and explicate the movement of living and 
experiencing without distorting the 'essence'. The motive is led further into 
inspecting the original morphology of ‘life in and for itself to illuminate what is 
formally objective in its pre-theoretical character and the genesis of the theoretical. 
By doing away with any theoretical imperative, Heidegger leads us to hear out 
'the pure motives of the sense of the pure experience' without looking for the causes 
of emergence or reifying conditions to explain the experience in a thingly way and 
within a thingly context，Then he draws a personalistic example of entering the 
lecture room for illustration. 
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, 58. 
162 Heidegger calls it in passing ‘the phenomenological intuition. ‘ See Towards the D(finition of 
Philosophy, 9 4 . 
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I see the lectern at which I am to speak. You (the audience) see the lectern, 
from 
which you are to be addressed, and from where I have spoken to you 
previously.…I see the lectern...as adjusted a bit too high for me. I see— and 
immediately so—a book lying upon it as annoying to me,^ '^^  
In the pure 'seeing', we do not see isolated sensible elements of brown surfaces of 
which a box, a desk, or a lectern as a whole is composed. We see immediately, in 
one fell swoop, the lectern in its meaningful connections, e.g. the lectern at which I 
am to speak, from which my audience is to be addressed, which is adjusted a bit too 
high for me, upon which a book lying, etc. Should it be 'a farmer from deep in the 
Black Forest' or ‘a Negro from Senegal' who is led into the lecture room, he will 
make sense of the lectern differently. The former may fail to name it as a lectern, 
but at least is able to see 'the place for the teacher.' The latter may just see it as a 
good shelter against arrows and flying stones. Yet no matter how different the 
'seeing' is, it is never the case that they bring to view bare objects standing there 
separately. Even the plainest object has a meaning for the seer. The moment of 
signification lets the Negro see the lectern much more as something, 'which he does 
not know what to make o f , something of 'instrumental strangeness' to him. Thus, 
the meaning fulfillment of the lectern may differ from one to another, but ‘the 
meaningful character' of it is identical. 
Of the 'seeing for meaning', we experience something (like lectern, book, 
blackboard, notebook, fountain pen, etc.) in terms of an immediate environment 
1" Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy ’ 60. 
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[Umweli] 'without any mental detours across thing-oriented apprehension.’脱 
Living in an environment, it signifies to me everywhere and always that 
everything— rather than as objects juxtaposing in front of my seeing— has the 
character of world (meaningful connections). Of experiencing something, or 'living 
towards somethingthe environmental experience has its own sight of the world in 
which 'the something' first appears in vividly flowing context of meaning 
encompassing us. The meaningful is the primary, for it gives itself immediately 
(prior to discursive reflection), and the activity of which can be described as 
‘worlding.’ The ever activating context of meaning that constitutes our experience 
of life is described by Heidegger as, ‘it worlds‘ [es weltetf^^ or the event of 
appropriation [Ereignis]}^^ The phenomenon of Heideggeriaii phenomenology is 
one that is ever meaningfully charged, and thus, hermeneutical. An instantaneous 
happening of factical life is itself an instantaneous happening of meaning. Departing 
from Husserlian phenomenology of transcendental consciousness, Heidegger had 
virtually initiated a hermeneutic turn on phenomenology in KNS and developed it 
into 'hermeneutics of facticity. ‘ In this chapter, I shall deal with what constitutes 
‘the facticity' (of factical life), and 'hermeneutics' in chapter 7. 
In WS 1919-20, Heidegger regards the basic problem of phenomenology as a 
science of the origin. The theme of phenomenology is not simply factic life but life 
as arising from the origin. Philosophy requires a 'primal leap' into the factic in 
search of its origin.彻 It is a continuation of the problematic begun in KNS, which 
has disclosed to us the originating domain of 'it worlds.' In it, we find not only the 
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy ’ 61. 
'^''Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, 61. 
168 Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, 63. 
彻 Kisiel, Genesis, 117. 
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worldly character of life but also its motivational origin. The synchronic 
interpenetrating situations of life-context (the worldly) do not stand there statically 
but are motivated to 'world' diachronically as life streams on. The tending 
potentiality to live out towards something, or into particular sense of world, is the 
basic characteristic of life in and for itself. The 'pre-worldly something' (not yet 
broken into genuine life) consists in the 'vital impetus' of life and is experienceable 
as the living moments of 'out towards' [auf z«], of 'direction towards', ‘into a 
(particular) world', e t c / ? � T h e pre-worldly tendencies of life is motivated from the 
overlapping situational connections in such a way tliat the worldly motivated is itself 
tendential. The pre-worldly and the worldly express life in its 'motivated tendency' 
or 'tending motivation', in which we find the characters of Ereignis.口i The 
environmental experience is itself expressing the motivated tendency in meaningful 
terms. Heidegger's meandering analyses and critiques have finally pointed us to see 
the wordly and the pre-worldly— the non-objectifiable 'primal something' in and for 
life, which is, in general, effective and conducing to experiencing life. 
On the basis of the insights developed in KNS, Heidegger advances his own 
sense of life. As early as SS 1920，and in his 'Comments on Karl Jaspers' 
Psychology of Worldviews,' (1920), Heidegger particularly pointed out two 
directions that the term 'life' had led in shaping its meaning, as a response and 
contrast to the Lebensphilosophie in vogue. 
(1) Life is understood as objectifying in the widest sense, as an act of creative 
formation and achievement, as an act of going out of itself, and thus as 
170 Heidegger, Towards the Defifiition of Philosophy, 97. 
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something like our ‘be-ing there' (Da sein) in this life and as this life. The 
basic sense of being and existence is creative shaping and objectifying: the 
externalizing d i rect ion尸 
(2) Life is understood as experiencing, as having an experience, understanding, 
and appropriating, and thus as something like our ‘be-ing there‘ (Da sein) in 
such experiencing and encounter. The basic sense of being and existence is 
experiencing: the internalizing direction/''^ 
It is the second direction that Heidegger heads for, proper phenomenon of 
factic life as an unfolding event of possibilities disclosure. Here life is described as 
‘an encompassing realm and as a flowing 'stream' that bears all movements within 
itself, 174 as well as being capable of 'having an experience, understanding, and 
appropriating.' 
Now, taking the internalizing sense of life as the proper aim, Heidegger 
enlarges and deepens such dynamic sense of life in the WS 1921-22 lectures entitled, 
Phenomenological Interpretation of Aristotle. In the lectures, Heidegger intended to 
appropriate the various senses of 'to live' into the direction of his own inquiry by 
indicating that: life = existence, ‘being, in and through life/"" We can also see the 
initial deliberate attempt to relate the problematic of factic life with 'existence' and 
172 Heidegger, 'Comments on Karl Jaspers' Psychology of Worldviews,' Supplements, 81. This 
characterization also appears in SS 1920 and it is called ‘the externalizing direction.’ See Kisiel, 
Genesis, 1 2 4 . 
173 Heidegger, ‘Comments on Karl Jaspers' Psychology of Worldviews,' Supplements, 81. This 
characterization also appears in SS 1920 and it is called ‘the internalizing direction. ‘ See Kisiel, 
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174 Heidegger, 'Comments on Karl Jaspers' Psychology of Worldviews,' Supplements, 84. 
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'being'. Adhering to the internalizing direction in which life is grasped by its verbal 
form, Heidegger particularly characterized three senses of life. The first sense 
points to 'the unity of succession and maturation' — the unity over the totality of life 
in its full or partial manifold of actualisation. The second stresses life as specifically 
bearing possibilities, which matured partially in and for life itself. Life is 
understood as lapsed possibilities, laden with possibilities and laden with itself 
forming possibilities. Or, more definitively, life is itself possibilities. Heidegger 
adheres to the third sense of life, which combines the two previous senses: the unity 
of extension in possibility and as possibility—lapsed possibilities, laden with 
possibilities and laden with itself, forming possibilities. The reality is taken as this 
whole. 176 It is in and through the actualising event of life possibilities that we exist 
and we make sense of our existence, or 'being' (life 二 existence, 'being' in and 
through life.) ‘Facticity’ is so far referred to the structural unity of actualisation and 
of maturation of life.'"" With factical life so understood, as a continuation of 'the 
worldly', and 'the pre-worldly' in KNS, it marks a decisive advancement of 
Heidegger towards his existential inquiry. The proper phenomenon of human 
existence is so viewed with respect to the dynamic event of iiv-ing' out possibilities. 
Of course, the development of 'the phenomenological beginnings' does not stop here. 
In section (b) of this chapter, I shall elucidate the further development with 
reference to the contribution of Diltliey's philosophy. 
Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretation of Aristotle, 64. 
177 Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretation of Aristotle, 61. In fact, the definition of ‘fecticity， 
reappears differently in the following lectures, depending on the different senses of factical life that 
Heidegger intends to develop. 
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(ii) The theoretical infringement upon lived experience 
In fact, the theoretical infringement upon the primal experience of life is not 
uncommon; it has often gone unaware in various trends of philosophies. The 
theoretical comportment to life necessarily extinguishes the environmental and 
dissolves the situational contexture in favour of objective unity of experience. 
Nevertheless, the theoretical comportment itself is also a kind of life experience. 
Heidegger's phenomenological analysis does not merely stop within the primal 
sphere of lived experience. The phenomenological critique intensifies itself as it not 
only simply attacks the de-vivication tendency of theorization, but also comes to 
connect the theoretical experience to its pre-theoretical origin. The 
phenomenological seeing allows us to transcend the restrictive sphere of the 
theoretical into the vital experience of life, and then come back to inspect the route 
that we may slide from the living comportment to the theoretical. Here the analysis 
we now turn to below, to inspect the means and consequences of tacit encroachment 
of the pre-theoretical sphere of life by the theoretical. And in the next section, we 
shall inspect the genesis of the theoretical from the sphere of the pre-theoretical. 
Heidegger leads us to note that the primordial phenomenon of 'liv-ing' is not a 
thing-like process. However, with a view to the objectivity of knowledge of life, 
the occurrence of life is often taken as something objectified and known, passing by 
before us. In such understanding, the 'givenness' of life is assumed to be knowable 
as thing contexture. 
Yet, what is concealed in the objectifying assumption by entailing life as an 
objectively knowable entity is a theoretical comportment of a theoretical T . It is a 
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typical modern kind of epistemological inquiry in which any subject matter of 
investigation is, by and large, first framed into the subject-object split so that 
objectivity and reality become correlates of the consciousness or the epistemological 
subject . 178 With that initial theorization through subject-object split, the subject 
matter to be interrogated is divided tacitly into two separable realms of entities. The 
T is so theoretically pinned down and made to comport knowingly to its detachable, 
posited ‘object’ in such a way that objectivity is maintained and guaranteed 
throughout the observation. 
However, once the same theorization is again applied to the subject matter: life, 
it becomes an infringement, rather than enhancement, upon the actual life-
experience— in which, the original self-world connection is thereby separated. In 
the theoretical comportment towards 'life' understood in externalizing direction, the 
supra-worldly ‘I’ is directed to some objectified occurrence known to ‘1’ as a 
worldly process. Yet such I do not live towards this or that worldly element. It is 
merely ‘a flaccid I-relatedness reduced to the minimum of life-experience. 
In fact, the infringement upon life runs in deeper sense when any employment 
of theorization necessarily involves method and fore-conceptions, which in turn 
restrict the way the object is grasped. Heidegger directs this line of attack mainly at 
Jaspers' ‘Psychology of WorldviewsBut it is helpful to illuminate the fundamental 
limitation of life-philosophy as a whole, and to contrast the essential sense of life 
that Heidegger proposes with that employed by the philosophers of this camp. 
170 Heidegger, Towards the Defifiition of Philosophy, 97. 
171 Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, 99. 
88 
The goal of Jaspers' Psychology of Worldviews is 'to give clarifications (of 
‘life’）and possibilities which can serve as means to self-reflection.' They lead to 
'certain articulated aspect of our life and psychical Dasein and for the sake of 
The method of ‘mere observation' is supposed to have made an objective access to 
'life'—without imposing on his readers any particular world-views/^^ However, 
with that method, certain fore-conceptions are already operative in determining the 
essential meaning of the ‘how’ of life is to be lived and expressed supposedly, also 
the basic sense that possibilities of life can be brought to light. At a more general 
level: 
When objects are approached by way of a specifically oriented mode of 
apprehension and this mode of apprehension is, whether explicitly or not 
understood and used as a technique, i.e., basically as a means of defining these 
objects that is not, however, restricted to them, it might turn out that these 
objects become lost for good by being forced to conform to a particular type of 
apprehension alien to them/®^ 
Now, given that ‘life，is such a labile and polymorphous 'object', it is highly 
sensitive and susceptible to the mode of apprehension, which is applied to it. 
Particularly, the object-life 'apprehended in these fore-conceptions is in fact what it 
is only by virtue of a primordially immanent ' m e t h o d ' . T h e method becomes 
‘part of the object's very make-up' and we have to join in the experience of these 
fore-conceptions wherever they operate in providing the direction for the 
actualisation of life and the fundamental type of knowledge of it. Life as such 
becomes conceptually manufactured products of this method or that. Consequently, 
Heidegger, 'Comments on Karl Jaspers' Psychology of Worldviews,' Supplements, 76. 
Heidegger, 'Comments on Karl Jaspers' Psychology of Worldviews,' Supplements, 100. 
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being forced to appear in conformation with methods and fore-conceptions of one 
type or another, the ultimate reality of life dwindles. The actual knowledge due to it 
is, thus, never in hold. 
For Heidegger, these limitations are due to the externalizing direction that life 
is grasped. With these limitations in view, Heidegger suggests turning to the 
internalizing direction in order to arrive at a pre-theoretical, pre-methodological 
sense of life so as to inspect what we have from the primordial experience of ‘it 
lives' [es lebt]. The inspection reveals to us that ‘the living' and 'the lived of 
experience' are not joined together in the manner of existing objects/^ Rather, 
what comes immediately to view is ‘Er-leben of something', 'living towards 
something，185一 the non-objectifiable, event-like character of experience. It signifies, 
first, an undivided state of relational referential involvement that constitutes the 
environment of living—the character of world; secondly, that the state of 
involvement always rolls on dynamically and extends temporally. The two related 
aspects are best captured in what Heidegger calls in KNS: "it worlds' for me’. By 
that supposition he points to the third related aspect. It is 'only through the accord 
of this particular T does it experience something environmental.' And whenever 
and wherever I find myself existing, the 'self is always already existent within and 
in comportment (or relation) to certain environmental state of involvement. The 
world is always already there 'worlding' in each case I— find myself—，am’. Every 
instance of making sense of my existence (of 'to be，）has to refer back to the 
environmental of living in which self is worldly and historically embodied. Self and 
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world are experienced in life as undivided wholeness which unfolds as 'an event of 
appropriation \EreignisY 
Heidegger here brings to our notice that 'lived experience do not pass in front 
of me like a thing, but I appropriate {er-eigne\ it to myself, and it appropriates itself 
according to its e s s e n c e . T h e originary access to lived experience reveals itself 
to be a coherent entirety of an ever-unfolding state of involvement towards which 
the embedded self comports. The T here is understood to be worldly situated (the 
worldly aspect of life) and historically intended (the temporal aspect of life). The 
determination of the meaning of our existence is, in each case, an event-like 
appropriation of '1' upon the worldly possibilities that disclose historically. 
Holding to the pre-theoretical event-view of life, Heidegger criticizes that the 
objectifying assumption of life not only fails to arrive at its primary reality, it 
actually de-vivids it from the start. While the environing world is experienced to be 
no spurious contingency but essentially bound to life as 'it worlds', the intent to 
objectify life but only infringes upon the environment and then strips it down into 
thingly experience of the environmental. Furthermore, as a flowing stream bearing 
all possible movements within itself, life is laden with certain vectorial tendencies. 
Theoretical treatment of life may well attend to these characteristics. The urge to 
give life an objective description is to ascribe to life the direction of movement most 
proper to it. However, the method applied and the fore-conceptions brought forth 
have virtually forced through a certain fixed vision of the vectorial tendency. It has 
tacitly pre-determined how life actualizes with respect to its possibilities. Life 
actualisation becomes thing-like process with objectifiable path of actualisation. So 
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, 63. 
91 
much so that the requirement of theoretical form of objectivity forces 'life' into the 
sphere of thingliness in which the environmental is crushed and the primary 
experience of 'it worlds' is suppressed. When life is so objectified vis-a-vis the 
theoretical T ’ such ‘1’ has already been removed from the actual experience, and 
the environmental character of life is driven into the theoretical character of the real. 
Certain fore-conceptions are always there, determining the vectorial actualisatioii of 
life. The consequence, as Heidegger explains, is that: 
The meaningful is de-interpreted into this residue of being real. Experience of 
the environment is de-vivified into the residue of recognizing something as real. 
The historical '1' is de-historicized into the residue of a specific 'I-ness' as the 
correlate of thingliness. 
In summary, the methodologically determined thing-experience [Dingerfahrung] 
is certainly counted as Erlebnis but 'understood vis-a-vis its origin from the 
environmental experience it is already de-vivification [Ent-lebnis].邏 In the sphere 
of thingliness, the ‘reality’ of life surely has its meaning, but it is bound to the 
theoretical sphere—with the environmental factor vanishing in view and life being 
restricted to certain fixed direction of movement or pre-determined set of 
possibilities. Once the life-contexture so extinguished, what remains for me is 'the 
externalised sphere of experienced things' with its fullness of content subject to 
regional definition of this or t l i a t . W h a t we obtain is the residue of the original 
richness of life. 
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, 63. 
1 甜 Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, 75. 
Heidegger, Towards the Definition cf Philosophy, 75. 
1 如 Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, 176. 
92 
The success of phenomenological access to the originating domain of factical 
life depends upon the possibility of breaking up the domination of the theoretical, in 
order to ascertain the priority of the original happening of lived experience over 
what is conceptually grasped of life. It entails ultimately the possibility of securing 
a pre-reflective kind of apprehension evolving from the domain as the basis of 
conceptual articulation of lived experience itself. The accomplishment of the 
'phenomenological beginnings', thus, requires a 'hermeneutic breakthrough.' 
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(b) The Hidden Diltheyan Sources 
T h e phenomenological beginnings' can be viewed from two aspects, positive 
and negative. The positive aspect involves disclosing the phenomenological sphere 
of lived experience; it is shown to be an instantaneous happening of factical life. 
The negative aspect indicates the eclipse of the sphere through theoretical 
comportment. The two aspects represent two parallel but complementary 
investigations of importance to the beginnings. They are complementary in that the 
phenomenological disclosure of lived experience entails our alertness to the tacit 
stubbornness of theoretical comportment to the subject matter that we intend to 
make sense of, as well as our ability to move from the theoretical to the pre-
theoretical. The originary access to life and the establishment of the primacy of life 
depends on the possibility of subordinating the operation of the theoretical, or 
capacity of thought in general, to the primal happening of life, i.e. the 
phenomenological disclosure of lived experience. It is not difficult to recognize that 
the motive of Dilthey's thesis— 'behind life thought cannot go’一 is, by and large, 
alive in KNS. Now let's locate the Dilthey-Heidegger connection in KNS more 
precisely. 
(i) ‘The immanent teleology of life' in KNS 
In KNS, Heidegger leads us to see 'the formally objective' of its original 
happening of meaningful vividness and kinesis of life. ‘The formally objective' 
refers to 'something' that resides in the fullness of life without genuine worldly 
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characterization. The 'pre-worldly something' is experienceable as moments of 'out 
towards', 'of direction towards', ‘into a (particular) world', and such other vectorial 
impetus or motivational tendencies of life/^^ Thus, ‘the formally objective' makes 
certain description of life possible without inducing interruption of the life-relation, 
de-vivification of life-event, or theoretical fixing and freezing of what can be 
experienced. It should not be identified with 'what' of life that is actualised, or with 
any pre-determined path or model of actualisation as it only but makes life a thing-
like process. The tendential 'pre-worldly something' is found to be the essential 
moment of life in and for itself, which is developed into thematized investigation of 
‘the movedness [Bewegtheit] of factical life' in WS 1921-22/^ The dynamism of 
life as such becomes one of the major theme thereafter. 
Though Heidegger intends to lead us into the phenomenological sphere of 
lived experience by means of ‘the formally objective' of 'the pre-worldly'; yet, the 
elucidation of these concepts in KNS are still far from precise and exact. Neither 
does the issue become clearer when Heidegger attempts to address the kinetic life 
with concepts of different accent such as 'encounter' and ‘restlessness of life'. 
Contrarily, readers are often made more confused. But, if we return to Dilthey for 
the source of Heidegger's insights, the matter will re-appear in transparence. 
What Dilthey refers to as ‘the immanent teleology' of life^^^ has more precise 
exposition of the vectorial impetus of life in 'the formally objective' manner. As 
Heidegger, Towards the D^nition of Philosophy, 97. 
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life necessarily tends at any moment from one psychic state of affairs into another, 
the tendency of 'striving-towards' is inherent in the psychic structure of life-course. 
The phenomenon of life being, 'striving-towards', refers simply to the intention to 
actualize. Neither must it be confused with what life strives for in actuality, nor 
identified with any definite telos. Such teleology is immanent because it is given in 
inner experience and is not grounded in any conceived end outside of itself. The 
teleological tendency is efficacious throughout its course of development. 
The dynamic of the immanent purposiveness intrinsic in life is embryonic to 
what Heidegger has appropriated as 'the pre-worldly，in KNS, the vectorial impetus 
of life. It is 'formal' as it points to ‘how，life is led and experienced (i.e. 
teleologically), which has not yet broken into anything worldly. Thus, should not 
be counted in terms of factual content. It is 'objective' as the teleological tendency 
is always there in and for life, irrespective of whether there is a definite goal or not. 
In fact, the Diltheyan sense of life in this perspective is outright historical and 
event-like. Though having not made a critique against the theoretical objectification 
of life as deliberate and accentuated as Heidegger has in his phenomenological 
critique, Dilthey is also well aware of the non-objectifiable character of life. Lived 
experience is defined as a unity of presence— in the flow of time. He has seized 
upon the original sense of life as (historically) developmental/^^ The original 
givenness of life is by no means object-life or process-life. The event-view of life is 
never foreign to Dilthey's Lebensphilosophie, including the motive and structural 
194 See Makkreel, Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Studies, 136，for more detailed discussion. 
195 SW3: 216. 
'Development' is one of the real categories of life. See SW 3: 263. 
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formulation. The internalizing sense of life delineated in Heidegger WS 1921-22, 
can been deemed as a recapitulation of Dilthey's purposive efficacy in its own 
course of development, and deepened into categorical investigation of life in terms 
of its movedness.197 it is against this view of life that 'the motivated tendency' 
comes to be identified as the phenomenon most proper to phenomenology in the 
KNS, around which the investigation of other phenomenal moments revolves. 
(ii) Life and world 
Unlike the world of modern epistemology that stands against the thinking-I, 
which is lying there separable from apprehension, the world belonging to kinetic life 
is one that we encounter. Entities are no mere objects of cognition, but emerge as 
constituent part of the meaningful activities of encountering. In a more animated 
term, the phenomenon of life is described as 'encountering.' 
The phenomenon itself thus directs us to interpret the structure of encounter, 
the activity of encountering. And the more we go about this without prejudice, 
the more authentically is the entity encountered ascertainable in its b e i n g， 
So when Heidegger talks about the life/world (or self-world) complex, it refers 
to the world we encounter in factical life. Life and world are not two separable 
entities but relationally belong to each other in the course of development. This 
insight is found alive in WS 1921-22, 
197 See Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, chapter one. 
Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, 216. 
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Accordingly, if the noun, 'life,' is understood in its relational sense, which is 
in itself rich and of a manifold referentiality, then the corresponding content 
can be characterized as 'world.' 
In a formal...way, we could say that life is in itself world-related; 'life' 
and 'world' are not two separate self-subsistent Objects,... The relatedness at 
issue is instead, one of referential ity; i.e., it is actualized, lived, and, as lived, 
preconceptually intended for the interpretation. ...World is the basic category 
of the content-sense in the phenomenon, life.^ ^^ (Italics, my emphasis) 
Though with slight change of emphasis, the position is even maintained in a post-BT 
publication. 
Self and world belong together in the single entity, Dasein. Self and world 
are not two entities, like subject and object...but self and world are the basic 
determination of Dasein itself in the unity of the structure of being-in-the-
world 严 
In each moment of existence, Dasein is nothing but concernful absorption in the 
world, and the wholeness of self-world is already there in the phenomenon. 
Before we get bewildered with Heidegger's jargons, let's turn to Dilthey for 
the original idea of life/world in more understandable terms. 
The analysis of Dilthey's ‘standpoint of life' in chapter 2 section (b) has shown 
that the psychic structure of life has (inner) relations with the world all along in the 
life-process. The world is given to life as the psychic content in relation to the 
psychic attitude. The motivated tendencies contained in the lived experiences such 
as 'striving for a goal', ‘caring about somebody', or 'taking a look at the notice'— 
199 Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, 65. 
Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 297. 
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can be distinguished from one another by the underlying attitudinal relations. The 
objective reality of the world is, thus，counted in terms of such experienceable 
relations between psychic attitude and psychic content. It should not be confused 
with the objectivity of the material determination of the perceptual object that 
epistemological realism comes to grips with. 
Furthermore, the purposive efficacy of the psychic nexus manifests itself as 
life-concern, the meaningful concern of life. Always already in its conduct and 
stance toward things and people, each particular life-unit manifests in itself 'life-
concern'. Thus, the objects (of the world) encountered in life are no bare objects 
but are given to life-concern, already bearing certain significance to me. If the 
psychic nexus is viewed from the moment of 'world', ‘the objective world' is one 
which psychic attitude relates the psychic nexus to. It is primordially given as the 
manifold of psychic contents that we interact with in daily life. The unified psychic 
nexus of life has its life-concern always present within the world. Life is always 
worldly-situated life. Life and world, though conceptually distinguishable, are 
virtually inseparable. It is through the alternating processes of the disclosive life-
world contextual complex that life unfolds. 
The objective world is one, which is virtually subject to the 'life-concern' of 
mine. The psychic nexus is effectual in each case of our willing, feeling, 
representing, etc., or in the sense of 'life-concern', i.e., our living comportment to 
our surrounding people and objects. The world in connection with attitudinal 
modification of consciousness expresses itself to be the world of life-concern with 
which I am relationally involved. With respect to my life-concern, people or things 
that I encounter in life are always 'significant' to me in this or that way. This life-
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concern, 'whether it be limited to a given moment or lasting, makes me see these 
people and things either as bearers of happiness, expanding my existence and 
heightening my powers, or as restricting the scope of my existence, bringing 
pressure to bear on me and diminishing my powers.僅 The world of life-concern is 
one that bears immediate significance upon me, before I can make any 
conceptualisation of it. Thus, in Dilthey and Heidegger, life and world belong to 
each other as a phenomenal complex of life/world. 
Let us now pay special attention to the nature of the life/world relatedness in 
Dilthey. The world holds to life as the source of psychic content. In this sense the 
world appears in terms of content-sense. Also, the world relates to life by means of 
psychic attitude. The world-content does not appear as bare objects standing against 
life, but it is always given to life as objects of life-concern, in certain attitudinal 
relations to the psychic nexus. In this regard, world appears to life in relation-sense. 
Yet, both the content-sense and relation-sense of world should be understood as 
'how' of life, and by no means identified with the objectivity of material 
determination or any definitely determined sense of reality. 
The characterization of the senses of world in WS 1921-22 has the same detour. 
Heidegger states that the phenomenological category, 'world,' immediately names 
what is lived, the content aimed at in living, which life holds to. But, just like 
content-sense of world in the case of Dilthey, the what does not designate some 
incidentally chosen particular r e a l i t y ^ Furthermore, the corresponding content 
2� ' SW 3: 153. 
This is reflected in the expression in speech that ‘life’ and ‘world’ is used interchangeably: e.g., ‘to 
go out into life,‘ ‘out into the world'; ‘to live totally in one's world,' 'totally in one's life.' World is 
the basic category of the content-sense in the phenomenon，life. See Heidegger, Phenomenological 
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obtains its full sense of 'world' insofar as 'life' is understood in its relational sense, 
the rich and manifold referential ity to the what-nQss of the world.^^^ The content-
sense of world is, thus, also relational to life. The content-sense and the relational 
sense of the world belong to each other, and both refer to the 'how' of life. 
(iii) Self and the existential moments of life 
An extended consideration evolving from the life/world phenomenon heralded 
by Dilthey is the status of 'self.' The assertion of the life reality has supplanted the 
primacy of thinking-I that modern epistemology espouses and the 'bloodless' 
knowing subject as merely a conceptual construction. However, the 
representational and conceptualising activities involved are definitely a constitutive 
part of lived experience and describable as facts of consciousness— according to the 
principle of phenomenal ity 严 Apart from feeling and willing, thinking is definitely 
a constitutive experiential moments of the wholeness of human beings. Although 
Diltliey's descriptive psychology is personalistic, he does not describe for us any 
definite self in which these various personalistic experiential moments are united. 
Rather, they are united under the totality of psychic But it does not mean 
that, as a result, he calls the certitude of 'self to doubt altogether. In Einleitung he 
Interpretations of Aristotle, 6 5 . 
203 Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, 65. By the way, Dilthey does not apply 
the terms 'relation-sense' and 'content-seiise.' They are borrowed from Heidegger who makes 
intensive use of them in WS 1921-22 to illustrate the relation between life and world. The application 
of these terms here on the elucidation of Diltliey's concepts of life/world and life-concern means to 
illuminate and magnify their significance and relevance to Heidegger's own inquiry. 
2況 Readers may refer to the discussion of ‘the principle of phenomenality' in ch. 2 section a. 
205 Readers may refer to ‘the principle of totality of psychic life' discussed in ch. 2 section b (i). 
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asserts that external reality is given simultaneously and with as much certitude as his 
own self.206 Then, what is the possible sense of self 'experienceable' in life? 
Dilthey claims that ‘the reference point (of T ) is by no means regularly 
contained in lived experience.' As ‘the more the turn toward the object 
predominates in apprehension or striving, the less an I that apprehends, or even one 
that strives is noticeable in lived experience.'"®^ The emergence of I-consciousness 
depends on how the predominant psychic attitude runs. So, 'when Hamlet suffers 
on the stage, the spectator's own ego is effaced. In striving to complete a task, I 
literally forget m y s e l f . T h e occasional oblivion of I-consciousness will not 
render certain lived experience anonymous or belonging to none. Whenever I 
resume from ‘the turn toward the object in apprehension' (i.e. being drawn to 
Hamlet's suffering on stage in this case), I definitely know that it is T who 
experienced the drama scenes the moment before. It is the selfsame T that runs 
through the experiences of having walked into the theatre, having taken the seat at 
the back row before the curtain was pulled up, and having been attracted to various 
scenes of the drama. At every moment, the inner relation of I-consciousness is 
operative to connect the lived experiences before and after. On the other hand, 
Dilthey also notes that: 
this relation (to ego) is always present in the feeling of life in which a situation 
relative to the surrounding world is felt in pleasure or displeasure, in hate or 
love. And the more decisively a Willing sets itself against the world in 
determining its own purposes, the more strongly is its being restricted felt, and 
206 SW 1： 51. 
2 � 7 S W 3 : 41. 
2�8 SW 3: 41. 
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the more decisively there emerges the relation of the attitude involved in 
willing both to objects and to that which has the attitude, that which does the 
wishing, the desiring or willing严 
In other words, the more intense the psychic attitude in relation to the world is, the 
more obvious is 'that' (the reference point of ‘1，）which has the attitude. 
Even so, one may still find Dilthey ambivalent and ambiguous with the 
certitude of self in lived experience. Yet, for Dilthey, what counts to be the 
fundamental reality is lived experience in its own psychic structure, and all kinds of 
phenomena will be accounted in terms of it. The T is merely one of the related 
aspects of lived experience. In fact, the reflexive awareness of the various psychic 
moments of an individual life process maintains in it the awareness that these 
moments belong to the same consciousness— the sense of ego or 'the reference 
point.，2io The psychic state of I-consciousness varies with the varying psychic acts. 
Thus, the I-consciousness has correspondingly changeable experiential moments and 
meanings, whether noticeable or unnoticeable. It is 'an immediate knowledge of 
being contained together with all my other psychic processes in an ego, a self, or 
more precisely, a substantial Thus, lived experience given in reflexive 
awareness is not something 'possessed' or 'known' by an abstract entity of T . 
Rather, we should say: life is experienced as being ‘mine.'212 The 'mineness' of 
lived experience infers that lived experience does 'have' its selfsame belonger 
throughout the life-course, which is never a posited entity standing against life. 
209 SW 3： 41. 
2�° Readers may refer to ch. 3 section a for more detailed discussion of the foraiative law of self-
consciousness in reflexive awareness. 
2" SW 1: 371. 
212 SW 1: 342. 
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However, if the pre-reflectively lived experience is subjected to reflection, 
'then 
the relation of the attitude to that which has the attitude is unavoidable. ’加 Upon 
employing conceptual thinking in reflection, it requires one to include an ego that 
'stands in a determinate relation to multiple contents or in multiple relations to a 
determinate content. So when asked by my friend about how I found the play on 
Hamlet, my reflection was immediately drawn to the scenes experienced before. No 
matter how much I was absorbed into the scenes so that my I-consciousness had 
been persistently obliterated, the conceptual articulation of my impressions 
necessarily demands me to relate them to my T . Such an I-hood is a necessary 
logical relation on a reflective level, yet, does not necessarily emerge on a pre-
reflective level of experience. The real ‘mineness’ of lived experience is always 
already there, and the psychic nexus of which already and always stands in 
determinate relations to the world of (psychic) objects. Every explicit 
pronouncement concerning 'my' state of affairs entails expressions containing I-
hood which have their reference back to, in each case, the 'mineness' of lived 
experience. Nevertheless, the I-hood as such is obtained insofar as lived experience 
is turned into an object of the thought. Its identity should not be confused with the 
varying I-consciousness experienced in the life-course. 
In order to make clear of the manner of I-consciousness that appears in lived 
experience, we need to withdraw from the stubborn habit of conceiving self and 
world in terms of the correlates of cognitive process. With reference to the cognitive 
process, selfhood is identified with the knowing subject, whose existence is logically 
S W 3 : 42. 
214 SW 3: 42. 
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posited in separation from the world. Apart from the capacity to know the world, 
the subject is virtually empty in meaning. But in reality, we do not experience 'the 
bloodless knowing subject' as such. We need to go back to lived experience to see 
how self/world complex is experienced in reflexive awareness, a pre-reflective kind 
of apprehension. 
The discussion on the question of T in KNS, which is more fully developed 
in the book-review of Jaspers' Psychology of Worldviews, almost goes through the 
same detour. With ‘the absolute sympathy with life,' phenomenology helps to 
disclose the sphere of lived experience, in which we find the primordial 
phenomenon of 'it worlds.' Of the pre-theoretical environmental experience as 'it 
worlds', Heidegger brings forth the indefinite subject 'it' in order to stress the 
primacy of the activating context of meaning in lived experience. Heidegger also 
speaks of 'it' in terms of 'situation' which stands for certain unity in natural 
experience [Erlebnis]. In every situation a unitary tendency is present and situations 
can interpenetrate one a n o t h e r . H o w e v e r , these situational experiences cannot be 
anonymous. They must belong to certain T . In fact, the environmental is effective 
as ‘worlding’ only through the accord of this particular T . In every situation a 
unitary tendency is present, arising from the motivation intrinsic in life-context. 
The motivating and the motivated in the 'worlding' tendency of life are not given 
explicitly (so as to be theoretically grasped) but pass implicitly through the T^^^ I 
am somehow there so that wherever and whenever 'it worlds', it worlds ‘for me.'^ ^^ 
213 Heidegger, Towards the D^nition of Philosophy, 173. 
Heidegger, Towards the D^nition &Philosophy�173. 
217 Heidegger, Towards the D^nition of Philosophy�62. 
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The theme is recast and expanded in 'Comments on Karl Jaspers' 'Psychology 
of Worldviewsdriven towards the issue of Existenz. In response to Jaspers' usage 
of the term, Heidegger had, for the first time, the terminological confrontation of 
Existenz. Based upon this confrontation Heidegger proposed a methodological 
suggestion for better employment of it.^ ^^  As a critique, it meant to attend to the 
basic motive of Jaspers' psychological study of life and radicalises the tendencies 
hidden in it. So after latching upon Jaspers' main theme and criticising the 
deficiency of his approach, Heidegger turns to his proposal. 
The object actually investigated in Jaspers' work can be defined in formal 
indication as our existence \Existenz\. Having such a formally indicated 
meaning, this concept is intended to point to the phenomenon of the 'I am,' i.e., 
to the sense of being in this ‘I am，that forms the starting point of an approach 
to a context of fundamental phenomena and the problems involved there.^^^ 
Heidegger's own proposal signifies a certain connection and reflection upon 
life-philosophy in general. The factical life, i.e. the restlessness and movement that 
characterize life's actualisation of its ownmost qualities, is explored as a 
radicalisation of the hidden tendency of the philosophy of life. For Heidegger, life-
philosophy in general tends in the direction of the phenomenon of existence严 The 
sense of existence is investigated in terms of its origin and our genuine basic 
experience of it. 
218 See Kisiel, Heidegger's my of Thought, 151. 
Heidegger, 'Comments on Karl Jaspers' Psychology of Worldviews,' Supplements, 78. I don't 
involve the part of Heidegger's critique of Jaspers' own investigation because it will run into lengthy 
exposition and so side-track from the proper theme of my paper. 
2如 Heidegger, 'Comments on Karl Jaspers' Psychology of Worldviews,' Supplements, 78. 
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'Existence'...can be understood as a certain manner of being and thus as a 
particular sense of 'is, ' that 'is, ' it has the essential sense of (I) 'am.' And we 
have this (I) ‘am’ in a genuine sense not through til inking about it in a 
theoretical manner, but rather by actual is ing the 'am,' which is a way of being, 
belonging to the be-ing of the ‘I.，... What turns out to be important here is the 
fact that I have myself, i.e., the basic experience in which I encounter myself 
as a self. Living in this experience and gearing myself to its very sense, I am 
able to question after the sense of my ‘I am’ .221 
Phenomenology of existence leads us to 'see', rather than think about, the 
ontological sense of ‘am’ in terms of actual is ing, which has the following features. 
1) The ‘I’ is understood as the full, concrete and historically factical self. It is 
encountered in its historically concrete experience. The actual is ing of one's 
experience and the specific sense of the ‘am，must have its origin in the full 
concreteness of the ‘I，，and it must be directed back to this T by way of a 
particular kind of 'how.'"^ 
2) The sense of existence is understood as the particular 'how' of the self (of the 
I).'223 In more general terms, as the 'I am’ can be articulated into 'he, she, it is’， 
existence can be taken as a particular sense of being and as a particular 'how' of 
221 Heidegger, 'Comments on Karl Jaspers' Psychology of Worldviews,' Supplements, 92. 
222 Heidegger, 'Comments on Karl Jaspers' Psychology of Worldviews,' Supplements, 93. 
223 Heidegger, 'Comments on Karl Jaspers' Psychology of Worldviews,' Supplements, 92. 
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being. The ‘is’ in each case has different meanings, and these differences mark 
out a multiplicity of contexts of life and realms of objects^* 
3) Such 'how' can be seen in terms of the phenomenon of existence, which 
discloses itself in a historical manner of actual is ing our experience. It is 
something to be actualised in our factical experience of life and appropriated 
from such factical experience. 
With reference to factical life, understood as experiencing and appropriating, 
Heidegger now finds that 'experiencing in its fullest sense' is found in its 
authentically factical context of actualisation in the historically existing self. The 
phenomenon of existence becomes the phenomenon of a certain ‘how，of 
experiencing it.^ "^ The essential step towards existential inquiry, thus, consists in 
dissolving the entity 7 ' into the multiplicity of existential moments. These existential 
moments are our factical, historically actual ised life at work, in which 'self is there. 
Such concrete self has its 'concreteness' fabricated synchronically in terms of its 
relations in the self-world, the with-world of others and the environing world, and 
diachronically in terms of experiencing the actual isation of these relations 
historically.227 These are 'how' of self in the experiencing. They consist in the 
phenomenon of existence or of ‘am’，from which my 'self derives its senses 
2以 Heidegger, 'Comments on Karl Jaspers' Psychology of Worldviews,' Supplements, 93. 
225 Heidegger, ‘Comments on Karl Jaspers' Psychology of Worldviews,' Supplements, 95. 
226 Heidegger, ‘Comments on Karl Jaspers' Psychology of Worldviews,' Supplements, 96. 
227 Heidegger, 'Comments on Karl Jaspers' Psychology of Worldviews,' Supplements, 96. 
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historically. 
This sense of existence cannot be obtained from the ‘is，which we use to 
explicate and objectify our experience when we acquire knowledge about it. Nor 
can it be explicated in 'theoretical' knowledge. In fact, the notion of a region or 
an objective realm of 'is' is foreign to the 'concrete self . 'Each time we attempt to 
give a regional definition of the T , we thereby 'efface' the sense of the ‘am’ and 
turn the T into an object able to be ascertained and classified by inserting it into a 
region.'229 T h e actualisation of experience that the phenomenon of existence 
reveals, constituting the 'how' or be-ing of self, resists regional isation, classification 
and objectification. 
Now we can compare the conceptual detours of the relation between self and 
the existential moments in Dilthey and Heidegger. What counts as existential 
moments in Dilthey are the experiential moments (or inner relations) of psychic 
nexus. The psychic state of I-consciousness is but one of the dimensions of such 
inner relations. Though the experiential moments and meanings are variable in each 
case, the self-sameness of an I-consciousness is maintained throughout, whether 
noticeable or unnoticeable. Lived experience given in reflexive awareness is not 
something 'possessed' or 'known' by an eternal entity of T . It is an immediate 
knowledge of being contained together with all my other psychic processes in such a 
'substantial me.’ The proper way to address the phenomenon is that—life is 
experienced as being ‘mine.’ The 'mineness' of lived experience infers that lived 
228 Heidegger, ‘Comments on Karl Jaspers' Psychology of Worldviews,' Supplements, 92. 
229 Heidegger, 'Comments on Karl Jaspers' Psychology of Worldviews, ‘ Supplements, 92. 
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experience does, 'has' its selfsame beloiiger maintaining itself throughout the life-
course, but such belonger is never a posited entity standing against life (or 
life/world). 
The personalistic, substantial self in Dilthey is inherited and becomes the 
'historical I，in KNS and the 'concrete self in the book-review. The meanings of 
existential moments is expanded and accentuated in the internalizing direction of life 
by which life is understood as experiencing and appropriating. The varying 
multiplicity of experiencing moments, existing as historical events of actualisation, 
define our existence, or the sense of ‘am’ in which I find ‘myself. The sense of 
existence holds to 'self as the particular ‘how’ of the 'self ; thus, it renders 'self to 
be understood in terms of the multiplicity of contexts of life. 'Self is not an 
abstract posited entity but is deconstructed into existential moments of actualisation. 
I find myself in relatedness in the happening of life. It is out of the concrete 
experiential contexts and moments that 'self has its selfsame meaning. That is why, 
in Heidegger, 'self is never referred in isolation but always as the meaningful 
complex of self-world. 
In fact, flowing with the situation, the T is indistinguishable as it is wrapped 
in alternating relations of meaning. What happens in life has a relation to me and it 
radiates into my own.'^ ® So another way to address the 'situational 1’ is to regard 
the events of appropriation, 'as they live out of one's 'own-ness'.'^^^ The 
170 Heidegger, Towards the Defifiition of Philosophy, 97. 
171 Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, 99. 
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'mineness' of life is fully engrossed in the 'it worlds' in which concrete and various 
senses of T are experienced as life flows on. When 'Dasein' emerges as the 
essential term denoting our existence in the development of ontological thesis 
thereafter which culminates in BT, Heidegger approaches the phenomenon of 'self 
by addressing the Being of Dasein as 'je meines’ (in each case mine). Mineness 
{Jemeinigkeit) belongs to any existent Dasein insofar as Dasein is an entity which in 
each case I myself am严 The conceptual similarity of 'mineness of lived 
experience' in Dilthey—though Dilthey does not emphasize this idea at all—and the 
'mineness of Dasein' in Heidegger is no coincidence but only re-affirms the fact that 
Heidegger has inherited and appropriated the essential aspects of Dilthey's 
phenomenology of life into his 'phenomenological beginnings.' 
Now, it becomes clear that, from Dilthey, Heidegger not only appropriates 
the dynamic and motivated sense of life but also those related insights elucidated 
above. The appropriation is not limited to one particular idea or aspect, but a 
wholesale absorption of Dilthey's 'original givenness of life.' As Heidegger's 
passing remarks hint, that in any serious and scientifically minded 'philosophy of 
life' there lies an unexpressed tendency towards an ontological problem of Being 
and such tendency is alive in D i l t h e y 严 Heidegger's project is a continuation, as 
well as a radicalisation of Dilthey's major thesis: 'behind life thought cannot go'— 
not only by subordinating any thoughtful operation of the theoretical to the primacy 
of factical life, but also by demonstrating its ontological spin. In this respect, 
232 BT 78/ H53. Reference can be drawn to the sayings in BT 67/ H41: The Being of any such entity 
(Dasein) is in each case mine. ‘ and in BT 68/ H42: 'Because Dasein lias in each case mineness 
[Jemeinigkeit]�one must always use a personal pronoun when one addresses it: ‘I am', ‘you are'.' 
233 S e e BT12I H 4 7 a n d History of the Concept cfTime, 1 2 5 . 
Ill 
phenomenological research is significant for laying the foundations of the problem 
of life in a more radical manner.'^ Insofar as Heidegger develops the 
phenomenological disclosure of life in KNS into an existential-ontological inquiry, it 
also signifies an important break from Diltehy's pursuit of the epistemological in 
Geisteswissenschaften. Hermeneutics in Heidegger's project becomes 'hermeneutics 
of facticity’ and it, thus, assumes an ontological dimension. This is what we now 
turn to. 
2M See B r 2 9 3 / H 2 4 9 note vi. 
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Chapter 7 
The Hidden Diltheyan Sources 
in ‘the Hermeneutic Breakthrough' 
(a) ‘The Hermeneutic Breakthrough' 
(i) The genesis of the theoretical from the pre-theoretical domain of lived 
experience and the corresponding moments of cognizing 
Having rendered the primacy of lived experience over anything to do with the 
logical operation of thought and the theoretical, Heidegger leads us to see the overall 
living and experiential character of the pre-theoretical and the theoretical. Breaking 
up the domination of the theoretical does not mean abandoning it. Insofar as the 
possibility of phenomenological disclosure of lived experience leads finally to 
articulation of life, we necessarily commit ourselves to certain means of 
conceptualization. For the purpose of phenomenology, we need to return the 
theoretical, in general, back to its living character and to ascertain its 
experiencedness. The task paves the way for such phenomenal possibility that 
'conceptualizing' can have, on the one hand, a living character; and, on the other, a 
hermeneutic function. Though the investigation of the experiential movement of the 
theoretical from the pre-theoretical is still rough here, it serves to be a prelude to 
‘the hermeneutic breakthrough' in KNS and thereafter. 
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Corresponding to the experiencing attitude and the theoretical attitude, 
Heidegger brings forth two types of experiencedness [Erlebtheit] in KNS. The 
former gives rise to 'lived experiences' [gelebte Erlebnisse], the unity of which 
comprises the historical I and the interpenetrating motivational situations. The latter 
effects experienced 'contents' which I have experienced. Now, let's look into how 
we experience, in actuality, the modification of the experiencing attitude into the 
theoretical attitude so that the genesis and the living character of the theoretical 
experience are illustrated. 
While the experiencedness of the experiencing attitude is immediate that of the 
theoretical gives rise to the factual contextures of the 'contents' with the character of 
a specific unity. With respect to the contextural unity: 
...one cannot continue in just any direction, but only within a certain region; 
from every state of affairs one comes to a 'natural boundary': e.g. one cannot 
come to a religious problem from a mathematical state of affairs. From this 
unity of the factual contexture there arises a typology of states of affairs 
Accordingly, the theoretical comportment has its own experiential character. It is led 
teleologically into a material contexture (givenness) and has to progress in definite 
direction from one factual determination to another. The direction gives the 
progression a method, as a means of lawfulness, in constituting the contexture of 
states of affairs. 
Now no matter in what directions the theoretical comportment heads for, as a 
differentiation of the living comportment, it has to undergo repeated renewal by 
241 Heidegger, Towurds the Definition of Philosophy, 179. 
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tapping back into lived experience for the original motivation of the subject matter so 
as to sustain and consolidate the theoretical objectivity. We can further infer that it 
is not a departure, once and for all, of the theoretical comportment from the living 
comportment, but a to-and-fro movement of reference. It is ‘an ever new return to 
the origin, first spontaneity' ‘a wavering between environmental and theoretical 
life.，236 For example, the ethical theorists need to draw upon the changing social 
milieu in which they are situated for reference to orient and re-orient their ethical 
thoughts. The varying deteriorating environmental conditions prompt the 
environmentalists to determine what pertaining research on rescuing and preventive 
measures to carry through accordingly. The theoretical is itself a living 
comportment and concern. As a contrast to the labile character of life, we tend to 
emphasize the precedence of the theoretical as it provides the solid claim of truth and 
objectivity. As a result, we are cast in negligence of the living attachment of the 
theoretical sphere to the pre-theoretical sphere of life, which is virtually the 
fountainhead of all theoretical motivations. (Cf. the discussion of Dilthey's 
'Objective World with respect to Life-concern，in chapter 2 section b (ii) 
Theoretical objectivity is reached only after the living attitude has modified 
completely into the theoretical attitude. The living experience is divested and 
becomes oblivious as the theoretical experience goes down its path of 
methodologically led progression. 
To reverse the tendency, we need not only to exhibit the experiential genesis of 
the theoretical in the pre-theoretical, but dig deep into the various possible cognitive 
moments bound to these experiences as well. In this respect, Heidegger 
241 Heidegger, Towurds the Definition of Philosophy, 179. 
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distinguishes three types of cognizing moments in KNS: 
1) Mere cognizance; 
2) Cognition (methodological solution); 
3) Cognitive discovery (research严 
In the preliminary phase (preliminary form of the theoretical) ‘cognizance’ 
exists with the natural life-experience and the situational context is maintained. It 
moves first of all in the sphere of natural (pre-theoretical) experience and is 
interested in what is simply being there and so. 
Then comportment to the theoretical may then activate. A habitus awakens in 
the knowing subject who is ready to go over to 'cognition', a disposition that 
'wanting cognizance is transformed into want to know.'^^^ Particular forms of 
contexture emerge and pure dedication to the subject matter is required. Moving to 
'cognition', one's every life-relation and life-contexts are suppressed, and one's 
natural living attitude has to be stripped away. ‘I am fully free of every life-
contexture and yet fully bound to the t r u t h . T h e comportmental tendency of the 
theoretical will then result in a new situation in which a life-contexture oriented to 
the theoretical world becomes possible. Going down the path of 'cognitive 
discovery (research)', I am obligated only to the idea of scientificity, all other 
comportments must be guided by t h i s， I give myself in dedication to the subject 
matters, their horizons and anything stemming from the character of the region. 
237 Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, 178. 
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(ii) In search of the hermeneutic intuition 
Though the fore-going clarification in KNS is still rough and far from definite, 
it brings out a notification gravely significant to phenomenology, i.e. the differences 
in nature and the relation of cognizing moments between the pre-theoretical (the 
preliminary phase) and the theoretical (theoretical comportment to scientificity). 
The pre-theoretical cognizance is described as 'a serene dedication' and 'moving in 
the regions of natural experience' in which 'natural situation is not d i s t u r b e d . I n 
other words, there is a primordial kind of experiential ‘intuition，concomitant in life 
that enables life to know and to be known ‘in and for itself, without, like the phase 
of cognition, drawing upon anything in the situational context or world character of 
life to be known by means of objectification. 
In order to grasp the essence of ‘the hermeneutic breakthrough', we need to 
adhere to the externalizing direction in which life is understood as an event of 
experiencing and appropriating. The fleeting event of life designated as 'life in and 
for itself is later called ‘factic life experience' in WS 1919-20 Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology. Factical life holds particularly to the tendencies intrinsic in life. 
These tendencies strive for fulfillment, and the fulfillment is provisional and never 
final. Everything we encounter in the tendential life expresses itself as phenomenon. 
What is experienced is real in the sense of being significant and meaningful. 
Significance is always and alone the character of factically experienced 
reality. ...Every factic life experience has a particular horizon of significances, 
which characterizes and influences its inner context. This meaningful context 
241 Heidegger, Towurds the Definition of Philosophy, 179. 
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is cantered in situations which are 'open,' that is, accessible for motivations 
from the past and future. Existence without significance simply does not have 
the possibility of motivation. Significance is defined by the context of 
expectation in which every vital situation s t a n d s严 
The phenomenological reality of the dynamic factical life has such subtle characters 
that it requires some detailed analysis before we push on. 
Life-course, as guided by a certain direction of expectation, runs through one 
experiential context into another. The 'mere cognizance' existent with the natural 
life-experience and the situational acknowledges the context, not only of the present 
but the past and future through the tendency. Tendencies of experience are virtually 
tendencies of sense, and the unfolding of tendencies is the unfolding of significance 
which is binding for what is being experienced, and experienced as meaningful. 
Phenomenology catches at the 'mere cognizance' as the originally giving intuition of 
the tendential life-context and is pre-theoretical in nature. 'Life experiences are not 
things, but expressive formations of the tendencies of concrete life-situations.'^^ 
Underlying every dynamic moment of factical life is the primary giving of the ever-
activating context of significance and meaning which expresses or interprets itself in 
terms of motivational tendencies. Expressiveness has the sense of expressing lived 
experiences or comportments through meaning in such a way that our simplest 
perceptions and constitutive states are already expressed, even more, are interpreted 
in a certain way. Thus, 'we do not say what we see, but rather the reverse, we see 
what we say (interpretively) about the mater.，浏 
242 Kisiel, Genesis, 119. 
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It brings us back to what Heidegger means by 'it worlds', indicating that the 
true locus of experience is the activating anonymous milieu of meaning-giving 
context encompassing us, in which things exist as being significant to us in one way 
or another. Accordingly, ‘the meaningful is primary and immediately given to me 
without any mental detours across thing-oriented apprehension,'245 so that theoretical 
comportment is outright inappropriate to the worldly character of living experience. 
The precedence of the ‘It’（or 'factical life' as so termed at a later time in 
Heidegger's course)— the encompassing context of meaning that is ever activating— 
gives phenomenology the ineradicable moment of hermeneutics, ‘It，‘can be 
experienced in understanding.'^^ In KNS, this hermeneutic intuition is referred as 
'something knowability' motivated from ‘the pre-worldly something of life'. This 
spontaneous understanding and familiarity 'in and for life itself makes possible 
some kind of precepts to ride on life's motivation and tendency. The motivated 
tendency of life is to carry with it the understanding intuition or the hermeneutic 
intuition— the originary phenomenological back-and-forth formation of the recepts 
and precepts from which all theoretical objectification, indeed every transcendent 
positing, falls out"*? The hermeneutic intuition is primordially living and 
experiential, and the signification or linguistic expression arising from it does not 
need to be theoretical or even object-specific，In response to Natorp's objection 
upon the issue of 'intuition and expression', Heidegger raises the possibility of a 
non-reflective understanding that enables non-objectifying articulation of lived 
245 Heidegger, Towards the Definition cf Philosophy, 61. 
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experience. Phenomenology has the task of bringing the appropriate language of the 
meaningful sphere of experience, which is in every case understood. 
Now, let's come back to KNS for a short summary. In KNS, the lived 
experience which is phenomenologically disclosed is shown to be an event of 'it 
worlds' or appropriation. It is virtually an instantaneous happening of life in terms 
of meaning. ‘The phenomenological beginnings' makes such original 'instantaneous 
happening of life' accessibly in view while 'the hermeneutic breakthrough' attends 
to the meaningful dimension that underlies it. Heidegger succeeds here in revealing 
that lived experience is itself already meaningfully contextualized. Thus, the 
'instantaneous happening of life' is virtually the 'instantaneous happening of 
meaning.' The Phenomenological description of life draws by necessity upon the 
meaningful and makes it transparent by means of interpretation. In this sense, 
phenomenology is hermeneutic. This position is maintained and meticulously 
explored in the following years leading up to BT, in which Heidegger finally states: 
T h e phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic in the primordial signification of 
this word, where it designates this business of interpreting.'^^ 
249 BT 62/ H37. 
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(b) The Hidden Diltheyan Sources 
Now, the mutual implication between ‘the phenomenological beginnings' and 
'the hermeneutic breakthrough' becomes clear. Making it transparent as how the 
theoretical infringes upon lived experience is helpful in disclosing the 
phenomenological realm of life. Once it is successfully disclosed, we are allowed to 
see the living character of life in its wholeness, including the living character of the 
pre-reflective pre-theoretical sphere, that of the theoretical as well as that of the 
possible transition from the former to the latter. The theoretical is not something 
we have to do away with. So long as the theoretical comportment is a living 
comportment, it is also a kind of experience that we may encounter in life. This 
point is particularly important and relevant to the consideration of Diltheyan and 
Heideggerian hermeneutics if we consider the possibility of understanding and 
articulation of life in terms of itself. Let's go through Dilthey's consideration 
before dealing with the 'hermeneutic breakthrough' in KNS. 
For Dilthey, thought is but an expression of life and behind life it cannot go. 
If life is conceptually understandable at all, it has to be understood via a faithful 
description of life. Psychological description is the attempt to describe life in 
accordance with the manner that life is originally given in terms of psychic facts of 
consciousness. It belongs to 'descriptive science', which involves distinguishing 
and describing the simplest components and the relationship among them. It is 
different from 'explanatory science' {erklarende Wissenschaft) which involves 
observations by means of hypotheses and subsuming to general laws data or 
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elements abstracted from our experience?，。Based upon the difference, Dilthey 
proposed his 'descriptive psychology' against the 'explanatory psychology' in reign 
then. Explanatory psychology seeks to explain human experiences, taking them as 
abstract, atomized and formalized givenness, by means of hypotheses that model the 
causal relationship of natural science. The natural scientific bias in psychology 
tends to parallel the psychic process with the perceptible physical event so that 
psychic 'effect' is aligned with the causal explanation of physical 'cause'. Higher 
mental activities are inferred from these basic explanations. Dilthey rejected it as 
'psychology without a soul.'^^ Psychologism, in its particular field of logic, 
ultimately suffers from a certain kind of confusion, as Heidegger noted: 
There was a tendency in logic to take the laws of thought as laws of the psychic 
processes of thought, of the psychic occurrence of thought. In opposition to 
this misunderstanding, Husserl, like Brentano, showed that the laws of thought 
are not the laws of the psychic course of thinking but laws of what is thought; 
that one must distinguish between the psychic process of judgment, the act in 
the broadest sense, and what is judged in these acts. Distinction is made 
between the real intake of the acts, the judging as such, and the ideal, the 
content of the judgment. This distinction between real performance and ideal 
content provides the basis for tht fundamental rejection of psychologism. 
It is in line with this consideration that Dilthey proposes 'descriptive 
psychology' to focus on the aspects and features of psychic life which have been 
persistently overlooked by explanatory psychology. From the domination of 'the 
议 See Hodges, The Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey, 33. 
251 GS 5:159. To be quoted from Emiartli, Wilhelm Dilthey: the Critique of Historical Reason, 170. 
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laws of what is thought’，it salvages 'the laws of the psychic process' in which 
thinking is simply one of such courses. Assuring the primacy of life over the logic 
of thought, Dilthey unlocks and attends directly to the psychic process of life and of 
those acts of judging before they are collapsed into the judged ideal content. By 
doing away with any trace of hypothetical construction, descriptive psychology 
seeks to describe and analyse the immediate givenness of psychic life in which man 
is understood as a real living person actively involved in h is tory严 As a whole, 
the productive point of departure for the sciences of culture, and for their inner 
philosophical connection into a fruitful whole, lies solely in a descriptive content-
psychology.'^'^ 
However, Dilthey's position was soon disputed. Ebbinghaus, a close friend of 
Dilthey's who specialized in psychology, did not acknowledge the gap that Dilthey 
proposed between the explanatory psychology and descriptive psychology. The self-
givenness of the psychic coherence, though unquestionable, was not as directly and 
immediately given in experience as Dilthey thought. These coherences are 
'constructed', at least out of partial contents, which is not given immediately, just 
like the hypothetical procedures that explanatory sciences have to go through. The 
psychic coherence is not 'lived through' directly, but is super-added and 
retroactively inferred, and thus hypothesizing of any degree is unavoidable. Pure 
description is simply unsustainable， 
253 See Heidegger, History qfthe Concept ofTime, 117. 
GS 5: Ixxi. To be quoted from Ermarth, Wilhelm Dilthey: the Critique of Historical Reason, 185. 
2" See the discussion in Ermarth, Wilhelm Dilthey: the Critique of Historical Reason, 184. 
123 
The critique was so detrimental that it not only broke the friendship between 
the two scholars, but also forced Dilthey himself to reflect on the viability of the 
descriptive science. He ever tried, but in vain, to make a defence of his own thesis. 
It finally caused a hermeneutics-turn in Dilthey's philosophy, the search for a new 
cognizing stance that belongs to Geisteswissenschaften. In his early move from the 
explanatory to the descriptive, Dilthey already felt the need for a different detour of 
cognising moment. He realized that we 'explain' nature, but we 'understand' 
psychic life—i.e., we explain natural events through intellectual processes, but we 
understand psychic life by focusing on the concrete contents of individual processes 
of experience to consider how they function as part of a larger encompassing whole. 
It proceeds from the context of the whole, as given in its vitality, in order to make 
the parts comprehensible on the basis of i t，But at that stage, the method of 
Verstehen remained undeveloped. Until the essay on ‘Die Entstehung der 
Hermeneutik' in 1900, hermeneutics emerged to be the sole method to understand 
the spiritual human world by means of interpreting the 'objectifications' and 
'manifestations' of psychic life. The essay indicated the emergence of a new 
direction of philosophical endeavour严 
Let's be reminded that Dilthey's personalistic and descriptive psychology has 
been premised on the distinction between ‘the laws of the psychic course of 
thinking' and 'laws of what is thought'. Psychic process has its own formative laws 
which must not be super-imposed by the laws of thought. If we push the 
requirement a bit further, it means to require that any priori theorization of life will 
256 See Makkreel, Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Studies, 134-5. 
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banish the psychic process from its own formation. The two kinds of laws have 
their own sources, the former from the immediate givenness of vital life and the 
latter from the logical operation with respect to its object. The vital givenness of 
life is essentially different from the object-correlate of thought. While the operation 
of the laws of thought entails the subject matter to be first objectified, the vital 
temporal givenness of life resists any such means of objectification. Yet, insofar as 
Ebbinghaus' criticism (as well as Natorp's criticism afterwards) is concerned, the 
dilemma is insoluble as any conceptual interpretation of life cannot be excused 
from constructive or objectifying conceptualization. Thus, without a forceful 
defence, Dilthey's ideal of psychological description falls back on psychologism. 
Though Dilthey failed to make a direct defence of his descriptive science 
against Ebbinghaus’ and Natorp's criticism, after 1900，when he turned to 
hermeneutics as the method of Geisteswissenschaften he managed to avoid 
psychologism altogether. It is because interpretation is concerned no more with the 
description of the mental process of particular life. Rather, interpretation now 
comes to grips with the meanings of the various manifestations and objectifications 
of spiritual life. The expressions of human spirit and the world are opened up as the 
text for understanding. Experience of life is identified not with the psychological 
process of subjective acts but the inter-subjective, mediated experience of cultural 
and historical contents. Interpretive grasping of meanings in expressions or 
objectifications of life, rather than 
a method of psychological description, becomes the subject matter proper to human 
science. Though Heidegger does not adhere to Dilthey's approach to hermeneutics 
by interpreting object-life, his discovery of ‘the interpretive moments' of living 
reality has provided the basis for Heidegger's hermeneutic breakthrough in KNS. 
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The triadic Diltheyan formula of the interconnection of lived experience, expression 
and understanding becomes the blueprint of the breakthrough. In its Heideggerian 
vein, life-experience becomes the expressive formations of the tendencies of 
concrete life-situations. Lived experience, expression and understanding co-exist 
and relate to one another on the same ontological plane. 
In fact, how Dilthey had struggled against psychologism, was also of close 
relevance to phenomenology. As a descriptive science, phenomenology is 
necessarily confronted with the same challenge: how is 'pure description' as such 
possible— describing the subject matter as it is without smuggling in hypothetical or 
constructive concepts? The criticism along the line of Ebbinghaus is deepened and 
finally radicalized in Natorp. It holds not only to Dilthey but also to Husserl's 
notion of pure description. 
Husserl intends to establish phenomenology as a descriptive science of 
experience, which involves no hypotheses but simply brings out what lies in the 
experiences themselves. It is possible, because the phenomenological method 
operates entirely in acts of reflection, the reflectively experiencing. Reflection 
renders every unexamined and unreflectively experienced living experience into 
something 'look at' and then describes it. Then we are bound within life by 
describing life through the lived experience of reflection. Thus, the purely 
descriptive of phenomenology claims to ‘has its justification in itself by changing 
nothing of what it describes in regard to its theoretical character. Nevertheless, 
Natorp raises doubt upon such possibility, as reflection is necessarily analytical. Its 
experiential character cannot refrain itself from having dissective and destructive 
effect upon the fluid unreflective experience of life by bringing it to a standstill. 
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Also, description itself presupposes a certain kind of concept-formation, which 
involves generalization, abstraction and objectification. Theorization is an 
ineradicable moment in both levels of reflective experiencing and description. Thus, 
immediate apprehension of experience is impossible. Apprehension of experience 
has to be conceptually mediated and is, thus, theoretical， 
Following Heidegger's analysis as presented in chapter 7 section (a) i, Natorp's 
claim is virtually justifiable. By rendering the immediate experience as ‘looked-at， 
experience of reflection, the 'mere cognizance' slides into 'cognition' and then the 
comportment to the theoretical activates. It is accompanied by the suppression of 
life-context and the original natural living attitude, as well as the emergence of a 
particular form of contexture. As a result, the theoretical comportment, with the 
help of certain orientation of concept-formation, is guided by the regional 
consideration of the subject matter. Going along with this logic, conceptual 
apprehension of life is possible only by means of regional isation, generalization and, 
after all, theorization. 
As a final defence against these challenges, for Heidegger, the sustainability of 
the entire phenomenological enterprise, as a descriptive science, depends on 
securing a certain peculiar mode of apprehension and articulation-express ion by way 
of which life is made intelligible. The according mode has to be non-theorizing 
non-objectifying in nature so that the vital impetus of factical life is not interrupted, 
but is maintained in the milieu of apprehension and expression. Accordingly, if 
such a mode exists at all, it has to be sought from nowhere else but directly from the 
Readers may refer to ch. 5 for detailed discussion. 
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origin of factical life itself, i.e., the motivated tendency. The motivated tendency of 
factical life, for Heidegger, is itself interpretive, (c.f. Dilthey: ‘the interpretive-
constitutive moment of experience'.) and, thus, expressive of meanings. Such 
character of the meaningful is non-theoretical. The understanding of life, i.e. 
making life intelligible, is hermeneutic intuition which gives meaning to life out of 
itself. By that means, the linguistic description of the meaningfulness of life does 
not have to be theoretical, or to be tied to generalization. Rather, it is directed 
toward the eidetic.^^^ Now, let's look into the nature of ‘the hermeneutic 
breakthrough' closely. 
For Heidegger, the hermeneutic solution for the overall challenge of 
phenomenological description lies in such a possibility. Negatively speaking, it 
seeks to break up the domination of theoretical approach to reality in terms of 
bipolar split of ‘knowing and the known', and then purge from the phenomenological 
sphere the last tinge of the theoretical, the hypothetical and fore-conceptions. These 
tasks have been illustrated in the fore-going analysis of 'the phenomenological 
beginnings'. Positively speaking, it entails a 'hermeneutic breakthrough,' which is 
able to meet the following requirements: 
(H-1): It seeks to establish the structural unity of ‘the knowing，and 'the known', 
i.e. the belonging together of life (‘the known') and understanding ('the 
knowing'). If such relation does not stand, the possibility of 'pure 
description' will lose its basis. 
241 Heidegger, Towurds the Definition of Philosophy, 179. 
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(H-2): Also, it has to ensure the descriptive concepts of life to be derived from the 
expression of the structural unity of life itself and not from other fore-
conception sources. 
(H-3): Furthermore, these concepts have to be non-objectifying, without rendering 
the described subject matter objectified. 
These requirements concern ultimately the possibility of understanding-
articulation of life. Such cognizing moment of understanding has to be intrinsic in 
the factical life itself and on the basis of which life is expressed. As a response to 
those challenges upon descriptive science, and also as a justification of its own thesis, 
phenomenology has to take a 'hermeneutic turn', which proves itself to be able to 
fulfill the fore-going three requirements. Before looking into how Heidegger's 
'hermeneutic turn' takes its shape from Dilthey's philosophy, let's have a 
preliminary overview of such a path. 
The success of phenomenological disclosure of lived experience relies 
ultimately on the possibility of certain kind of understanding that maintains itself 
within the life stream and finally makes conceptual articulation of life possible. In 
fact, such a possibility had already been prepared by Dilthey's method of Verstehen. 
In chapter 3 section c (i), on the elementary forms of understanding, I have already 
pointed out Dilthey's discovery of the 'interpretive moment' in experience itself. It 
is not secondary to some purportedly more original process, but is constitutive of 
experience as such. Experiencing is an interpretive-adaptive mutually-implicated 
process of personal life with life in general. To be experiencing is already a kind of 
proto-interpretation in such a way that experience of life and understanding work 
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together reciprocally to promote ever-higher level of conscious 
Furthermore, consisting in every practice is 'the act of understanding'. These 
acts of understanding do not run in isolation, but on tracks of commonalities that 
knit life-units together within a spiritual world. By means of these acts, I make my 
life manifestations understandable to myself and to others, or others' to me. Our 
practical-interpreting lives are always already embedded within and emerge from a 
specific contextualized historical situatedness, and each case of acting discloses to us 
the characterization and meaning of 'objective spirit', which is always already there 
latent at the background— historically extending with continuing acts of 
interpretation. Life-experience {Lebenserfahrung, culturally-historically mediated 
experience) consists virtually in the interpretive moment, which activates the 
meaningful context of situatedness for each practical act of interaction with the 
surrounding world. 
In WS 1919-20 and SS 1920, we 'find' that Heidegger's discussion has almost 
followed the Diltheyan line of insight. What was most relevant to Heidegger was the 
illumination of the self-world complex, the structural unity of acquired psychic nexus 
of concrete self cum its operative context of situation.^ It amounts to recapitulation 
of the primordial phenomenon of ‘it worlds for me,' and sheds light on how 
motivated tendency (the pre-worldly something) is like in concrete life. Besides, the 
spiritual world of commonalities and objective spirit in Dilthey constitutes the 
significance and meaning we encounter in the world. Every interpretive-experience 
is real and meaningful to me insofar as the world, already significant to me, is 
2 叨 See the discussion in Emiartli, Wilhelm Dilthey: the Critique of Historical Reason, 227-8. 
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activated and becomes meaningful and understandable manifestations. 
Factic life has a definite direction, a tendency, which is not always conscious. 
Life is a sequence of tendencies: it makes a claim on us, ‘addresses’ us, or 
passes us by. Whether latent or patent, such tendencies tend to stabilize or 
'crystallize' around us . ' " 
Just as Dilthey claims that 'immanent teleology' is intrinsic in life, irrespective of 
what definite goal one may take, tendency— for Heidegger— is intrinsic in life, 
irrespective of whether one is conscious of it or not. And as a tendency, it is 
motivated from the past or future, in which significance and meaning are involved. 
Every factic life experience has a particular horizon of significances which 
characterizes and influences its inner context (of self-world). This meaningful 
context is centred in situations which are 'open', that is, accessible for 
motivations from the past and future. Existence without significance simply 
does not have the possibility of motivation. Significance is defined by the 
context of expectation in which every vital situation stands.^^^ 
Now, Heidegger lets us see that the vital impetus of life tendencies and the 
activation of meaning-context of the world are virtually two sides of a phenomenon. 
Adhering to such phenomenal characteristic of factical life, we shall be able to make 
clear sense of the nature of ‘the hermeneutic breakthrough.' 
Kisiel, Genesis, 118. 
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(i) The structural unity of ‘the knowing' and ‘the known，. 
We begin with Dilthey's imminent teleology. Life in terms of lived 
experience, the smallest entity with a unitary meaning in the stream of time, is itself 
a 'productive process'. The teleological tendency renders life the efficacy to 
'project' meanings upon the factual instances of the world, which is always already 
there, being significant to my life-concern. The 'productive process' produces 
objective contents of mental expressions and 'products' that are intelligible as norms, 
values and goals. Thus, psychic life is also a 'productive system', capable to be 
productive of various potential forms of goods, values and meanings. Every 
instance of lived experience is a 'productive system' insofar as it adheres to the 
present of the past values and the future realizable goals, and produces meaningful 
connections of them. The temporality and the productivity of meaningful 
experience are the two essential moments of lived experience, out of both we obtain 
the basis for the historicity of life. In this sense, life is historical to the degree that 
it is apprehended as advancing in time and as an emerging productive n e x u s . S o 
if the understanding of life is at all possible, it has to approach the mental products 
or expressions of life as objective texts of interpretation. Understanding here 
presupposes knowledge of an approximate wholeness of life-nexus, and inductive 
inferences drawn from analogy run from particular expression (part) to the overall 
life-nexus (whole). The science of interpretation involves constructing the life-
nexus as a whole by drawing reference to the repertoire of past life manifestations. 
Understanding is ultimately oriented towards the epistemological foundation of the 
SW 3: 280. 
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world of human spirit.^^^ However, it is this line of epistemic hermeneutics that 
Heidegger objects. 
In chapter 6 section a (i), we have reviewed the two directions by which life is 
understood, externalizing and internalizing. In the case of Dilthey, 'life is 
approached as the fundamental reality, and all phenomena are seen to lead back to it, 
so that everything and anything is understood as an objectification and manifestation 
‘of life.，’2秘 The Diltheyan hermeneutic sense of life, as Heidegger seems to 
suggest, belongs to the externalizing direction, i.e., the basic sense of being and 
existence is creative shaping and objectifying. This renders hermeneutics in Dilthey 
an epistemic methodology in making avail of historical relics as the textual objects 
of interpretation. However, it is the second direction that Heidegger heads for the 
proper phenomenon of existence, in which 'life' is viewed as an unfolding event of 
possibilities disclosure. Hermeneutics becomes one of such possibility of self-
knowledge inherent in the phenomenon of existence. But we must notice that, while 
Dilthey's later development of hermeneutics of life does belong to the externalizing 
direction—accord ing to Heidegger's characterization— his early project of 
psychological description remains as belonging to the internalizing direction. In this 
regard, Heidegger's appropriation of Dilthey can mean that he adapts Dilthey's 
early philosophical thesis against his later thesis by introducing ‘the hermeneutic 
breakthrough.' Below we shall see how it is achieved. 
In SSI923 Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity, Heidegger first came to a 
systematic grip with the thematic issue of hermeneutics and connected it with his 
Readers may refer to ch. 2 (c) for detailed discussion of the points here. 
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ontological inquiry. While, from Schleiermacher, Dilthey receives hermeneutics as 
‘the formulation of rules of understanding' and advances its application to human 
sciences, Heidegger finds the overall project as a grave limitation to the essential 
dimension of hermeneutics. The analysis of understanding has moved only to a 
small extent in the direction of obtaining a scientific methodology严 The original 
meaning of hermeneutics is virtually hidden to these modern philosophers. 
The most fitting meaning of hermeneutics for Heidegger's own inquiry is 
noted in Aristotle's On Interpretation, which deals with A o r o T in terms of its 
basic accomplishment of uncovering beings and making us familiar with them.^ ^^ 
The original meaning of hermeneutics is so connected with a definite unity in the 
actual is ing of communication, with the distinctive possibility of making what was 
previously concealed available as unconcealed, as being out in the open.^ ^^ By that 
means, Heidegger formulates hermeneutics as the self-interpretation (the distinctive 
possibility of laying bare) of facticity (what is concealed), in which facticity is being 
encountered, seen, grasped and expressed in concepts."^® Thus, hermeneutics 
becomes a possibility of carrying out the distinctive function of disclosure, throwing 
into light what is factically concealed. Such a possibility is not a haphazard one but 
essentially ontological as it is constitutive of the Being of Daseiii. Now Heidegger 
intends to develop hermeneutics in terms of 'the distinctive function of disclosure'. 
For a while let us stay with this distinctive feature in SS 1923. 
267 Ontology: the Hermeneutics cf Facticity, 10-11. 
268 Ontology: the Hermeneutics cf Facticity, 8. 
269 Ontology: the Hermeneutics of Facticity, 8 & 1 1 . 
270 Ontology: the Hermeneutics of Facticity, 1 1 . 
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Heidegger puts down the formula: facticity = in each case our own Dasein in 
its being-there for a while at the particular time^i The German term 'Dasein' 
composes of ‘Da’ and ‘sein，which mean literally 'there' and ‘to be’. Special 
attention has to be drawn to subject matter of investigation, the 'how' of Dasein (or 
the being of facticity), rather than 'what'. It is pointless to ask 'what' (the being of) 
Dasein is, because Dasein is not a posited entity, existent ever unchangeably at 
every present.^^^ As an entity that each of us is (exists) temporally, Dasein is 
essentially possibility-bound and, thus, cannot be pre-determined or well defined 
with respect to its content. Such Dasein possibilities are neither logical nor empty 
possibilities. They are contextualised possibilities in that this being-possible of 
Dasein is one which is circumscribed, modifying itself in a factical manner from out 
of the situation.273 The circumscribed possibilities consist in the being of the 'there' 
and 'how' of ‘Da，. Seen in this respect, 'possibility' is the most primordial and 
ultimately positive way in which Dasein is characterized ontologically. And, as 
such, 'possibility' is an existentiale of Dasein, signifying Dasein as the potentiality-
for-Being 严 
Dasein is Being-possible, which has been delivered over to itself— thrown 
possibility through and through. Dasein is the possibility of Being-free for its 
ownmost potentiality-for-Beiiig.^"" 
271 Ontology: the Hermeneutics of Facticity, 1 7 . 
Heidegger notes that 'Dasein is not a 'tiling' like a piece of wood or such a tiling as a plant—nor 
does it consist of experiences, and still less is it a subject (an ego) standing over against objects 
(which are not the ego). It is a distinctive being [Seiendes] which precisely insofar as it 'is there，for 
itself in an authentic manner is not an object. ’ {Ontology: the Hermeneutics of Facticity, 37) 
Therefore, we cannot define Dasein's essence by citing a 'what' of the kind that pertains to a subject 
matter,...its essence lies rather in the iact tliat in each case it lias its being to be.' (BT32-33/ H12) 
273 Heidegger, Ontology: the Hermeneutics of Facticity, 13, 
274 57^183/ H143. 
饥 BT mi H144. 
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Following the internalizing sense of life explicated above, Heidegger already 
delimited 'life' as 'something bears possibilities and is its possibilities, itself as a 
possibility.，276 In terms of the characters of extension, unity of succession, and 
manifold of actual isation, 'life' is categorially determined as possibility—delivered 
over to possibility and developing possibility. This whole is taken as reality. 
Possibility as a category—which is by no means logical, an a priori possibility—can 
be grasped in a phenomenological rigorous w a y ? 
For Heidegger, priority, from the outset, is given to the futural tendency of 
Dasein over its past and present moments, just to pre-empt the disclosive dynamic of 
possibilities of Dasein. The possibility as an existential of Dasein is essentially 
related to the distinctive function of hermeneutics: disclosure of concrete 
possibilities. Insofar as Dasein is an entity existing temporally, and characterized as 
potentiality-for-Being, in every case it has already seized upon possibilities and got 
itself into definite possibilities and explicitness. In BT, the disclosive moment of 
Dasein is especially captured in the technical term, Lichtung, which literally means 
'lighting up’ or 'clearing'. Dasein is its disclosedness, or the clearing itself.^^^ In 
each case of the clearing, the possibilities are disclosed from concealment to 
disclosedness, and the entities of the world are lit up— in term of meanings. 
In the simplest terms, the distinctive function of hermeneutics is to disclose 
what is concealed in the factical possibilities of Dasein. Yet, it involves making 
known conceptually explicit (to interpret) what is understood pre-reflectively. This 
276 Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, 64. 
277 Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, 64. 
278 紹7 1 / H 1 3 3 . 
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event of hermeneutic disclosure draws upon the worldly involvement (facticity), 
which is significant to me pre-reflectively, in one way or another, and makes it 
explicit in terms of meaning. Hermeneutics is essentially the self-interpretation of 
facticity, the distinctive possibility of laying bare what is concealed in meaning. 
What hermeneutics is really meant to achieve is not taking cognizance of something 
and having knowledge about it, but rather an existential knowing, i.e., a being [ein 
Sein]. It speaks from out of interpretation and for the sake of it.^ ^^  
Hermeneutics has the task of making the Dasein which is in each case our own 
accessible to this Dasein itself with regard to the character of its being, 
communicating Dasein to itself in this regard,... In hermeneutics what is 
developed for Dasein is a possibility of its becoming and being for itself in the 
manner of an understanding of itself.28® 
Thus, the relationship between hermeneutics and facticity is not the kind of 
relationship between 'knowing' and ‘the object to be known'. Rather, 'interpreting' 
is a being which belongs to the being of factical life itself. Hermeneutics belongs to 
facticity. The being of 'knowing' and the being of 'the known' belong together. 
'Hermeneutics of facticity', promoted by Heidegger in SS 1923, has sought to fulfil 
the (H-1) requirement of ‘the hermeneutic breakthrough': to establish the structural 
unity of 'the knowing' and 'the known', i.e. the belonging together of life ('the 
known') and understanding ('the knowing'). 
For prima facie reasons, Heidegger has given an obviously different definition 
of hermeneutics from that of Dilthey. Yet, in his actual formulation of 
'hermeneutics of facticity', Heidegger owes a lot to Dilthey. The Diltheyan idea— 
279 Heidegger, Ontology: the Hermeneutics of Facticity, 14. 
Ontology: the Hermeneutics of Facticity, 11. 
137 
that the immanent teleology of spiritual life as being productive of meaning in its 
course of development—has been incorporated into the idea of the hermeneutic 
function of possibilities disclosure. Since a comprehensive analysis of the Diltheyan 
contribution on this connection can be rather lengthy, for the time being, I will keep 
to two mutually referred features of the disclosive hermeneutic function for 
comparison, i.e., the futural tendency of possibilities disclosure and the 
disclosiveness of meaning. These two features refer us back to Dilthey's analysis 
of psychic life as a 'productive system', shown at the beginning of this section. But, 
before turning back to it, let's consider the point of 'the category of purpose' in 
Dilthey. 
On working through the real categories of life in Drafts for a Critique of 
Historical Reason, Dilthey comes up with 'the category of purpose' which arises 
when we face the future and commit ourselves to projective attitude towards 
possibilities or a directedness at a goal. Dilthey refers to the representation of 
purpose as ‘the emergence of an intention to actualize something that was not 
already part of reality.''^' The possibilities contained in it are not abstract or logical, 
but are concretely connected with the present values. Values differentiate 
themselves into various plausible forgoing possibilities. Thus, in life, the future is 
presented 'through the imaginative consideration of its possibilities and through 
activity that frames purposes for itself in light of these possibilities.珊 The futural 
tendency of psychic life is intended actualisation of possibilities. It is comparable to 
the disclosive function of concrete possibilities in Heideggerian hermeneutics. 
281 SW 3: 224. 
SW 3: 252. 
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On the other hand, life is meaningful 'insofar as an act or some external event 
committing us to the future took place; or insofar as a plan to guide us into the 
future was adopted; or insofar as such a plan was carried out.'^^^ The teleological 
tendency renders life the efficacy to 'project' meanings upon the factual instances of 
the world, which is always already there, being significant to my life-concern. Life-
course is a ‘productive process' of mental expressions and 'products' that are 
intelligible as norms, values and goals. They are held to be meaningful to life. 
Every present instance of lived experience produces meaningful connections upon 
the past values and the future realizable goals. Therefore, as a 'productive system', 
psychic life is actually productive of meaning. This character of life fulfills what 
Heidegger intends for the meaning-disclosive aspect of hermeneutics. 
However, 'the productive system of life' means its being capable of producing 
spiritual products, and interpretation of life has to proceed upon these 
objectifications of life. For Heidegger, the self-interpretation of facticity does not 
turn facticity into an object to be interpreted. Rather, the being of interpretation 
belongs to the facticity and, thus, hermeneutics is constitutive of the experience of 
factical life (c.f. Dilthey: the interpretive moment of lived experience.) 
(ii) Expressive formation of concepts 
In KNS, there is a pre-theoretical, pre-reflective cognizance described as ‘a 
serene dedication' and 'moving in the regions of natural experience' in which 
283 SW 3: 253. 
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‘natural situation is not d i s t u r b e d . I t is s a primordial kind of experiential 
'intuition' concomitant in factical life that enables life 'to know' and 'to be known' 
both 'in and for itself. It is known without drawing upon anything in the situational 
context or world character of life by means of objectification. Rather, it is known 
by means of making explicit (interpreting) what has been caught in the pre-reflective 
experiential intuition (understood).^^^ 
It now becomes clear that the Heideggerian line of hermeneutics depends on the 
possibility of certain kind of pre-reflective existential knowing that goes with the 
streaming life as the basis of making anything about life itself conceptually known. 
It brings us back immediately to the insight that Dilthey holds upon the distinction 
between Erkenntnis and Wissen of life. 
‘All science, all philosophy is experiential,' as Dilthey states.^^^ Insofar as the 
knowledge of human science is concerned, it has to base its coherence and validity 
on its authentic origin of experience, which is distilled of any theoretical make-up. 
For Dilthey, the origin lies in the lived experiential context of human consciousness. 
In this dimension, he mentions the two moments of objective necessity of knowledge. 
One lies in the evidence which adheres to properly completed thought processes, 
and the other is contained in the character of the reflexive awareness of reality in a 
lived experience.^" From the two moments springs the two forms of 'knowledge' 
with definite characterization that is obliterated in English translation. 
Knowledge (Erkenntnis) cannot go behind life, of which it is a function. Life 
2拟 Heidegger, To\vards the D^nition of Philosophy, 179. 
283 Readers may refer to ch. 6 section (b) ii for detailed discussion. 
挪 SW 1: 493. 
SW 3: 28. 
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always remains the presupposition of knowledge, i.e., of, the consciousness or 
knowledge (Wissen) contained in life. As a presupposition of knowledge (des 
Erkennens) itself, life is not analyzable by knowledge {Erkenntnis). Thus the 
foundation that necessarily contains the presuppositions of all knowledge is life 
itself— the totality and fullness and power of l ifers 
Here Dilthey distinguishes the immediate knowledge {Wissen) of life from 
knowledge derived from conceptualisation {Erkenntnis). He also asserts, That 
which we know (Wissen) primarily and objectively is psychic life.' 'It is the 
medium of all experience and knowledge—the lasting, unshakeable, impenetrable 
ground of experiencing, thinking, and k n o w i n g . S o , no matter how many 
different kinds of Erkenntnis are possibly drawn from certain aspects of life, yet, the 
Wissen of life in its unity has always and already been there. Accordingly, what 
human sciences seek is to penetrate through the objective necessity of 
conceptualisation into that of living reality. Thus, the basis of human sciences is 
founded upon ‘the reflexive awareness of a psychic state in its wholeness and its 
rediscovery in re-experiencing.''^ The existence of such 'living-awareness' makes 
for the possibility of 'life grasping life.' The completion of human sciences relies 
ultimately on thoughtful conceptualisation of what has been grasped in the psychic 
nexus of life. 
However, from the pre-reflective knowledge of life (Wissen) to conceptual 
knowledge of life {Erkenntnis), or from 'lived experience' to 'conceptual 
2肪 SW 1: 489. 
289 SW 1: 490. 
2卯 S W 3 : 158. 
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interpretation' of life, Dilthey includes an intermediary moment by which spiritual 
life manifests and objectifies itself into 'expressions.' This is the triadic formula of 
Diltheyan hermeneutics: lived experience—expressions—understanding. Yet, it is 
interesting to find the Dilthey-Heidegger connection here. Though Heidegger 
deplores the epistemic methodological approach to hermeneutics, his ontological 
hermeneutics has virtually pre-empted Diltheyan insights. Let's go over it from the 
side of knowledge first. 
Dilthey distinguishes the difference between knowledge of life: Erkenntnis and 
Wissen. While conceptual knowledge of life {Erkenntnis) that presupposes 
immediate knowledge of life {Wissen) holds for Diltehy as the proper task of human 
sciences, conceptual knowledge of life holds for Heidegger as interpretive moment 
connecting to what is immediately understood. Wissen and Erkenntnis relate to each 
other, for Heidegger, not as epistemological presupposition, but as constitutive 
moments of hermeneutics. Such possibility can be accounted for from the side of 
experience. 
In Dilthey, reflexive awareness of lived experience is intrinsic in life-course. 
It makes immediate knowledge of life possible, prior to the distinction of self/world, 
and subject/object. This quality of 'knowing' is what Heidegger seeks for his 
'hermeneutic intuition' in KNS, which is called 'existential knowing' in SSI923, 
and is ultimately developed into 'the understanding of Being' {Seinverstandnis) in 
BT. Heidegger also aptly captures the Diltheyan claim of an interpretive moment in 
life-experience.291 He renders the pre-reflective moment of understanding and the 
Readers may refer to ch. 3 section c (i) on the discussion of 'Elementary Form of Understanding.‘ 
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conceptual interpretive moment conjointly constitutive of our existential experience. 
Ill its Heideggerian vein, life-experience becomes the expressive formations of the 
tendencies of concrete life-situations, the ever-activating context of significance and 
meaning which expresses or interprets itself in terms of motivational tendencies. 
Expressiveness has the sense of expressing lived experiences or comportments 
through meaning. Now what is understood pre-reflectively is the sense, or 
significance of life-contexts, and the interpretive experience is to bring it to 
conceptual expressiveness of meaning. Thus, the hermeneutic concepts are 
expressions of sense arising from experiential contexts of life (the hermeneutic 
situation). Such expressive concepts have a different structural form from concepts 
that order objects by means of subsumptive generalisations. Understanding gives 
the phenomenological concept of essence another sense than that of a generic 
universal 严 
In fact, in WS 1919-20 and SS 1920, Heidegger was particularly obsessed 
with the problem of ‘intuition and expression.' The problem was derived from the 
neo-Kantian objections, as mentioned in KNS, against the accessibility and 
expressibility of immediate experience. Rickert points out that, given the irrational 
nature of the fluidic heterogeneous continuum of life, the rational use of 
conceptualisation is powerless to capture directly the living reality. For Natorp, 
conceptual description presupposes a certain kind of concept-formation that involves 
generalization, abstraction and theorization. Description, as knowledge of facts, is 
already objectifying and is impossible to avoid theorization. Thus, there is no 
immediate apprehension of e x p e r i e n c e d Heidegger not only establishes 
饥 Kisiel, Genesis, 121 & 123. 
Readers may refer to ch. 5 for detailed discussion. 
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'hermeneutic intuition' or 'understanding' as the possibility of immediate 
apprehension of experience, he also indicates an alternative function of concept-
formation, which is expressive of the immediate experiential apprehension. Such 
expressions of life do not draw upon life as objects for generalization, but draws 
upon 'the sense of life' immediately understood and lays it bare in terms of 
meaningful explicitness. Expressiveness of life becomes interpretive expressiveness 
of facticity. Now, while criticising Diltheyan hermeneutics as interpreting 
expressions or objectifications of life, Heidegger finally seizes upon the triadic 
formula of lived experience-expression-understanding and plays it out again on an 
ontological plane. Hermeneutics is rendered ontological insofar as the being of 
interpretation belongs to the being of facticity, i.e.'hermeneutics o/faciticity.' 
After all, Heidegger succeeds in giving a breakthrough to the (H-2) 
requirement. Having affirmed the structural unity of 'knowing' and ‘the known' and 
rendered the unity as constitutive of facticity, Heidegger further ensures the 
descriptive concepts to be derived from the expression of the facticity itself and not 
from other fore-conception sources. The living character of these expressive 
concepts requires that they are non-objectifying, nor generalizing, but expressive of 
senses and meanings in terms of the motivated tendency of factical life. 
(iii) Formal indication 
Here we are led to the third related question: how are such non-objectifying 
concepts, which are expressive of senses and meanings, possible and like? The (H-
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3) requirement of hermeneutic breakthrough now comes to the front, and the answer 
for it lies at 'formal indication.’ 
According to Kisiel's study, Heidegger's initial adoption of 'formal 
indication' meant to get at and express the factic. His habilitation work on The 
Doctrine of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus，was governed by what Duns 
Scitus called haecceitas (thisness), in which Heidegger found 'a greater and finer 
proximity {haecceitas) to real life, its multiplicity and potential.' It held for him the 
full identification of the factic. In a letter to Lowith on 20 August, 1927, after the 
publication of BT, Heidegger remarked upon his early philosophical attempt: 
The problems of facticity exist for me no less than in my Freiburg beginnings, 
only much more radically, and now in the perspectives which even in Freiburg 
were guiding me. ...I first had to go all out after the fact/c in order to make 
facticity into a problem at all. Formal indication critique of the customary 
doctrine of the a priori, formalization and the like, all of that is still for me 
there [in BT] even though I do not talk about them now严 
It indicated a strong feeling for the investigation of the concreteness of life as well 
as for the need of a formal means to express it. Thus, what happened in KNS was 
in fact a double breakthrough, not only to facticity but also the 'formally indicative' 
approach to that f a c t i c i t y ^ The promise of a hermeneutic breakthrough is fulfilled 
only insofar as the possibility of formal indication is demonstrable as a means to 
catch onto the concrete life and describe it formally without concretising and 
objectifying it in advances. 'Formal' here refers to the ‘how，，rather than ‘what’，of 
factical life. The opposite of ‘formal’ here is ‘concrete，，instead of 'informal.' 
2射 Quoted from Kisiel, Genesis�19. 
See the overall discussion in Genesis, 19-20. 
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In chapter 6 section b (i), I have illustrated how the insight of 'the immanent 
teleology of life' in Dilthey may have been incorporated into 'the pre-worldly' in 
KNS, which was later developed into thematized investigation of ‘the movedness of 
factical life' in WS 1921-22. One of the essential ways to forge such Diltliey-
Heidegger connection is by means of what Heidegger calls in KNS, ‘the formally 
objective', which is afterwards called ‘formal indication'. 'The formally objective' 
refers to 'something' that resides in the fullness of life as an original happening of 
meaningful vividness and kinesis. The 'pre-worldly something’ is experienceable as 
moments of vectorial impetus or motivational tendencies of life. ‘The formally 
objective' makes a certain description of 'the structure of life' possible without 
inducing interruption of the life-relation, de-vivification of life-event, or theoretical 
fixing and freezing of what can be experienced.^^^ In Dilthey, the immanent 
purposiveness or teleology of life' not only has suggested what Heidegger aims for, 
i.e., the tendential dynamic of life, its characterization has also included what 
Heidegger requires of ‘the formally objective.' T h e immanent teleology' is 
'formal' as it points to 'how' life is led and experienced (i.e. teleologically), which 
has not yet broken into anything worldly. Thus, it should not be counted in terms of 
factual content. It is ‘objective，as the teleological tendency is always there in and 
for life, irrespective of whether there is a definite goal or not. Following Dilthey, 
Heidegger is able to grasp the tendential character of life and develop it into the 
actualization- sense of factical life. 
Apart from the actualisation-sense, the relation-sense of 'world'—with regard 
to its 'formally objective' character— can also be traced back to its Diltheyan source. 
241 Heidegger, Towurds the Definition of Philosophy, 179. 
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The world holds to life as the source of psychic content. In this sense, world 
appears in terms of content-sense. Besides, the world as psychic content relates to 
life by means of psychic attitude. In this sense, world appears to be relational to life. 
Thus, the world-content is psychically relational. Yet, both the content-sense and 
relation-sense of world, should be understood as 'how' of life, and by no means 
identified with the objectivity of material determination or any definitely determined 
sense of reality. 
The characterization of the senses of world in Heidegger in WS 1921-22 has 
the same detour. Heidegger states that the phenomenological category 'world,' 
immediately names what is lived, the content aimed at in living, that which life 
holds to. But just like content-sense of world in the case of Dilthey, the what here 
does not designate some incidentally chosen particular reality严 Furthermore, the 
corresponding content obtains its full sense of ‘world’ insofar as 'life' is understood 
in its relational sense, the rich and manifold referential ity to what-ntss of the 
world.298 The content-sense of world is, thus, also relational to life. The content-
sense and the relation-sense of the world belong to each other, and both refer to the 
‘how’ of l i f e， 
Adhering to Dilthey，s view on the dynamic nature of life-course and the 
distinction between ‘what’ and 'how' of life, we are drawn closer to the real 
intention of 'formal indication.' In WS 1921-22, Heidegger is anxious to push 
297 This is reflected in the expression in speech that ‘life，and 'world' is used interchangeably: e.g.'to 
go out into life，，'out into the world'; 'to live totally in one's world，，'totally in one's life.' World is 
the basic category of the content-sense in the phenomenon, life. See Heidegger, Phenomenological 
Interpretations of Aristotle, 6 5 . 
Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, 65. 
2卯 Readers may refer to chapter 6 section b (ii) for detailed discussion on 'life and world.‘ 
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forward the internalizing direction of factical life to be understood as encountering, 
experiencing, understanding and appropriating. Life so understood is, meanwhile, 
also an event of actual is ing (or disclosing) life possibilities. The elucidation of 
factical life phenomenon, thus, cannot proceed by means of generalizing and 
objectifying the ‘whatness’ of life. Instead, it entails a 'formal' approach to the 
‘how’ of life, 'toward actual is ing the maturation of an original fulfillment of what 
was indicated.’ 
The definitory content is such that it refers to the 'how' of a genuine encounter, 
determination, constitution, formation. These lie in the actualized in-forming 
[Ein-bildung] of the full phenomenon. ...tending 'intensively' and genuinely 
toward actualization, the genuine phenomena are determined in a decisive 
w a y， 
One must not misidentify the ‘formal’ with 'form', and 'indication' with its 
'content'. The ‘formal’ has the 'approach-character', which refers to or indicates 
the direction, i.e., pre-delineates the way or approach toward the d e t e r m i n a t i o n， 
The theme of 'formal indication' is, among early Heidegger lectures, most 
intensively discussed in WS 1920-21 Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion. 
It relates closely to the overall project of hermeneutic phenomenology. 
'Phenomenon' can be made clear only by means of formal indication. In order to 
clarify the case, we need to go back to the original sense of txptnencing and what 
is txpcrienced in phenomenon: (1) according to the original 'what, ‘ that is 
experienced therein (content sense); (2) according to the original 'how,，in which it 
Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, 27. 
Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, 27. 
^ Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, 27. 
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is experienced (relation sense); and (3) according to the original 'how,，in which the 
relational meaning is enacted (or actualized) (actualization sense).鄉 These three 
directions of meaning (the meaning of content, relation, and enactment) do not 
simply stand next to one another. ‘Phenomenon’ is a totality of sense in these three 
directions. ‘Phenomenology’ is the explication of this totality of sense. It gives 
the ' A o r o r ' of the phenomena, ' A o r o t ' in the sense of a ‘verbum 
internum" (not in the sense of a logical abstraction.)^^ 
As 'directions' of meaning, the relation and actualization (or enactment) of the 
phenomenon is not determined in advance. The phenomenon is kept in abeyance 
and the meaning of the links is kept pending. The methodic use of a sense, which is 
conducive to phenomenological explication, is called 'formal indication.' 
Its task is to prefigure the direction of this explication. It points the way and 
guides the deliberation. The phenomena are viewed on the basis of the 
bearing of the formally indicating sense. But even though it guides the 
phenomenological deliberation, content-wise it has nothing to say. 
Methodological considerations must make it clear how the formal 
indication...interjects no preconceived opinions into the problems, and in no 
way prejudices the content of the explication^， 
Now, the explication of phenomenon dictates the language of formal indication. 
The ‘indication’ should indicate the constellation of phenomena in advance and in 
such a way that the meaning of its link is kept pending. The indication is formal as, 
Martin Heidegger, The Phenomenology qf Religious Life�translated by Matthias Fritsch and 
Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei (Bloomiiigton, IN : Indiana University Press, 2004)，43. 
Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 43. 
3�5 Kisiel, Genesis, 164. 
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concerning the content of the subject matter, it has no pre-established path of 
determination or of consideration marked by a fixed disposition. Thus, the language 
of formal indication is non-objectifying. The opposite of 'formal' in formal 
indication is not 'informal' but 'the concreteness of content'. It holds to 'the 
concreteness of content' as being free of any mode of pre-determination. 
Accordingly, it has nothing to do with generalization and objectification. Keeping 
the relational-dynamic phenomenon of life to view, particularly the 'how-
experiencing', the 'formal' is referred as something relational and the 'indication' 
indicates beforehand the relation of the phenomenon with its relational meaning held 
in abeyance.306 Heidegger particularly warns us here tliat, 
One must prevent oneself from taking it for granted that its relational meaning 
is originally theoretical, ...There is no insertion into a material domain, but 
rather the opposite: the formal indication is a defense [Abwehr], a preliminary 
securing, so that the enactment-(actualizing-) character still remains free?。？ 
The formally indicative explication of phenomenon, thus, helps expose the 
lawfulness of the streaming factical life without ossifying it by any means of prior 
determination. The neo-Kantian challenges eventually have a forceful response in 
Heidegger's formal indication. And finally, the employment of formal indication as 
a philosophic language renders philosophy, in Heidegger, to re-emerge in a 
radically different outlook from its traditional sense. 'The philosophy— in this way 
in general, fixed and atemporal, represented in some vague manner—does not 
exist.’細 
知6 Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 43-4. 
斯 Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 44. 
郷 Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, 50. 
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Neither is there the philosophy in general as a living philosophy, nor is there 
only one single situation, along with its one basic sense, out of which the 
comportment of philosophising could be actualised. The indication emphasizes 
precisely that it should remain open, that other nexuses of life can provide 
access to philosophy and can bring to maturity the actualisation of 
philosophising. 309 
Coming back to ‘the hermeneutic breakthrough', we find that 
‘phenomenology，ultimately relies on the formally indicative explication of 
phenomenon, which is an ‘understanding’ explication out of the facticity itself. 
Thus, formal indication is itself hermeneutical. The possibility of formally 
indicative concepts enables the final accomplishment of 'the hermeneutic 
breakthrough', and, as in Heidegger's early endeavour, it also illuminates the 
internal connection between phenomenology and hermeneutics. 'Hermeneutics of 
facticity' signifies ultimately a hermeneutic turn on phenomenology, an 
advancement that is led up to BT. And yet, the motive for such advancement can be 
traced back originally to Diltehy's philosophy, especially his objectionable attempt 
in reconciling his two theses: ‘Behind life thought cannot go，and T o understand 
life in terms of itself.' 




In recent decades there has aroused an interest in Heidegger's early path of 
thought leading to BT. One of the strands of thought concerns 'hermeneutics of 
facticity', which is accentuated by John D. Caputo. He argues, that in the early 
Heideggerian thematic of bring philosophy back to the rough ground of 'facticity', 
hermeneutics is the leading theme which must remain faithful to the 'difficulty of 
life.’ He notes that: 
The first Freiburg project, entitled 'hermeneutics of facticity,' took the form of 
a two-pronged retrieval: on the one hand, of the factical lifeworld of the New 
Testament communities, which lay sedimented beneath the dogmatic 
ontotheology of the tradition; and, on the other hand, of the factical lifeworld 
of Aristotelian ethics, which lay sedimented beneath the metaphysics of 
ousia. 
However, the early thematic of 'hermeneutics of facticity' was betrayed by Gadamer, 
who reinterpreted this hermeneutics in deeply Hegelian and Platonic tones which 
ultimately undermined the radicality of what Heidegger then called ‘facticity.，�“ 
310 John D. Caputo, Deniythologizing Heidegger (Blcxmiington: Indiana University Press, 1993)，4. 
Roy Martinez eel., The Ven Idea cf Radical Hermeneutics (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities 
Press, 1997), 1. ‘ 
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conclusion here is not only the gist of the essential objective of 'hermeneutics' that 
he provides. But just for that very objective, which developed out of the thematic of 
‘facticity’ in early Heidegger, the remarkable contribution of Dilthey philosophy is 
often either marginalized or totally neglected among commentators and critics. In 
introduction, I have pointed out that Gadamer under-evaluates Dilthey's influence on 
Heidegger by unilaterally emphasising Dilthey's failure to reconcile the 
incompatibility of the Cartes ian ism and his Lebensphilosophie. Caputo also sees a 
certain Dilthey/Heidegger connection as he rightly spots that, '[E]verything in these 
early Freiburg lectures turns on the notion of 'factical life,' a concept taken from 
Dilthey which signifies concrete, historical existence.' But, the credit to Dilthey is 
immediately superseded by that of Aristotle when Caputo says, for Heidegger, 
'factical life is determined in Aristotelian terms as something self-moving, a 'being-
moved' in itself, that whose movement proceeds from itself {kinesis, Bewegtheif)严 
It is in line with Heidegger's ingenious interpretive reading of Aristotle's 
Nichomachean Ethics and Metaphysics that Caputo refers Heideggerian sense of 
'facticity' as 'the difficulty of (kinetic) life.' 
In fact, the philosophical motive of leading philosophy back to the rough 
ground of life is already nascent in Dilthey's Lebensphilosophie which, to certain 
extent, anticipates Heidegger's thematic of facticity. The question is how the reality 
of life is to be taken, as what sort of being. Hence, he remarks, 
If we are to avoid half-measures in settling the question of the ontological 
character of the relevant life-nexus, ...then we are compelled to take up the 
312 Caputo, Detmhologizing Heidegger, 44. 
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question of the objective and the ontological character of 'life., The Being of 
life as its ‘ fac t ic i ty .�" 
Concerning the source of 'facticity' for Heidegger, different scholars have different 
reports. Kisiel finds in SS 1920 the first co-opting of the neo-Kaiitian term 
‘facticity’ for Heidegger's own technical use. Contrary to the neo-Kantian, the 
'problem of facticity' is not that of the transcendental determination of the individual 
out of ultimate logical laws, but rather a primal reality ever to be experienced by 
vital participation in the actualisation of life-experience/^'* Gadamer points out that 
it was Rothe, in the dispute regarding faith in the Resurrection, who initially used 
the word 'facticity'. When this word was taken over by Heidegger, it remained 
fused with the concept of life. ‘Facticity means the fact [Faktum] in its being a fact 
[Faktum-sein], that is, that behind which and back of which one cannot go.'^ ^^ In 
Diltliey's works, the term 'facticity' is used, though not prominently. It variously 
means 'the conditioning relations (of existence)', 'the dead factical necessities of life 
(as contrast to the loftiest spiritual life)', ‘the matrix of race, space and power-
relations', e t c . I n general, it means the necessary conditioning relations of human 
existence. This sense of ‘facticity’ is used also in connection with history尸？ and the 
abstraction of judgment in cognition is inappropriate to grasp its nature. In fact, the 
best way to grasp the Diltheyan sense of ‘facticity’ and its influence on Heidegger is 
to relate it back to the original givenness of life for its 'necessary conditioning 
Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, 85. For Heidegger, the early 
philosophical mission is 'to go all out after the fectz'c in order to make f-ACticity into a problem at all.' 
(Kisiel, Genesis�19.) The ‘fectic，here means what he later called 'fectical life', and ‘fecticity’ 
refers to the categorial connectedness of fectical life as a whole. In tact, the philosophical motive is 
maintained in BT, in which Heidegger says, ‘the roots of the existential analytic, on its part, are 
ultimately existentiell. that is, ontical.‘ {BT34/ HI3) 
Kisiel, Genesis�136. 
See James Risser , Hermeneutics and the Voice of the Other : Re-reading Gadamer's Philosophical 
Hermeneutics (Albany : SUNY Press, 1997)，41. 
See SW 3: 307/ 328. 
See SW 1: 153. 
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relations.' As shown in fore-going chapters, the synchronic dimension (i.e., 
relational dimension of life) and the diachronic dimension (i.e., the temporal-
dynamic dimension of life) of the 'necessary conditioning relations' in Dilthey are 
well appropriated in Heidegger's conception of 'factical life.' 
Accordingly, the Dilthey/Heidegger connection is traceable decisively to the 
ultimate Diltheyan insight of arriving at the synchronic and diachronic dimensions of 
life by getting at the ‘how’ of life— rather than the 'what'— as the 'objective reality'. 
The significance of the theme is most precisely re-formulated in WS 1920-21. 
I experience myself tactically in what I do and suffer, what confronts me and 
what I accomplish, in my concern and disregard, my states of depression and 
elevation, and the like, where I am always caught up in the environment, 
captured and captivated by the surrounding world.^^^ 
As a result, I am kept busy with an astonishing variety of things in the course of a 
day, and totally absorbed in the 'what'—the experienced content. Thus, there is a 
'falling tendency of the factical life experience, which constantly threatens to slip 
into the objective, and out of which we must still retrieve the p h e n o m e n a . F o r 
Heidegger, the falling tendency can be lifted and reversed by attending to the 'how' 
of experiencing. Th i s how of experiencing the worlds is the relational sense of 
factic life experience (cf. ‘the relational dimension of life' in Dilthey). It relates 
'the how of experiencing to the what of its experienced content. • In fact, such 
relation between the ‘how’ and the 'what' of life is well demonstrated in Dilthey's 
original access to the givenness of life (cf. chapter 2). The 'phenomenological 
训 Kisiel, Genesis, 155. 
319 Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 44. 
3如 Kisiel, Genesis, 155. 
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beginnings' in KNS are such beginnings as to disclose phenomenologically the 
'how' of experiencing-cum-appropriating. Dilthey's research of ‘the original 
givenness of life', with respect to the 'how' of experiencing, has virtually opened 
the door for a new possibility of phenomenology. The phenomenological 
investigation in Heidegger now adheres to the phenomena of 'factical life' and 
explicates its worldly-relational and temporal-dynamic characters ('the worldly' and 
'the pre-worldly' in KNS) by means of formal indication. This vein of connection is 
best represented by Heidegger's proclaimed indebtedness to Dilthey for his 
emphasis of the historical nature of human existence.^^^ History, for them both, is 
the experiential phenomenon that validates the relational (or meaningful) and 
temporal characters of life. 
Tapping into the phenomenological sphere of the 'how' of experiencing, 
unlocked by Dilthey, Heidegger in the Freiburg period engaged himself with the 
investigation of factical life in internalizing direction, proclaiming himself to be in 
obvious opposition to neo-Kantianism and the camp of life-philosophy in vogue at 
that time. The latter led the investigation of life in an externalising direction, i.e., 
at the level of ‘what’，so that life was rendered objectified and theorized from the 
start. The flux character of life was hampered and the 'how' of experiencing was 
lost in view. What remained was the experienced content, being subjected to 
various possible conceptual classifications. Thus, 'the phenomenological 
beginnings' for Heidegger is a decisive switch of subject matter from the objectivity 
of concrete life to the formal objectivity of life. By means of formal indication, the 
formal objectivity of life is explicated as meanings disclosed out of the motivated 
321 See the discussions in BT section 77 and ‘Wilhelm Dilthey's Research and the Struggle for a 
Historical Worldview', in Heidegger, Supplements, ch. 10. 
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tendencies of life itself (cf. the disclosure of Being in BT). The explication, by such 
means, intensifies the flux character of factical life in its purity and preserves its 
various possible senses of actualization, before and beyond its ossification into the 
innumerable and relatively stable ontic, positive, empirical and theoretical forms of 
‘life’. 
From Dilthey's 'objective reality' of psychic structural nexus to the 'formally 
objective' in KNS, Heidegger finally leads the 'how' of experiencing into 
existential-ontological inquiry. The formula put down in WS 1921-22 is 'existence 
=being in and through life.，Life here means the phenomenon of 'factical life' or 
the ‘how’ of experiencing, in terms of which the various possible senses of existence 
are actual ised into concrete meaning in each case I am— the 'what' of the 
experienced. All 'what，is experienced and bears the character of significance as 
derived from the ‘how，of experiencing. The character of significance comes about 
not in epistemological or theoretical terms. I experience or live all my life-
situations in this non-epistemological and non-theoretical sort of significance. 
However, the variegated "how" of relating to the variety of things in daily life 
never comes to our awareness. Factical life experience is remarkably “ indifferent" 
to its relational way of experiencing. It becomes totally absorbed in the what of the 
world, and how to control it, and forgets the how. As a result, the actualizing sense 
of the various possible meanings of life will be theoretically regionalized and 
demarcated into fixated essence and pre-determined meanings. Phenomenology, 
accordingly, has the objective to "lift up" the falling tendency of life and awake us 
from the forgetful ness of being—the original ways we are. But coming back to the 
origin of the philosophical motive, the originary access to life which has been 
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marked out by Dilthey proves to be one of the most important intellectual sources, 
especially the temporal-historical dimension of phenomenology. Such connection is 
most proclaimed in Kassel lectures: 
We will see authentic historical reality is human Dasein itself, and we also will 
see what kinds of structures human Dasein possesses. The fundamental 
character of Dasein is nothing other than time. On the basis of this character of 
time，we will make clear that human being is historical. ...From the historicity 
of Dasein, we will return to Dilthey in order to inquire, in a critical way, into 
the whole of his w o r k尸 
In this line of access, Heidegger comes to grips with Dilthey's fundamental meaning 
of Erlebnis, by which human life is no more counted as biological or psychological 
phenomena. The characteristic of Erlebnis lies at its underlying temporality and 
historicity, in which life is capable of self-appropriation. To ask what 'life' is 
conceptually is amount to asking how life appropriates i t s e l f严� U l t i m a t e l y , it 
requires a new, non-theoretical method to establish the science of Erlebnis, which 
was attempted since K N S尸 < This line of consideration leads us to the overall 
discussion of the hermeneutic connection between Dilthey and the young Heidegger. 








Above, I have reviewed conclusively the connection between Dilthey and the 
young Heidegger from the phenomenological perspective. Below, I shall conclude 
the connection from the hermeneutic perspective: how the 'hermeneutics of facticity' 
paves the way toward a ‘hermeneutics of Dasein' and the place of Dilthey in the 
development. 
Concealed in Dilthey's scientifically intended language of Erlebnis analysis is 
another insight concerning the ‘interpretive moments' of our practical lives and the 
existentiality of ‘understanding’. His analysis of Verstehen illustrates that 
understanding and interpretation are inseparable from our daily practical life. 
Virtually, we live or exist 'understandingly.' The 'interpretive moments' are 
constitutive of our living reality. However, the final aim for Dilthey is to 
consolidate the cognitive foundation of understanding, and to ultimately establish 
hermeneutics as the method of human sciences. It is in this direction that he carries 
on his analysis to a higher form of understanding, by which hermeneutics is finally 
identified with the interpretation of objectified texts of the spiritual world. For 
Dilthey, life as a 'productive system，objectifies itself in structures of meaning. The 
task of hermeneutics is to translate these objectifications of life back into the 
spiritual life. It is the epistemological basis for all knowing of the spiritual world. 
Insofar as the objective, textual givenness of understanding is permanently fixed and 
scientifically ascertained, hermeneutics can then be developed into rule-guided 
procedures corresponding to the nature of the texts. The scientific status of 
hermeneutics can well be established as a result. However, his ideal is considerably 
undermined by the ‘subjective’ side of understanding as the success of interpretation 
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entails personal sympathetic quality of re-experiencing. ‘The ultimate sureness 
residing in this re-experiencing cannot be replaced by any cognitively tested 
inferences that explicate the process of u n d e r s t a n d i n g . A f t e r all, the limiting 
certainty of the method of Verstehen attests to the truth that a methodological mode 
of apprehension is ultimately inappropriate to grasp the temporal-dynamic 
phenomenon of life. 
As a methodical proceeding of cognition that turns life into textual objects of 
interpretation, ‘understanding’ ultimately departs from the original happening of 
life-course. It finally renders objectification of life, thus, ossification of the flux (or 
historical) character of life. According to the line of critique illustrated in the book-
review of Jaspers' work, right after the characterization of the two directions that 
'life' is understood, Heidegger comments on Dilthey as in him, “life is approached 
as the fundamental reality, and all phenomena are seen to lead back to it, so that 
everything and anything is understood as an objectification and manifestation ‘of 
life.，"326 Heidegger ‘seemingly，tries to suggest that the Diltheyan way of tackling 
the problematic of life belongs to the externalizing direction, which Heidegger 
himself intends to repudiate. In fact, Heidegger's comment here is correct so far as 
Dilthey hermeneutic point of view is concerned, as in that formulation, it means to 
regionalize life and finally degrade it from event-life to object-life (or process-life). 
In order to give ‘understanding，a favour of scientific objectivity, Dilthey withdraws 
totally from the phenomenological sphere of lived experience and turns life into a 
productive system of objectifiable meaningful expressions. By splitting 
‘understanding，and event-life into the polarity of 'knowing' and 'the known', 
SW 3： 239. 
326 Heidegger, 'Comments on Karl Jaspers' Psychology of Worldviews,' Supplements, 81. 
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Dilthey has actually led himself astray from his own thesis— T o understand life in 
terms of itself. This is what Gadamer criticizes most severely the internal conflict 
between the nature of historical life and Cartesianism in Dilthey's problematic. The 
search for methodological certainty of Verstehen turns out to be a slim promise. 
However, when Heidegger intends to switch from the externalizing direction 
of understanding life to the internalizing, he lets himself be gravitated toward the 
variety insights of Diltheyan project of arriving at ‘the original givenness of life', 
particularly with regard to its relational sense as well as its historical-temporal sense. 
It is in this sense that Dilthey's Lebensphilosophie is greatly relevant to Heidegger's 
own problematic. However, concerning the nature and function of 'understanding' 
here, Dilthey and Heidegger have arrived at the crossroads at which they depart. 
For Heidegger, the solution for the problem confronting Dilthey lies at smoothing 
out the conflict between ‘the being of understanding' and ‘the being of factical life,' 
and finally rendering both belonging to each other. Giving up the cognitive mode of 
apprehension as a means to understand life, he goes for a kind of pre-reflective pre-
predicative mode of apprehension, which is inherent in factical life. In the 
tendential movement of factical life, such apprehension is motivated to express life 
itself. Such event of apprehension— which is called the event of appropriation 
[Ereignis] in KNS— is later developed into the 'hermeneutics of facticity'. 
Hermeneutics becomes the being of facticity, by which life expresses itself. It, thus, 
obtains an ontological spin. 
In the fore-going chapters I have illustrated how the precursor of 'hermeneutics 
of Dasein' — 'hermeneutics of facticity'—may have benefited from Dilthey's insights 
upon the interpretive moment of experience, first introduced in his exposition of the 
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elementary forms of understanding. And in the following conclusive remark, I 
would like to illuminate the contributions of Dilthey's philosophy in Heidegger's 
‘hermeneutics of Dasein’. Let us start with ‘the question of Being' [Seinsfrage]. 
Heidegger starts the discussion in BT with the question of Being. As Being 
is in every case the Being of some entity, we must make an entity— the inquirer-
transparent in his own Being. The direction of working it out has to proceed, first, 
by bringing forward the relevant entity—'Dasein', which each of us is; and, second, 
laying bare (interpreting) the meaning of Being by means of ‘the vague average 
understanding of Being ‘ [Seinsverstandnis] which Dasein is capable of?? Now, 
what is inquired about or made ‘known，is 'Being' and the possibility of 'knowing' 
about Being is 'the average understanding of Being. According to Heidegger, 
'Dasein understands itself in its Being', and 'with and through its Being, this Being 
is disclosed to it.， Thus, 'understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic 
of DaseinBeing.，Or, the former is constitutive of the latter. The explication of 
‘the known', i.e., Dasein's Being proceeds via the means of 'knowing' unique to 
Dasein, i.e., understanding of Being, which is itself constitutive of ‘the known'. It 
has made avail of the insight, developed in 'hermeneutics of facticity', out of the 
first requirement of ‘hermeneutic breakthrough—the pursuit of structural unity of 
‘the knowing，and ‘the k n o w n ，严 
Furthermore, the structural unity of 'understanding of Being' and 'the 
question of Being，paves the way for the elucidation of ‘the disclosedness of 
understanding, which is also the disclosedness of the world in terms of possibilities. 
327 See BT 25/ H5, 27/ H7 and 61/ H37. 
Readers may refer back to the discussion in ch. 7 section b (i). 
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In chapter 7 section b (ii), we have discussed the relation between motivational 
tendencies of life and its expressiveness in the young Heidegger. ‘Expressivenss，has 
the sense of expressing lived experiences or comportments through meaning and it 
assumes a hermeneutic dimension. What is understood pre-reflectively is the sense, 
or significance of life-contexts, and the interpretive experience is to bring it to 
conceptual expressiveness of meaning. In BT, the motivational tendential aspect of 
life is translated into the phenomenon of 'thrown projection' in which the 
disclosedness of understanding and interpretation proceed. Understanding has in 
itself the existential structure of 'projection. 
In the projecting of the understanding, entities are disclosed in their 
possibility. The character of the possibility corresponds, on each occasion, 
with the kind of Being of the entity which is understood. Entities within-the-
world generally are projected upon the world—that is, upon a whole of 
significance, to whose reference-relations concern, as Being-in-the-world, has 
been tied up in advance. When entities witliin-the-world are discovered along 
with the Being of Dasein—that is, when they have come to be understood— 
we say that they have meaning [Sinn]尸。 
Accordingly, 'understanding of Being', pre-reflective pre-predicative as it is, 'has 
been tied up in advance' with the entities within-the-world with regard to their 
reference-relations concern. It is effectual throughout 'the thrown projection'. 
When something within-the-world is encountered as such, the thing in question 
already has an involvement (thus, assumes significance and reference-relations 
concern; cf. Dilthey's ‘life-concern’ and ‘significance，）which is disclosed in our 
understanding of the world, and this involvement is one which gets laid out by the 
fir 1 8 5 / H 1 4 5 . 
firi92/H151. 
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interpretation."' Therefore, in the dynamic phenomenon of 'thrown projection' in 
which 'entities within-the-world are discovered along with the Being of Dasein，， 
'interpretation' means to draw to explicitness and intelligibility of what is 
‘understood’. Accordingly, “ {m\eaning is the 'upon-which' of a projection in terms 
of which something becomes intelligible as something; it gets its structure from a 
fore-having, a fore-sight, and a fore-conception. ”说 Interpretation, hence, is to lay 
bare intelligibly in terms of meaning of what we project upon the entities with-in-
the-world. 'Understanding' and 'interpretation' so understood in Heidegger's 
hermeneutics of Dasein have virtually pre-empted the Diltheyan triadic formula of 
lived experience-expression-understanding and plays it out again on an ontological 
plane in terms of the belonging togetherness of 'the Being of Dasein', 'thrown 
projection' and 'understanding of Being'. Hermeneutics is rendered ontological 
insofar as the being of interpretation belongs to the being of facticity in the young 
Heidegger, and belongs to the Being of Dasein in BT. 
The transformation of hermeneutics in Heidegger means, in the sense of my 
thesis concerned, to overcome the accusation that he makes upon Dilthey on his 
rendering objectification of life in interpretation. For Heidegger, working out 'the 
meaning of Being' by means of ‘understanding of Being' does not take 'the meaning 
of Being' as something objectifiable. Rather, ‘the meaning of Being' is held to be 
B r i 9 l / H 1 5 0 . 
Cf. the Diltheyan claim of an interpretive moment in life-experience, which renders the pre-
retlective iiionieiu of understanding and the conceptual interpretive moment conjointly constitutive ot 
our existential experience. In its Heideggerian vein, life-experience becomes the expressive 
fomiatioiis of the tendencies of concrete life-situatioiis, the ever-activating context of significance and 
meaning which expresses or interprets itself in terms of motivational tendencies. Expressiveness has 
the sense of expressing lived experiences or comportments through meaning. Now what is understood 
pre-retlectively is the seiise, or significance of life-contexts, and the interpretive experience is to bring 
it to conceptual expressiveness of meaning. See ch. 7 section b (ii) for the discussion. 
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the expressiveness of Being itself via 'understanding of Being'. Only already in 
'understanding of Being' and from the disclosedness of which are we able to work 
out the self-referring knowledge of Being. 
Now, according to the 'hermeneutic breakthrough' discussed in ch. 7，the 
possibility of such breakthrough lies at demonstrating the non-objectifying character 
of phenomenological description with respect to its hermeneutic expressions of 
meaning. In the young Heidegger, the method of description is called 'formal 
indication，. But the term is finally dropped in BT without stated reasons. However, 
it does not mean that the corresponding insights are dismissed. The explicata to 
which the analytic of Dasein gives rise, which are called 'existentialia' in B严,are, 
in fact, the 'formal meanings' of Dasein's existential constitution. The explicata are 
'meaningful' as they are projected from 'the understanding of Being', and are 
'formal' as they describe the phenomena of Dasein. For Heidegger, the signification 
of 'phenomenon' is conceived formally such that 'phenomenology' involves 
exhibiting 'how' an entity (i.e., Dasein) shows itself in itself.奶 In this vein, “the 
meaning of phenomenological description as a method lies in ‘interpretation”’ and 
‘the phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic in the primordial signification of the 
word.，"6 
As a radicalization of Dilthey's hermeneutic motive of 'understanding life in 
terms of i tself , Heidegger has actually made a 'phenomenological turn'. Here ‘the 
hermeneutic breakthrough' marked out in KNS is finally fulfilled in BT at the point 
where the phenomenological project and hermeneutic project meet. Once the 
BT 70/ H44. 
BT 59/ H35. Readers may refer to the discussion in fore-going section. 
B r 61-2/ H37. 
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phenomenological and ontological motives hidden in Dilthey's problematic are 
successfully tapped and released by Heidegger, the outlook of hermeneutics is totally 
transformed. By that means, he has eventually changed the Diltheyan thesis from 
T o understand life in terms of itself to 'It is in terms of life (or the Being of Dasein) 
that we understand.' With this revised thesis, Heidegger has finally succeeded in 




Wilhelm Dilthey: Selected Works, edited by Rudolf A. Makkreel & Frithjof Rodi 
(Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press.) 
Volume 1. 
Introduction to the Human Sciences (1989) 
Volume 3. 
The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences (1985) 
Volume 4 
Hermeneutics and the Study of History (1996) 
Volume 5 
Poetry and Experience (1985) 
W. Dilthey, Descriptive Psychology and Historical Understanding, translated by Richard 
M. Zaner and Kenneth L. Heiges (the Hague : Nijhoff, 1977.) 
Meaning in History; W. Dilthey's Thoughts on History and Society, 
edited and introduced by H.R Rickman (London, Allen and Unwin: 
1961. 
Pattern and Meaning in History; Thoughts on History and Society, edited & 
introduced by H. P. Rickman (Harper : New York, 1962) 
The Essence of Philosophy, trans, by Stephen A. Emery and William T. 
Emery (New York : AMS Press, 1969.) 
Charles R. Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism, (Ithaca : 
Cornell University Press, 1995.) 
H.A. Hodges, The Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey (Routledge & K. Paul: London, 1952.) 
167 
H. P. Rickman, Wilhelm Dilthey— Pioneer of the Human Studies, (London : Elek, 
1979.) 
Jacob Owensby, Dilthey and the Narrative of History, (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 
1994.) 
Michael Ermarth, Wilhelm Dilthey : the Critique of Historical Reason (Chicago : 
University of Chicago Press, 1978.) 
Ronald Bontekoe, Dimensions of the Hermeneutic Circle, (Atlantic Highlands, N.J . : 
Humanaties Press International, 1996.) 
Rudolf A. Makkreel, Dilthey——Philosopher of the Human Studies, (Princeton, N.J . : 
Princeton University Press, cl992.) 
Rudolf A. Makkreel and John Scanlon, Dilthey and Phenomenology (Pittsburgh, Pa.: 
Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology ； Washington, D.C: 
University Press of America, 1987.) 
T h e o d o r e P l a n t i n g a , Historical Understanding in the Thought of Wilhelm 
Dilthey, (Toronto ； Buffalo : University of Toronto Press, cl980.) 
Heidegger 
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson 
(Oxford : Blackwell, 1967.) 
，History of the Concept of Time : Prolegomena, translated by Theodore Kisiel, 
Bloomington : Indiana University Press, cl985. 
，Ontology: the Hermeneutics of Facticity, trans. By John van Buren 
(Bloomington, Ind. : Indiana University Press, cl999.) 
， Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into 
Phenomenological Research, translated by Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2001.) 
168 
’ Supplements ： from the Earliest Essays to Being and Time and Beyond, 
edited by John van Buren (Albany : State University of New York Press, 
2002.) 
，T h e Basic Problems of Phenomenology translated by Albert Hofttadter, 
(Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1982.) 
，The Concept of Time, translated by William McNeill (Blackwell Publisher, 
1992.) 
,The Phenomenology of Religious Life�translated by Matthias Fritsch and 
Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei (Bloomington, IN : Indiana University Press, 
2004.) 
Towards the Definition of Philosophy, translated by Ted Sadler (London ； 
New Brunswick, NJ, 2000.) 
Arleen B. Dallery and Charles E. Scott with P. Holley Roberts ed., Ethics and Danger : 
essays on Heidegger and Continental thought (Albany : State University of 
New York Press, 1992.) 
Christopher Macann ed., Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments, (London ； New 
York : Routledge, 1992.) 
Francois Raffoul and David Pettigrew ed., Heidegger and Practical Philosophy 
(Albany, N.Y. : State University of New York Press, 2002.) 
Frederick Elliston ed., Heidegger's Existential Analytic (The Hague : Mouton, 1978.) 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Heidegger's Ways, translated by John W. Stanley (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1994.) 
John van Buren, The Young Heidegger : Rumor of the Hidden King (Bloomington : 
Indiana University Press, 1994 .) 
Joseph J. Kockelmans, Heidegger's “Being and Time", (Washington, D.C. : Center for 
Advanced Research in Phenomenology : University Press of America, 1990.) 
169 
Joseph J. Kockelmans ed., A Companion to Martin Heidegger's “Being and Time", 
(Washington, D.C. : Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology : 
University Press of America, 1986.) 
Otto Poggeler, Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking, translated by Daniel Magurshak and 
Sigmund Barber (Atlantic Highlands, N.J. : Humanities Press International, 
1987.) 
Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren, Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in 
His Earliest Thought, (Albany : SUNY Press, 1994.) 
Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time, (Berkeley : University of 
California Press, 1993.) 
Heidegger's Way of Thought: Critical and Interpretative Signposts, edited 
by Alfred Denker and Marion Heinz (New York : Continuum, 2002.) 
William J.Richardson, Heidegger : Through Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague : 
M. Nijhoff, 1974.) 
General 
Brice R. Wachterhauser ed., Hermeneutics and Truth, (Evanston, 111. : Northwestern 
University Press, 1994.) 
Brice R. Wachterhauser ed., Hermeneutics and Modern Philosophy (Albany, N.Y. : State 
University of New York Press, 1986.) 
Edmund Husserl, Ideas : General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, translated by 
W.R. Boyce Gibson (New York : Collier Books, 1962.) 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd rev. ed., translation revised by Joel 
Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York : Continuum, 1994.) 
Heinrich Rickert, The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science : a Logical 
Introduction to the Historical Sciences, edited and translated by Guy Oakes 
(Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1986，） 
170 
Howard N. Tuttle, The Dawn of Historical Reason, (New York : P. Lang, 1994.) 
James Dicenso, Hermeneutics and the Disclosure of Truth, (Charlottesville : 
University Press of Virginia, 1990.) 
James Risser，Hermeneutics and the Voice of the Other : Re-reading Gadamer's 
Philosophical Hermeneutics (Albany : SUNY Press, 1997.) 
John D. Caputo, Demythologizing Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1993.) 
Joseph J. Kockelmans, Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology; a 
Historico-critical Study (Atlantic Highlands, N. J. : Humanities Press, 
1978.) 
Richard Palmer, Hermeneutics, (Evanston : Northwestern University Press, 1969.) 
Roy Martinez ed., The Very Idea of Radical Hermeneutics (Atlantic Highlands, N J . : 






. • • .
 .
 ？
 . . 
• ‘






































 : . . : — —
 ： .










































 . . •
 •
 .














 . . • /
 . . 々
 >
 . 
‘ . , 、
 . . . .
 . — —
















 ; ' . » • • 
\ ,,...
 : •






 . . • . . 〜 ， . . / . 、 〔 . .































































































. . . - • . . . 
、 .
 •


















； • . ： ： 玄 ‘ K 、 _ ^ , :
 ,
 - , ’ .
 “ ‘
 ’
 . . v
 : 「 ：
,：产. . . 
CUHK Libraries 
llilllill 
004279013 
